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Introduction
“...it is extremely likely [i.e. with at least 95% conﬁdence] that humans have exerted
a substantial warming inﬂuence on climate.” – Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Forster et al., 2007, p. 131)
“The ultimate objective of this Convention (...) is to achieve (...) stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” – Article 2 of United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
WiththecominginforceoftheKyotoProtocolinFebruary2005,anenvironmental-
economic policy of unprecedented scale became active. The Protocol lays binding
emissionlimitsforgreenhousegasesonagroupofmorethan30countries,respon-
sibleformorethan40%ofglobalcarbondioxideemissionsin1990. TheKyotoPro-
tocol, which is a protocol to the UNFCCC, assigns to these countries greenhouse
gas emission reduction targets.1 For example, the EU-15 should reduce its emis-
sions to 8% below its 1990 emissions, over the period 2008-2012. Effectively this
puts a ceiling on that country’s greenhouse gas emissions: although its economy is
1The group of countries subject to the Kyoto Protocol excludes the United States, who signed
the Kyoto Protocol but did not ratify it, and developing countries like China and India. In addition,
some of the countries that ratiﬁed the Protocol have smaller economies than in 1990, most notably
countries of the Former Soviet Union, and will in any case emit less greenhouse gases than allowed
under the Protocol.
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allowed to develop and grow the way it wants, emissions are not allowed to exceed
their target.2
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the dynamic effects that such a ceiling
on emissions has on the economy. Questions that will be answered include: What
is the effect of the emission ceiling on the optimal use of fossil fuels like coal, oil
and gas? To what extent will emissions of greenhouse gases be shifted from coun-
tries subject to the Kyoto Protocol to countries that did not ratify this treaty? What
is the role of carbon-saving technological change in this? Is announcement of cli-
mate policy, giving the economy time to prepare, always a good thing to do? Is the
productionstructureofdynamicquantitativemodelsforclimatepolicyadequately
modeled?
To place this thesis in the literature on the economics of climate change, we ﬁrst
presentabriefintroductionintotheliteratureontheeconomicsofclimatechange.
In section 1.1.1 we present a brief discussion of this. Then we move on to the lit-
erature on the design and consequences of climate policy in section 1.1.2. The
current thesis can be placed in this part of the literature on the economics of cli-
mate change. Section 1.1.3 gives a brief overview of the literature on the formation
ofinternationalenvironmentalagreements. Wepresentthespeciﬁcresearchques-
tions and some conclusions of this thesis in section 1.2. Section 1.2.3 summarizes
the main ﬁndings of this thesis, and presents some good news and some warnings
for proponents of climate policy and policy makers.
1.1 The economics of climate change: a short intro-
duction
The effects of an increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
are (1) long term, (2) uncertain, (3) potentially catastrophic and (4) unequally dis-
tributed over our planet and over time (Goulder and Pizer, 2008). In addition,
climate change control is a global public good: all countries beneﬁt from a sin-
gle country’s reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (Carraro, 2002), and hence
eachcountryhasanincentivetofree-rideonothercountries’emissionreductions.
Thesecharacteristicsmakeclimatechangeauniqueeconomicproblemthathasto
2Under the Protocol, countries are allowed to achieve a part of their targets through emission re-
ductions abroad. Through the Clean Development Mechanism, for example, countries can ﬁnance
projects in developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions over there, and add these
emission reductions to their own record. However, there is a maximum of emission reductions that
each country is allowed to achieve abroad, and once these cheap emission reduction possibilities
are exploited, each country (or Party in terms of the Protocol, as the EU-15 operates as one unit)
has to reduce emissions domestically.CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 3
be studied from different angles, and hence the ﬁeld of climate change economics
has developed in several directions. A ﬁrst question that arises with climate policy
is what is the optimal amount of climate change mitigation, and what is its time
path? We brieﬂy discuss this topic in section 1.1.1. Given the path and amount of
mitigation, optimal or not, the next question is how the mitigation target can be
achieved at lowest costs, and what the effects of the policy will be on all kinds of
economic variables including GDP and employment? This literature will be dis-
cussed in section 1.1.2. Section 1.1.3 brieﬂy discusses the literature on how a coali-
tion of countries can be formed to jointly introduce international climate policy.
1.1.1 Optimal climate policy
Integrated Assessment Models: from DICE-99 to DICE-2007
To answer the question ’what to do with a changing climate?’ economists would
preferably do a cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA). First determine the costs of several cli-
mate change scenarios and the costs and beneﬁts of the associated policies (both
in terms of avoided costs from climate change, and the direct costs that the policy
putsoneconomicagents),andthendeterminethepolicythatyieldsthelargestnet
beneﬁt.
The literature on optimal climate policy relies heavily on integrated assessment
models (IAMs). These are models that link a simpliﬁed climate module with a
global model of optimal GDP growth, that seek to ﬁnd the optimal policy which
tradesoffexpectedcostsandbeneﬁtsofclimatechangecontrol(KellyandKolstad,
1999). Two well-known models that were very inﬂuential in the 1990s are the DICE
(ﬁrst published in Nordhaus, 1992) and RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) models.
The latter paper compares the optimal policy for the case where each of 10 world
regions maximizes its own sum of discounted future streams of utility with the op-
timal policy for the case where global net present value of utility is maximized, us-
ingtheRICE-94model. Sincethecostsofemissioncontrolarehighwhilethebene-
ﬁts are in thefar future, theeconomically efﬁcientstrategy (accordingto Nordhaus
and Yang, 1996) is for only a small reduction in CO2 emissions (compared to the
case in which climate does not affect welfare). The optimal reduction rates in case
of global cooperation are highest for developing countries (rising from 17% 2000
to22% in 2070 for China) andlowestfor industrialized countries (risingfrom7% to
12% for Japan). Nordhaus and Yang (1996, p. 752) use this analysis to argue against
the Kyoto Protocol: “The only potential rationale for the Framework Convention is
that it puts a very high weight on equity (by relieving poor countries of obligations
toreduceemissions)andrulesoutthepossibilityofsidepayments(saythroughal-
location of emission permits).” Nordhaus and Yang conclude that “Countries may4 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
(...) be triply persuaded not to undertake costly efforts today – ﬁrstly because the
beneﬁts are so conjectural, secondly because they occur so far in the future, and
third because no individual country can have a signiﬁcant impact upon the pace
of global warming.” (p. 762) In an overview of integrated assessment models, Kelly
and Kolstad (1999) conclude: “Probably the most striking result is that our current
understanding of climate change costs and damages does not justify more than
modest emissions control given a discount rate calibrated from interest rates and
slow economic growth. The optimal amount of emissions control is well below
currently proposed policies [i.e. the Kyoto Protocol], yet more than the (...) policy
of doing nothing.” (p. 192)
Over time, however, Nordhaus has changed the parameters underlying his mod-
els, to bring the model closer to intergenerational neutrality. This was not feasible
in the past, as the increased nonlinearity of the model under the new parameter
construct was too difﬁcult to solve numerically (Nordhaus, 2007a). The insights
the models provide have changed accordingly. The DICE-2007 model, for exam-
ple, ﬁnds optimal global emission reduction rates of 14% in 2015, 25% in 2050 and
43% in 2100, and calls the policies currently in place “meager” (Nordhaus, 2007b,
p. 698). Compared to the DICE-99 model, this increase in the optimal amount of
emission reductions stems for over two-thirds from a change in the damage func-
tion (reduced estimated beneﬁts of warming at low rates of warming for some re-
gions), for about a quarter from a reduction in the discount rate from 3% to 1.5%
(to reduce the market interest rate, joint with a doubling of the consumption elas-
ticity from 1 to 2, using the Ramsey rule; see below), and for about 5% from a slight
increase in the temperature sensitivity coefﬁcient; projection errors and compo-
sition effects regarding world output have led to a slight (some 2%) counter-effect
(own calculations, based upon Nordhaus, 2007a).
Itshouldbenotedthatthemodelsjustdescribeddidnotincludeendogenoustech-
nological change. Popp (2004) extends the DICE-99 model with endogenous tech-
nological change, but ﬁnds that it hardly affects the path of optimal climate policy.
However, it substantially increases the policy’s welfare gains through cost reduc-
tions(comparedtothecaseofoptimalclimatepolicywithexogenousresearchand
development).
Ethical choices and the consumption discount rate
The second quote from Nordhaus and Yang (1996) above reﬂects most of the char-
acteristics of the climate change problem mentioned in the introduction of this
section. Indeed, although the textbook solution of equating marginal beneﬁts of
harmful emissions with the marginal costs of emission reductions is feasible for
severalenvironmentalproblems, thefourcharacteristicsoftheeffectsofincreasedCHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 5
greenhouse gas concentrations, described above, make this solution very hard for
the case of greenhouse gases. That is, it is hard to come with an optimal climate
policy, and it is probably impossible to come with a proposal of optimal policy
without taking some ethical decisions when deriving this optimal policy.3 Should
emissionsbereducedindevelopingcountries,asthereemissionreductionscanbe
achieved at lowest costs? Or should OECD countries, responsible for some 65% of
the increase in CO2 concentrations since 1750 (Raupach et al., 2007), take their re-
sponsibilities and start reducing ﬁrst? How should welfare of future generations be
taken into account, that is what discount rate should be chosen when determining
optimal policy?
As global warming is a long-term issue (CO2 that is emitted now may stay in the
atmosphere for over 200 years), the results from optimal growth models are very
sensitive to the choice of discount rate in integrated assessment models. This
point makes clear that climate change is an intertemporal and intergenerational
problem, and is nicely illustrated by the recent discussion around the ’Stern Re-
view on the economics of climate change’ (Stern, 2006). The Review, a political
document initiated by the British government, argued in favor of strong current





PAGE, and as in any optimal growth IAM the discount rate crucially appears in the
Ramsey equation: r Æ½Å´g. Here r is the consumption discount rate (also called
market interest rate), ½ is the rate of pure time preference, ´ is the elasticity of
marginal utility (or, equivalently, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion), and g is
theper-capitagrowthrateofconsumption.4 UsingtheReview’svalues of½ Æ0.1%,
´ Æ 1, and g Æ 1.3%, we get a consumption discount rate of 1.4%. That is, a loss
100 years from now of¿100, for example coming from climate change, is presently
valued as a loss of ¿24.90. Nordhaus (2007b) and Weitzman (2007) argue that the
Review’s choices for ´ and ½ are at the extreme lower bound of what is considered
’reasonable’ in economics. In addition, both authors argue that the implicit sav-
3Indeed, van den Bergh (2004) argues that “an overall quantitative CBA evaluation and compari-
sonofpolicyoptionsthataimtoreachdistinctreductionpercentages,aswellasachoiceofoptimal
climate policy based on models of optimal growth, are overly ambitious.” (p. 385)
4Instead of ’consumption discount rate’, authors frequently label r the interest rate or return on
capital (see e.g. Weitzman, 2007, Nordhaus, 2007b). However, r equals the return on capital only
if there are no market failures with respect to consumption (with growth rate g in the equation),
and only with perfect foresight on all capital markets (see e.g. Heal, forthcoming). Heal argues that
since climate change is a large external effect, and given the current crisis in capital markets, the
Ramsey equation cannot be used in the climate change debate.6 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
ings rate resulting resulting from the choice of parameters in the Stern Review is
too high. Nordhaus chooses ´ Æ 2 and ½ Æ 1.5 in his DICE-2007 model, combined
with a growth rate of (on average) 2.25%, and hence uses an interest rate of 6%.
With this rate, a loss 100 years from now of ¿100 is presently valued as a loss of
less than 30 cents: a difference of two orders of magnitude.5 Nordhaus (2007b)
ﬁnds a much lower optimal carbon tax than the Stern Review (initially, $35 versus
$350, and about $180 versus close to $1000 for the year 2100), albeit higher than
theexpectedcarbonpricestemmingfromtheKyotoProtocol. Clearly, theReview’s
choiceofaverysmalldiscountrate,compoundedbyalowvaluefortheelasticityof
marginal utility, put the odds strongly in favour of immediate emission reductions
for any given expected future damages.
Weitzman (2007) goes even further than Nordhaus in his critique on the Stern Re-
view. Given the uncertainty surrounding climate change itself (see e.g. Tol, 2005),
there is uncertainty about future rates of return, leading to low riskfree rates of re-
turn and higher risky rates. Following the framework of the Ramsey equation, the
uncertainty comes from uncertainty about future economic developments, that is
uncertainty about g. The fundamental question is whether in principle the risk-
free rate or the risky economy-wide rate of return should be used for discounting
the costs and beneﬁts of climate change. This depends on the correlation between
the return to the climate-related project and the return to the economy as whole.
Weitzman (2007, p. 713) argues that this correlation coefﬁcient might be signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than one: “Instances of changes in "outdoor" activities under global
warming include what happens to tropical agriculture, losing signiﬁcant parts of
Bangladesh (or Florida) to rising sea levels, the "consumption" of an altered nat-
ural world that is a direct argument in the utility function, and so forth. These
kinds of changes, which include the existence value of natural environments, are
presumablynothighlycorrelatedwithtechnologicalprogressincomputingpower,
furniture making, or better pharmaceuticals a century from now.” The higher the
correlation, the closer the rate of return should be to the risky economy-wide rate
of return. Since the observed risk-free rate is about 1% and the risky rate is about
7%,thesubjectivechoicetobemadehere,hasahugeinﬂuenceonthecost-beneﬁt
analysis. Hencetheproblemsofacost-beneﬁtanalysisstemmingfromuncertainty
about future costs and beneﬁts of climate change are compounded by uncertainty
about the choice of interest rate to use in the discount factor.
5Combining Stern’s values for ´ and g with Nordhaus’ ½ Æ 1.5% and combining Nordhaus’ pa-
rameters with Stern’s rate of pure time preference give a present discounted value of ¿6.32 and
¿1.80 respectively, both still much smaller than the Review’s ¿24.90. Heal (forthcoming) argues
that if one does use the Ramsey equation (contrary to his suggestion; see footnote 4), the reasoning
should be from ½ to ´, r and g, as there is certainty about the former parameter (according to Heal,
it should be zero, which is even lower than the Review’s 0.1%), whereas all other parameters are
uncertain (and g is a variable).CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 7
More problems with IAMs
In addition, Heal (forthcoming) shows that moving from a one consumption good
worldtoamulti-goodworld,includingenvironmentalservices,thecross-elasticity
of marginal utility between two goods might be negative (if the goods are comple-
ments), and hence the consumption discount rate of a particular good might be
smaller or larger than the return on capital, and might even be negative. Another
interestingpointmadeinHeal(forthcoming), concernstheroleof´. As´rises, the
marginalutilityofconsumptionfallsmorerapidly. Assumingthatfutureconsump-
tion will grow, larger values of ´ imply that we place less value on stopping climate
change. However, ´ also plays a role in the intratemporal dimension: a higher
value implies a stronger preference for equality. Given that a lot of the damage
from climate change falls on poor countries, this should lead to stronger action.
However, all IAM’s, including DICE, only capture the ﬁrst dimension, leading to
the result that a greater preference for equality leads to less concern about climate
change. Therefore, multi-good (including environmental goods) multi-consumer
(country) models are needed.
The biggest problem with cost-beneﬁt analysis for climate change might come
from low-probability high-impact events, or “rare disasters” in brief. Weitzman
(2007) deduces from table SPM-3 of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2007) that the probability of a temperature increase of 6°C in the coming one
hundred years is “very roughly about 3%”. Both the size of the temperature in-
crease and the relatively short time-scale (from a climate and ecology perspective)
make this temperature increase a disaster. Moreover, the fact that disasters are
rare makes their probability itself hard to estimate, while at the same time it is
unforeseeable what will be the economic damage (the resulting negative value of
parameter g) associated with the disaster. In short, there is uncertainty about the
uncertainties which leads to a probability distribution of g with a thick left tail.
“Mitigating the future consequences of greenhouse warming does not just shift
the center of the distribution of g to the right but, perhaps far more importantly
in this context, it thins the left tail of the distribution as well.” (Weitzman, 2007,
p. 718) Weitzman therefore suggests to have a time out for the next decade by in-
vestigating seriously the nature of the disasters in the thick tails and what might
be done realistically about them if they arise, instead of immediately and dramati-
callyreducinggreenhousegasemissionsassuggestedbytheSternReview. Vanden
Bergh (2004) uses similar arguments to argue for a qualitative rather than a quan-
titative cost-beneﬁt analysis in the economic analysis of climate policy. According
to Leach (2007), it may take thousands of years to learn the true parameter val-
ues of the climate model, which goes against the suggestion of Weitzman, and is
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models.
Heal (forthcoming) compares the results and assumptions of several papers, in-
cluding Stern (2006) and Weitzman (2007), and concludes that “...there are several
ways of concluding that we need to take action. We can follow the route of the
Stern review and use a low discount rate and set ´ Æ 1, or we can allow for climate
impacts on ecosystem services, or we can be explicitly concerned about the risk of
anoutcomeinthetail of thedistribution ofpossible outcomes. Anyof theseseems
sufﬁcient to justify immediate action. And several of them seem plausible.” (Heal,
forthcoming, p. 21)
1.1.2 Design and consequences of climate policy
Givensomeclimatepolicytarget(theanswertothequestion: Howmuchtoabate?),
several questions can be asked regarding the abatement policy:
• What to abate?
• How to abate?
• Where to abate?
• When to abate?
When an agent is free in choosing the answers to these questions, she has maxi-
mum ﬂexibility in meeting the objective. Hence, the objective can be met against
thelowestcostandpolicyiscost-efﬁcient. TheKyotoprotocolgivesallparticipants
an emissions target, but leavesthe questions above mostly unanswered. Countries
themselves can choose what to abate, that is which emissions (CO2, methane, ni-
trous oxide) to reduce. So if a country can reduce emissions of methane at a lower
cost than emissions of carbon dioxide it will ﬁrst reduce emissions of methane, up
to the point where the costs of reducing methane are equal to the costs of reducing
carbon dioxide emissions.
According to the Kyoto Protocol, countries can choose themselves how to reduce
emissions, that is which instruments to use: taxes, standards, tradable permits,
and carbon sequestration. Furthermore they can decide where to reduce these
emissions. Not only can they choose where to do it within their own borders but,
countries can also fulﬁll part of their requirement by paying for reduction of emis-
sions in other regions subject to the Protocol (Joint Implementation) or in devel-
oping countries (Clean Development Mechanism). Although one might argue that
thiswillleadtoadecreaseinemissionsbycountriesoutsidetheProtocol, thereare
other forces that might lead to emission increases in these countries. We will study
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There is less ﬂexibility in when to abate. Countries may see opportunities to abate
against lower costs in the future, for example because of expected technological
developments. However, within the Kyoto Protocol the targets of the regions are
formulated for the ’commitment period’ 2008-2012, so they can only postpone
emissions within these ﬁve years. Furthermore, since the Protocol was agreed
upon in 1997, and entered into force in 2005, this still left countries free in their
emissions before 2008. As will be argued in chapter 3 of this thesis, the fact that
agents new some years in advance that they would be constrained in their emis-
sions at some given point in time (the commitment period 2008-2012), might have
led to an increase in emissions in the period before 2008.
We now brieﬂy discuss the ’what’ and ’how’ questions, and then give a short over-
view of the literature on the economic effects of climate policy.
What to abate?
Although a lot of attention in the popular and scientiﬁc press goes to carbon diox-
ideemissions,othergreenhousegases,notablymethaneandnitrousoxide,areim-
portant contributors to global warming as well. The Kyoto Protocol covers these
gases as well, and, as noted above, if countries ﬁnd it cheaper to reduce emissions
ofthesegases,theyarefreetodoso. Emissionreductionsfromthesegasesarethen
converted in to CO2 equivalents, and are counted for their emission reduction tar-
get.
In addition, although carbon dioxide is largely emitted by industrial processes, it
can be sequestered through agricultural activities. Indeed, carbon sequestration
through forestry (see e.g. Lee et al., 2005) or through soil management in agricul-
ture (see e.g. Antle et al., 2001) can help to provide low- or even negative-cost near-
term climate policy strategies, buying time for technological developments (Lal,
2004).
How to abate?
Regarding the question on how to abate, that is what instrument to use, it can be
shown that for many environmental problems both a tax on pollution and a sys-
tem of a cap on emissions with tradable permits can achieve an environmental
target at lowest cost. That is, both instruments are cost-efﬁcient. In addition, both
instruments are dynamically efﬁcient, as they give ﬁrms incentive to invest in re-
search and development, to further reduce emissions. Fischer et al. (2003) do not
ﬁndageneralpreferenceforauctionedpermitsoveremissionstaxesandemissions
taxes over free permits, when technological change is endogenous. Under differ-
ent circumstances either auctioned permits or taxes can induce larger amounts of10 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
innovation but any of the three policies may induce a signiﬁcantly greater welfare




Weitzman (1974) showed that taxes and permits are not equivalent when marginal
beneﬁts and costs of abatement are uncertain. In that case, the relative slopes of
the two curves determine which policy will be better. Permits are preferred when
the marginal beneﬁts are steep and marginal costs are ﬂat. In that case, it is im-
portant to get the quantity of emissions down to a threshold, which is exactly what
a permit policy does. In the opposite case, however, a (carbon) tax would be a
better policy. In general, the marginal cost curve for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions is considered to be steep, while the nature of climate change indicate
that the marginal beneﬁt curve for reducing emissions will be very ﬂat (McKibbin
and Wilcoxen, 2002). Given that carbon dioxide is a stock pollutant, an additional
unit emitted now has about the same impact on global warming as an additional
unit emitted in one year time, and a carbon tax is preferred. In practice, however,
(Pigouvian) taxes are not as often used as one might expect. One reason for this
might be the hostility of ﬁrms to the large sums of money that have to be payed
to the government: even when a ﬁrm reduces its emissions of a pollutant by 30%,
it will have to pay taxes over the remaining 70%. In a permit trading system with
grandfathering(commonpraxisforPhaseIoftheEuropeanUnionEmissionsTrad-
ing System and Phases I and II of the US Acid Rain Program) on the other hand,
ﬁrms only need to buy the permits that they need to ﬁll the gap (if any) between
actual emissions and received permits.
In order to reduce emissions, only the last unit of emissions needs to be priced.
This, however, is hard to do in practice. Vollebergh et al. (1997) therefore argue
in favour of either a carbon tax with credits, or a system of permits with partial
grandfathering, which reduce the overall transfer from ﬁrms to the government,
but still leave incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched.
Another advantage of taxes over a system of (grandfathered) permits is that the
receipts from carbon taxes can be used to lower other taxes through a revenue-
neutral governmental policy. Given some target of emission reductions, distorting
taxes on, for example, labour can be reduced in such a way that the government’s
foregone labour-tax receipts are exactly offset by the receipts from a carbon tax
(or a tax on greenhouse gases in general, converted into carbon-equivalents). The
weak form of the ’double dividend hypothesis’ in environmental economics states
that the (non-environmental) efﬁciency costs of such a revenue-neutral environ-
mental tax reform are lower if the additional revenues from the environmental
taxes are recycled in the form of lower distortionary taxes compared to the caseCHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 11
that these revenues are recycled in a lump-sum fashion (Bovenberg, 1999). Al-
though this hypothesis is widely accepted among economists (Schöb, 2005), the
strong double dividend hypothesis, which asserts that an environmental tax re-
form enhances not only environmental quality but also non-environmental wel-
fare, is strongly debated (see Bovenberg, 1999).
Although there are several arguments for a (global) carbon tax, instead of a system
of tradable permits, it is quite likely that the future will see a cap-and-trade system
for greenhouse gases, as the institutions for such a system are already available.
First, the Kyoto Protocol effectively puts caps on participating countries, and it is
likely that negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate agreement will build upon the ex-
perience gained during the 2008-2012 period that is covered by the Protocol. Sec-
ond, the European Union has introduced the EU Emission Trading System: a sys-
tem where tradable permits are allocated over ﬁrms in the European Union, which
then can trade these permits on permit markets. Although currently only the EU
is involved, other regions, ranging from Europe’s Norway to several US states, have
indicated to be interested in joining the scheme in the future.
Although taxes and permits are considered to be the most efﬁcient instruments to
achieve a certain environmental target, they can be supported by other policies,
insofar as they correct for other externalities. The most important additional pol-
icyisprobablytechnologypolicy. Asclimatepolicyisalong-termproblem,cleaner
technologies are generally expected to lead to most of future emission reductions.
Forcleanertechnologiestoappear,however,itisimportanttoputapriceongreen-
housegasemissions,forexamplethroughataxorthroughacap-and-tradesystem.
With these instruments, ﬁrms have an incentive to reduce emissions as long as the
marginal beneﬁts of doing so (foregone taxes, or the receipts of selling emission
permits) exceed the marginal costs. However, technological change has an impor-
tant market failure with it, stemming from the public good characteristic of knowl-
edge. Once a new technology is introduced, it is available for use by other agents,
without having to incur the costs of research and development. As a consequence,
the ﬁrm that has done the initial investment can not cover the cost of this invest-
ment by charging a price over its marginal cost, and no ﬁrm can proﬁtably invest
in new knowledge. Hence, a system of (and enforcement of) intellectual property
rights is needed, to ﬁx the market failure of knowledge spillovers. With a system of
patents,aﬁrmthathasdevelopedanewtechnologycangetatemporarymonopoly
onitstechnology(whichallowstheﬁrmtocoverthecostsofresearchanddevelop-
ment with monopoly proﬁts), but in return it must publish its ﬁndings, such that
other ﬁrms can use the results to develop further new technologies. Therefore, the
social return to knowledge is widely believed to be much higher than the private
return (for example, Jones and Williams (1998) ﬁnd that the social return is two to
four times higher than the private return), which suggests that there is room for12 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
technology policy, such as subsidies to research and development.
Economic effects of climate policy
There is a substantial literature on the assessment of the (macro)economic effects
of climate policy, especially with respect to the Kyoto Protocol. Regarding quan-
titative modeling, during most of the 1990s this literature was divided along two
types of models used. On the one hand there was a literature using bottom-up
models (see e.g. Messner, 1997, Barretto and Kypreos, 2004). These models have a
detailed representation of technological possibilities in energy sectors, but gener-
ally lack an adequate representation of other sectors in the economy, in particular
ﬁnal demand for energy. Second there were top-down models (see Carraro, 2002,
for an overview). These are mostly computable general equilibrium (CGE) models,
and they generally have a multi-sector (and often multi-country) representation of
the economy and are able to represent changes in demand for several goods, in-
cluding energy, that come from climate policy.6 The drawback of these models is
thatthetechnological opportunitiesoftheenergysector arenotmodeled indetail,
leading to higher cost estimates than those from the bottom-up literature. The ﬂip
side of the coin is that the latter literature may be too optimistic: the availability of
a cleaner technology does not imply that it will be adopted by ﬁrms. This depends
on several underlying economic factors that are generally lacking in these models.
Therecentliteraturetriestocombinethetop-downandbottom-upcharacteristics
in hybrid models (see e.g. Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008, Bosetti et al., 2006, Sue
Wing, 2008).
Theliteratureontheeffectsofclimatepolicyonthemacro-economyisverybroad,
and uses both analytical and quantitative models.7 In the policy debate, the pol-
icy’s effects on output and employment have received most attention. In the sci-
entiﬁc debate this comes back in the literature on the double dividend hypothesis
mentioned above, which studies the effects of environmental policies on output
and employment (see Bovenberg, 1999, Schöb, 2005, for references). We will now
only brieﬂy touch upon the topics that are related to the chapters of this thesis;
more extensive literature overviews can be found in the respective chapters.
Theliteratureoncarbonleakagestudiestheeffectsofclimatepolicyontradeﬂows
and emissions by regions that are not subject to climate policy (see for example
6Within the group of top-down models there are a few macroeconometric models as well, see
for example Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1996). Integrated Assessment Models can fall in each of the
two categories, depending on the model’s details. Over time, the two groups of models have moved
closer,asbottom-upmodelsgainedineconomicdetail,whiletop-downmodelsgainedinthemod-
eling of energy supply and energy technologies.
7Inthisthesis,weuseanalyticalmodelstostudysomeofclimatepolicy’seffectsonthebehaviour
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Copeland and Taylor, 2005, Hoel, 1996, Ishikawa and Kiyuno, 2006). Carbon leak-
age will also be the subject of scrutiny in chapter 4.
Second, any policy that affects relative prices will induce substitution effects, be-
tween goods and between inputs, as agents will want to substitute away from in-
puts that have a higher relative price. Substitution between (energy) inputs, as
induced by climate policy, is explicitly studied in Chakravorty et al. (1997), Chakra-
vortyetal.(2006), Chakravortyetal.(2008). Inthesepapers, theoptimalextraction
paths of fossil fuels are studied in the presence of climate policy. Chapter 2 of this
thesis is closely related to this literature.
Recentlytherelationbetweenclimatepolicyandtechnologicalchangehasreceived
alotofattention. ThisliteraturehasbeenreviewedinLöschel(2002)andJaffeetal.
(2002), but even though these reviews are quite recent, they are already outdated,
as since their publication a wave of publications on this topic can be found. Ex-
amples of these are the special issues of Resource and Energy Economics in 2003,
Ecological Economics in 2005, The Energy Journal in 2006 and Energy Economics
in November 2008. Part II of this thesis also studies the relations between climate
policy and technological change.
Finally, it should be noted that CGE models are also used to study the (expected)
economic effects of a changing climate. As CGE models are generally based on
a competitive economy, these models generally only take market damages due
to climate change – changes in productivity (especially of agriculture) or coastal
zones (see for example the special issue of Ecological Economics of August 2007),
increases in probabilities of diseases, etc. – into account. However, large beneﬁts
of climate policy come from the prevention of non-market damages. For example,
a less hospitable climate affects utility but not necessarily productivity; ecosys-
tem services and biodiversity can have option and existence values, that are not
reﬂected in market prices.
1.1.3 Coalition formation
The previous sections have discussed climate policy as performed by a country, a
group of countries, or the world as a whole. That is, we assumed that there ex-
ists a country or group of countries (coalition) that implements policies aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the remaining chapters of this thesis this
is assumed as well. The question is then how such a coalition of countries, that
voluntarily reduces its emissions of greenhouse gases, can be formed.
Themaincharacteristicofinternationalenvironmentalagreements(IEAs),likethe
Kyoto Protocol, is that there is no international agency that can establish binding
agreements. Hence, IEAs have to be proﬁtable for all potential participants (Finus,
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Protocol over the last 10 years. The United States and Australia did not ratify the
Kyoto Protocol as they expected its costs to be larger than its beneﬁts. In addition,
developing countries indicated to put more weight on economic growth than on
cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the problems surrounding the formation of an in-
ternational environmental agreement (for recent reviews, see Finus, 2003, Folmer
and von Mouche, 2000). As welfare levels of countries in the context of climate
change and climate policy are interdependent, the topic of coalition formation is
best studied using game theory. We focus on what Finus (2003) calls ’membership
models’: models where countries can free-ride by either not being a member of
an IEA, or being a member of an IEA that contributes less to the improvement of
environmentalqualitythanmembersofotheragreements.8 Thesemodelsarecon-
cerned with the coalition formation process and stability of membership. Further-
more, we focus on the results from non-cooperative game theory, which assumes
that binding agreements are not possible.9 The subject of this literature is on in-
ternal and external stability. A coalition of countries that signs an international
environmental agreement is internally stable if there is no incentive for a partici-
pant to leave the coalition, and it is externally stable if there is no incentive for a
non-participant to join the coalition. If a country leaves the coalition, its members
punish by increasing their emissions.
Whencountriesaresymmetric, andintheabsenceoftransfers, thenumberofpar-
ticipants usually falls short of the grand coalition (which covers all countries), and
is hence socially sub-optimal (Finus, 2003, p. 109). The larger the coalition, the
larger are the beneﬁts from free riding. Furthermore, given the size of a coalition,
the number of participants will be lower when the pay-off of an emission increase
is higher. Indeed, whenever cooperation is most needed from a global point of
view, international environmental agreements achieve only little (Barrett, 1994).
When countries are asymmetric, cooperation is even more difﬁcult, and the coali-
tion is even smaller.
Linking a public-good agreement to a club-good agreement may increase partic-
ipation of the environmental public-good agreement. The former type of agree-
ment suffers from free-riding, while the latter type enjoys a higher participation
since the gains from cooperation are exclusive to signatories (see for example Bar-
rett, 1997). Indeed, issue linkage could be observed for the Kyoto Protocol as well.
Kyoto only came into force after passing a threshold of participating countries’
8A second branch of the literature on IEAs looks at compliance: whether members of an IEA will
comply with its terms. The interested reader is referred to Finus (2003) and Barrett (2005).
9Cooperative game theory focusses on countries’ decisions when facing the socially optimal
emissions vector. This is mainly a normative concept and cannot be used to explain suboptimal
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emissions, which was passed after Russia joined. However, one reason why Russia
joined was that the European Union promised to support Russia’s application for
joining the WTO when Russia ratiﬁed Kyoto.
Another extension of the literature on coalition formation comes from reputation
effects. If a country decides not to join an agreement, it might be bad for future
negotiations on other topics. This reputation effect might have played a role at the
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Indonesia, in 2007. At this confer-
ence, parties tried to agree on a ’roadmap’ for a future (post-Kyoto) international
agreement on climate policy, and the US were blocking an agreement for a long
time. Only at the very last instant, when it was clear that most other countries con-
demned the attitude of the US, it agreed on the ’Bali roadmap’.
1.2 Research questions and overview of thesis
“...policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as
to ensure global beneﬁts at the lowest possible cost.” – Article 3.3 of United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
Themainpurposeofthisthesisistostudyhowclimatepolicyaffectsthebehaviour
of economic agents (ﬁrms, consumers, resource owners) over time, and this thesis
can therefore be placed in the literature discussed in section 1.1.2 above. The type
of policy that is considered throughout this thesis is a ceiling on greenhouse gas
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol effectively puts a ceiling on emissions for the group
of countries that ratiﬁed it, and throughout this thesis we take a ceiling on the ﬂow
ofcarbondioxideemissionsasgiven. Hence,throughoutthisthesiswetaketheKy-
oto Protocol as our starting point, and study optimal responses to a given climate
policy (as opposed to studying optimal climate policy).
There are many reasons to dismiss the Protocol as ’optimal’ climate policy: pro-
posed emission reductions are only marginal from a global perspective, both the
world’s largest emitter (the US) and large and rapidly growing emitters like China
are not subject to emission constraints, the Protocol’s 5-year window causes a lack
of certainty for ﬁrms to make long-term investments, etc. However, while many
of the Protocol’s ﬂaws are a result of its underlying political processes, there are
at the same time (political) forces that might ﬁx these ﬂaws. With the passing of
time, there is more scientiﬁc knowledge about global warming and greenhouse
gasconcentrations, reducinguncertaintiesandincreasingpressurestocurbglobal
emissions. Political forces in the US are in the direction of curbing greenhouse
gas emissions, inside or outside a post-Kyoto treaty, while local pollution in China
triggers the awareness of authorities to monitor the use of fossil fuels. There are
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Heiligendamm, Germany, climate policy stretching to 2050 was mentioned, which
gives ﬁrms at least a hint that it might be beneﬁcial to take up long-term invest-
ments in clean technologies. It is therefore likely that future multilateral climate
policy will be based on the foundations of the Kyoto Protocol. We will hence take
a ceiling on emissions as exogenous in the ﬁrst three chapters of this thesis, and
study several of its possible effects.
In this thesis, we will mainly focus on emissions of carbon dioxide that come from
the use of fossil fuels. Although the Protocol covers 6 different greenhouse gases,
most attention (both in science, in policy and in popular press) goes to carbon
dioxide (CO2), as this gas has led to a radiative forcing of 1.66 W/m2 compared to a
total radiative forcing of 2.63 W/m2 (Forster et al., 2007, p. 131).10 About three-
quarters of the radiative forcing coming from carbon dioxide is caused by past
emissions of fossil fuels and cement production (with roughly 3% coming from
cement, see Denman et al., 2007, p. 517), with the remainder caused by land use
changes (Forster et al., 2007, p. 131).11




The economic effects of climate policy are often studied using either static mod-
els, or using models in which energy from fossil fuels is provided using some ﬁxed
factor. In reality, however, fossil fuels are nonrenewable resources: as it takes na-
ture millions of years to create fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) from the remains
of plants and animals, the stocks of these resources are de facto given for human-
ity. As a consequence, when some amount of a resource is currently extracted, is
no longer available for future generations, and the path of extraction of fossil fuels
should be determined taking into account the needs of coming years and future
generations. Hotelling (1931) has shown in a partial equilibrium setting that un-
der perfect competition, the price of a nonrenewable should grow at the rate of
interest, to make the resource owner indifferent between selling the resource to-
day or at some later date. In this part of the thesis, we take this Hotelling model as
the starting point, and study how climate policy affects the optimal extraction of
two resources that differ in their carbon content (chapter 2), and how it affects the
optimal extraction of a resource and the path of carbon dioxide emissions when
10Radiative forcing is a concept used for quantitative comparisons of the strength of different
human and natural agents in causing climate change.
11For an overview on modeling linkages between land use and climate policy, see Van der Werf
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climate policy is announced in advance (chapter 3).
Chapter 2: Climate policy and the optimal extraction of high- and low-carbon
fossil fuels
Climate policy affects the relative prices of fossil fuels, e.g. through a carbon tax
or through tradable permits. Since coal has a higher carbon content (per unit of
energy) than oil, which in turn has a higher carbon content than natural gas, the
standard static model of a Pigouvian tax suggests it will be optimal for ﬁrms to
substitute towards the cleaner inputs oil and (especially) gas. In chapter 2, we take
take the question of optimal fuel use under a carbon tax to a dynamic context. We
model fossil fuels as nonrenewable resources that are imperfect substitutes at an
aggregate level, and study the following questions:
1. (a) How does a ceiling on carbon dioxide emissions affect the optimal ex-
traction paths of fossil fuels, and how does it induce ﬁrms to substitute
between different fuels?
(b) How are these results affected when the climate policy is announced in
advance?
We show that the results of the static model can change dramatically when the
more appropriate dynamic model is taken into account. Relative extraction of the
fossil fuels not only depends on the respective carbon contents (and hence tax per
unit of energy), but also on their relative productivity and physical scarcity. The
best way to cope with an emission constraint is to intertemporally reallocate the
extraction of the resource stocks such that production per unit of carbon dioxide
emissions is relatively high during the period in which the emission constraint is
binding, and low when the constraint no longer (or – in the case of an anticipated
constraint–notyet)binds. Hencetheconstrainedeconomyusestheresourcewith
the lowest amount of emissions per unit of output relatively more intensively, as
compared to an unconstrained economy. This resource is not necessarily the re-
source with the lowest amount of carbon per unit of energy: because of dimin-
ishing returns to each of the energy inputs, the scarcer a resource relatively is, the
higher its marginal productivity per unit of emissions.
Our empirical results suggest that it is cost-effective to substitute away from dirty
coal to cleaner oil or gas. However, when it comes to choose between relatively
clean natural gas and the dirtier input oil, the paradoxical "dirty-ﬁrst" result might
apply: there should be substitution from (low-carbon) gas towards (high-carbon)
oil,asthelatterisfoundtoberelativelymoreproductiveperunitofCO2 emissions.
When the constraint is announced in advance (which for example was the case for
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(in terms of GDP per unit of emissions) drops, while there is a rush on resources
that will be used less after implementation. As a consequence the constrained pe-
riod starts with (relatively) more of the productive resource, and resource owners
of the other resource face a smaller loss (i.e. a smaller drop in scarcity rent), as
compared to the situation without announcement. At the instant the constraint
becomes binding the extraction rate of the productive input jumps up, and from
then on relative extraction develops as would be the case with an unanticipated
constraint.
Chapter 3: Announcement effects of climate policy
In chapter 3, we have a closer look a the effect of announcing climate policy in
advance. We study the optimal paths of resource extraction and carbon dioxide
emissions when the economy faces an announced constraint on emissions. Gov-
ernments often announce policies some years in advance, partly to give ﬁrms time
to adjust such that the real costs of the policy can be reduced. The Kyoto Protocol
was agreed upon in December 1997, but the Protocol’s ﬁrst commitment period
started only on January 1, 2008. Hence, agents were well in advance informed that
it was likely that a policy on greenhouse gas emissions would enter into force at
some future date. At the same time, agents were still free in their emissions in the
period prior to 2008. We are especially interested in the answer to the following
research question:
2. Can announced climate policy induce an increase in emissions?
As we are interested in emission levels instead of relative extraction paths, we in-
clude only one resource in our model. Our ﬁrst result is that announcement of
the policy indeed induces an increase in extraction and emissions at the instant of
announcement. This is due to an abundance effect: as the entire resource stock
must be extracted over time, if less is extracted during some period of time due to
the constraint, more must be extracted over other periods. The question, then, is
whether this additional extraction should be postponed, or should be brought for-
ward to the period between announcement of the policy and its implementation.
We show that it is optimal to do a bit of both (in order to keep discounted marginal
utility constant over unconstrained times), and hence extraction and emissions
jump up at the instant at which future climate policy is announced. As the idea
underlying the policy is to stabilize the concentration of carbon dioxide in the at-
mosphere (Article 2 of the UNFCCC), this emissions increase goes directly against
the spirit of the policy. Hence, there seems to be a trade-off between the economic
gain of pre-announcement of climate policy, and the environmental loss coming
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In addition we show that, although emissions and extraction jump up at the in-
stant of announcement of climate policy, both jump down at the instant of imple-
mentation. Thatis,evenwhenclimatepolicyisannouncedsomeyearsinadvance,
consumptionwillnotbesmoothedtoavoidajumpinutilityattheinstantatwhich
the constraint is put into practice. We also show that a longer interim period and
a looser constraint reduce the sizes of both jumps. Furthermore, the length of the
period in which the economy is constrained is shorter if the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion is higher, the interim period is longer, and the constraint is looser.
1.2.2 Part II of the thesis: Climate policy, input substitution, and
technological change
In Part II of the thesis we study the relation between climate policy, input sub-
stitution and technological change. We ﬁrst study how unilateral climate policy
affects technological change and (directly and indirectly) carbon leakage (i.e. the
emissions of countries that are not subject to climate policy). Finally, chapter 5
presents an empirical analysis of production functions, used in dynamic climate





icy in an attempt to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, other countries get incen-
tives to increase their emissions. This is called carbon leakage. For example, when
the production of energy-intensive goods is reduced in constrained countries due
to the introduction of an emission constraint, the international prices of these
goods will increase, giving unconstrained countries incentives to increase their
production of energy-intensive goods and export them to constrained countries.
In addition, reduced demand for fossil fuels from constrained countries reduces
their prices, inducing unconstrained countries to substitute towards fossil fuels.
Indeed, United States Senator Chuck Hagel (co-sponsor of the 1997 Byrd-Hagel
Resolution,whichstatesthattheUSSenatewillnotbeasignatorytotheKyotoPro-
tocol) argued that “The main effect of the assumed policy would be to redistribute
output,employment,andemissionsfromparticipatingtonon-participatingcoun-
tries”.12
12Remarks by Senator Hagel at "Countdown to Kyoto – International Conference on The Conse-
quences of Mandatory Global CO2 Emission Reductions", August 21, 1997 Canberra, Australia.20 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
The price changes underlying possible channels of carbon leakage, however, also
modify the incentives for innovation, changing the level and, most importantly,
the direction of technological change (i.e. how technology levels develop across
industries). Once the available technology changes as a result of climate policy,
however, so do the responses of the unconstrained countries. The main research
question of chapter 4 is therefore:
3. How does the introduction of directed technological change affect carbon
leakage?
In this chapter, we study the consequences of induced (directed) technological
change on carbon leakage using a stylized theoretical model of the interactions
betweenconstrainedandunconstrainedcountries,whichfocusesontransmission
mechanisms based on terms-of-trade effects. In order to be able to highlight the
effects of induced technological change, we model two countries that are perfectly
symmetric as refers to preferences, technology and endowments. In this way we
rule out any other potential source of carbon leakage, which would cloud the ef-
fects of technological change. Indeed, we only allow the two countries to differ in
one crucial respect: one country imposes a binding emission cap, while the other
remains unconstrained. As the countries are symmetric before the imposition of
the cap, the adjustment process represents a pure response to policy. In this sense,
the paper analyzes a ‘policy-induced pollution-haven effect’.
We show that, when (the composition of) technology is allowed to adjust endoge-
nously, induced technological change always leads to a reduction in the degree of
carbon leakage. As this technology channel of carbon leakage is not taken into ac-
count in the numerical literature on carbon leakage, the leakage rates (degree to
which emission reductions are offset by increased emissions from unconstrained
countries) that are estimated by this literature may be too high. In addition, we
ﬁnd that unconstrained countries might have incentives to reduce their emissions
aftertheintroductionofunilateralclimatepolicyinothercountries,whentheelas-
ticity of demand for carbon-based energy is sufﬁciently high. This would lead to a
negative rate of carbon leakage.
Chapter5: Productionfunctionsforclimatepolicymodeling–anempiricalana-
lysis
In chapter 5 we have a look at the production functions that are used in dynamic
climate policy models. These models generally use CES production functions with
capital, labour and energy as inputs. Most models either ﬁrst combine capital
and labour in one CES function, and then combine this composite with energy
in another CES function with a different value for the elasticity of substitution, orCHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 21
have all three inputs in a one-level CES function. Recent models in this literature
introduce endogenous technological change, and study for example the effect of
endogenous technological change on the costs of climate policy. A problem with
this literature is that the values for the elasticities of substitution of the production
function are not based on empirical estimates, while the values for these elastici-
ties might affect the results with respectto the effects of endogenous technological
change.
In this chapter, we estimate CES production functions with capital, labour and en-
ergy as inputs. The research questions are:
4. (a) Which nesting structure ﬁts the data best?
(b) How do the values for the elasticities used in the literature compare to
the values we ﬁnd?
(c) How might the results of climate policy models with endogenous tech-
nological change be affected when using the elasticities found in this
chapter?
We ﬁnd that the (KL)E nesting structure, that is a nesting structure in which capital
andlabourarecombinedﬁrst,ﬁtsthedatabest,butwegenerallycannotrejectthat
the production function has all inputs in one CES function (i.e. a 3-input 1-level
CES function). These nesting structures are used by most of the recent models in
the literature. However, for the (KL)E nesting structure we reject that elasticities
are equal to 1, in favour of considerably lower values, while several of the climate
policy models in the table use a Cobb-Douglas function for (part of the) produc-
tionfunction. Finallywetestfordifferenttechnologytrendsandrejectthehypoth-
esis that only energy-speciﬁc technological change matters, and the hypothesis
of input-neutral total factor productivity (TFP) growth, in favour of factor-speciﬁc
technological change. That is, technology trends differ signiﬁcantly between capi-
tal, labour and energy.13
Many of the recent models in the climate policy modeling literature use higher
elasticities than those that we found in our empirical analysis. The higher an elas-
ticity of substitution, the easier it is to substitute away from an input that faces
an increase in its relative price, and the lower will be the need to invest in input-
saving technological change. As a consequence, climate policy models that use
13I distinguish between technological change and substitution purely from the abstract perspec-
tive of (CES) production functions: substitution takes place instantaneously and substitution pos-
sibilities are determined by a parameter called the elasticity of substitution (movements along a
production isoquant), while technological change takes time and affects the (relative) marginal
productivity of inputs even when their levels do not change (shifts of and changes in the shape of
the isoquant). In reality, however, the line between substitution and technological change is thin.
For more on this topic, see Sue Wing (2006).22 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
elasticities of substitution that are too high may underestimate the role of endoge-
nous technological change in reducing the costs of climate policy. Furthermore,
energy-speciﬁc technological change and total factor productivity growth (even at
the industry or country level) all take away degrees of freedom from an economy.
Adding additional ﬂexibility to a model could lead to a lower burden of climate
policy on an economy.
1.2.3 Main ﬁndings of this thesis
This thesis shows that taking into account the dynamic aspects of climate policy
may reverseconclusionsfoundinstaticmodels. Ingeneral, wecandivide our con-
clusions in good news and warnings for proponents of climate policy and policy
makers. We begin with an overview of the good news.
Some good news...
The conclusions of chapters 4 and 5 provide some good news for the proponents
of climate policy. In chapter 4 we ﬁnd that carbon leakage may be smaller than
has been thought so far. That is, the increase in emissions by countries without cli-
mate policy in response to the emission reduction by e.g. those countries that rat-
iﬁed the Kyoto Protocol may have been overestimated in the current quantitative
literatureoncarbonleakage. Wearguethatthesamepricechangesthatcauseleak-
age in the short-run, also affect incentives to innovate. This induced-technology
effect works in the opposite direction, and tends to reduce the incentives for un-
constrained countries to increase their emissions. Since energy in effect becomes
scarcer due to the constraint on carbon dioxide emissions (that to a large extent
result from energy production), it becomes attractive to innovate in technologies
that increase the (marginal) productivity of energy. In equilibrium then, this in-
creased productivity of energy leads to a higher price for energy for both the con-
strained and unconstrained countries, and hence to a reduction in energy use and
emissions. Indeed, if the elasticity of relative demand for carbon-based energy is
sufﬁciently large, unconstrained countries might even be induced to reduce their
emissions, which goes against conclusions of static models.
In chapter 5 we have a look at the literature that studies the effect of endogenous
technological change on the cost of climate policy. This literature argues that as
climate policy affects prices of energy and fossil fuels, it will also affect the incen-
tives to innovate (as we argue in chapter 4 as well). These new technologies might
then in effect reduce the amount of emissions per unit of output, leading to lower
costs of climate policy thanwhen the role of technological change is not taken into
account. Our empirical analysis in chapter 5 shows that many papers in this lit-CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 23
erature use elasticities of substitution in their production functions that have val-
ues that are too high. We argue that when this literature uses the lower elasticities
that we ﬁnd, their conclusions on the effect of endogenous technological change
might change. To be more precise, when using lower elasticities, the incentive to
innovate will be higher (as substitution possibilities are smaller), leading to more
investment in new technologies, and hence a bigger effect of endogenous techno-
logical change on, and lower costs of, climate policy. Of course, with lower substi-
tution elasticities, it will be harder to substitute away from energy, which might in
turn lead to higher costs of climate policy. Which of these two effects dominates
in the long run is an open question, and the answer will differ for each paper, as it
depends on the initial values of the model’s substitution elasticities.
...and some warnings.
Chapters 2 and 3 on the other hand provide some warnings for policy makers. In
chapter 2 we study the optimal response of resource owners to a ceiling on carbon
dioxide emissions, and argue that it might not be optimal to substitute from high-
carbon resources to low-carbon resources. As it is not only carbon content that
matters for the optimal response to climate policy, but also marginal productivity
of the resources (determined by their scarcity), it is the productivity per unit car-
bon dioxide that matters. Our (preliminary) empirical analysis suggests that pro-
ductivity per unit of carbon dioxide might be higher for oil than it is for gas. That
is, it might be optimal to substitute from the low-carbon input gas to the high-
carbon input oil, in response to climate policy. This counter-intuitive result has
an important warning for policy makers: when fossil fuels are priced to their car-
bon content, supporting policies to move to a low-carbon economy (for example
through subsidies on gas) might increase the costs of climate policy and increase
thepolicy’sburdenontheeconomy. Whencarbondioxideisproperlypriced,ﬁrms
will decide which input gives them the highest level of output per unit of energy.
Subsidizing a high-carbon input that effectively has a high productivity per unit of
output induces ﬁrms to make use of less productive resources, which harms the
economy.
In chapter 3 we study the announcement effects of climate policy. Governments
usually announce climate policy some years in advance, partly to give ﬁrms time
to adjust. As especially the power generation industry is facing ﬁxed stocks of in-
stalled capital in coal and gas ﬁred power plants, their scope to react to a limit in
carbon dioxide emissions is limited. Giving ﬁrms time to prepare may lower the
policy’s burden on the economy. However, when taking into account the long-
run dynamic aspects of climate policy, announcement of policy might be good for
ﬁrms,butbadforthepolicy’stargettoreduceharmfulemissions. Asresourceown-24 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
ers see their future prospects to sell their resource decline, they have incentives to
lower the price and sell more of their resource in the period between announce-
ment of the policy and the instant at which the policy becomes effective. Indeed,
we show that announcement of the policy induces an increase in extraction and
emissions at the instant of announcement. As the idea underlying the policy is to
stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (Article 2 of the
UNFCCC),thisemissionsincreasegoesdirectlyagainst thespiritofthepolicy. The
key message of this chapter is that there is a trade-off between the economic gain
from pre-announcing a ceiling on carbon dioxide emissions, and the environmen-
tal loss stemming from an increase in emissions in the period between announce-
ment and implementation. The shorter the interim period, the larger will be the
instantaneous effect. Of course, immediate implementation postpones emissions
untiltheconstraintceasestobebinding,whichisthemainpurposeofclimatepol-
icy. This lesson should be taken into account by countries that do not yet have a
binding constraint on carbon dioxide emissions.Part I
Climate policy and the optimal extraction of fossil fuelsCHAPTER 2




omy. Substitution from high-carbon to low-carbon energy sources may allow an
economy to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions at lower cost. For example, a
country can build gas-fueled powerplants instead of coal-fueled powerplants. Or
thecountrycanexpandsectorsthatrelyonlow-carboninputsatthecostofsectors
that mainly use high-carbon inputs. The overall cost of climate change policies
therefore depends on the behaviour of both energy users and energy suppliers,
and important questions in this context are: how should energy users substitute
between different energy sources; should they make a transition towards a ’low-
carbon economy’; how will resource rents for energy producing countries change;
shouldtheyleavereservesofhigh-carbonresources(e.g. coal)unexploited,atleast
for a while?
In a standard static partial equilibrium setting, a CO2 emission tax affects the user
cost of high-carbon energy more than that of low-carbon energy and substitution
will take place towards low-carbon energy. We show that in the more appropriate
dynamic setting, with energy coming from non-renewable resource stocks, the re-
sults are quite different. Extending the canonical non-renewable resource model
with a second resource, we ﬁnd that a binding CO2 emission constraint not nec-
14This chapter is a slightly adjusted reprint of Smulders and van der Werf (2008). We thank Jean-
PierreAmigues, GeirAsheim, RossellaBargiacchi, CorradoDiMaria, ChristianGroth, MichelMore-
aux, and Cees Withagen for useful discussions.
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essarily calls for substitution towards low-carbon fuels in the short-run, but – de-
pending on a well-deﬁned measure of scarcity of the two resources – may instead
call for relatively more intensive high-carbon fuel use in the short-run and less of
it in the long-run.
Taking the current global policy regarding global warming as a starting point, we
study how a permanent cap on carbon dioxide emissions (’Kyoto forever’) affects
thecompositionofenergyuse,thetimingofextractionofdifferentenergyresources
and their scarcity rents when the government uses a cost-effective instrument. We
build a model that is as close as possible to the standard non-renewable resource
model and distinguish between two non-renewable resources, for example coal
and natural gas, that are imperfect substitutes in production and differ in CO2
emissions per unit of effective energy.
We build our arguments on the fact that high-carbon and low-carbon inputs are
imperfect substitutes at an aggregate level. Substitution between different types
of products implies indirect substitution between energy types and types of fossil
fuels. Forexample,ashiftinthetransportsectorfromroadtransporttorailimplies
a change in the fossil fuel mix as trucks use oil-based products while the rail sector
uses electricity, which can be generated by gas-fueled powerplants. The energy
sector can substitute between fossil fuel types when deciding upon investment in
new powerplants: although for an individual power plant the choice between coal,
oil, and gas is a discrete one, the point of indifference between the three inputs
may differ at different locations, leading to imperfect substitution at the aggregate
level.
We show that relative extraction in the constrained economy not only depends on
the carbon content of the two inputs, but also on their relative productivity and
physical scarcity. The best way to cope with an emission constraint is to intertem-
porally reallocate the extraction of the two given resource stocks such that produc-
tion per unit of carbon dioxide emissions is relatively high at the time the emission
constraint is binding, and low when the constraint no longer (or – in the case of an
anticipated constraint – not yet) binds. Hence the constrained economy uses the
resource with the lowest amount of emissions per unit of output relatively more
intensively, as compared to an unconstrained economy. This resource is not nec-
essarily the resource with lowest amount of carbon per unit of energy: because of
diminishing returns to each of the energy inputs, the scarcer a resource relatively
is, the higher its marginal productivity per unit of emissions.
Our empirical results suggest that it is cost-effective to substitute away from dirty
coal to cleaner oil or gas. However, when it comes to choose between relatively
clean natural gas and the dirtier input oil, the paradoxical "dirty-ﬁrst result" might
apply, i.e. there should be substitution from (low-carbon) gas towards (high-car-
bon) oil, as the latter is found to be relatively more productive per unit of CO2CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 29
emissions.
The option of substituting low-carbon for high-carbon fuels to meet climate tar-
gets has been studied analytically in Chakravorty et al. (2008) and numerically in
Chakravorty et al. (1997). The latter paper develops a numerical integrated assess-
ment model with several non-renewables (oil, coal and natural gas), multiple en-
ergy demand sectors, and a clean renewable resource. The authors simulate three
scenarios for technical change with optimal climate policy, but do not analytically
identify the forces underlying relative extraction patterns. In Chakravorty et al.
(2008), climate policy consists of an exogenous ceiling on the stock of pollution. A
high- and a low-carbon fossil fuel, together with a clean backstop technology, are
used in energy generation. The optimal order of extraction is studied. This work
maintains the assumption that the fossil fuels are perfect substitutes, so that often
one resource is exclusively used and at certain points in time there is a complete
switch in resource use from one to the other fuel.
Most theoretical papers studying climate policy and fossil fuel extraction use a
single (polluting) non-renewable resource. Withagen (1994) extends the standard
Hotelling (1931) model with stock externalities from resource use and studies the
optimal extraction path. Grimaud and Rougé (2005) treat pollution as a ﬂow and
extend the model with endogenous technological change and growth.
A second branch of theoretical papers has both a polluting non-renewable and a
non-polluting backstop technology. Tahvonen (1997) extends Withagen’s model
with extraction costs and a backstop and shows that, if the initial stock of external-
itiesislowenough, theextractionpathofthenon-renewablemayhaveaninverted
U-shape form. In a related paper, Chakravorty et al. (2006) study the effects of an
exogenous ceiling on the stock of emissions on the use of the non-renewable re-
sourceandthebackstoptechnologyduringandaftertheperiodthattheconstraint
is binding.
Few papers study imperfect substitution between non-renewable resources. Ex-
ceptions are Beckmann (1974) and Hartwick (1978), but these early studies are not
concerned with carbon emissions.
In the remainder of the chapter, we ﬁrst present our model in section 2.1, and we
study the economy without any form of climate policy in section 2.2. In section
2.3 we study an unexpected and initially binding constant CO2 emission ceiling,
and show that it might be optimal to use relatively more of the high-carbon input.
In section 2.4 we study the empirical relevance of this paradoxical “dirty-ﬁrst” re-
sult. Section 2.5 presents the effects of an announced constraint, and in section
2.6 we look at the robustness of our results with respect to alternative policies and
technological change. We conclude in section 2.7.30 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
2.1 The model
The representative consumer derives utility from ﬁnal good Y and faces an in-
tertemporal budget constraint: dV (t)/dt Æ r (t)V (t)¡Y (t). Here V (t) is wealth






where ½ is the utility discount rate. Maximizing (2.1) subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint implies the following Ramsey rule:
b Y (t)Ær (t)¡½. (2.2)
where, as in the remainder of this chapter, the hat denotes the growth rate (b Y Æ
dlnY /dt).
The competitive ﬁnal goods industry produces Y from two fossil fuel inputs, H
andL,bothscaledtounitsofenergy,accordingtothefollowingconstantreturnsto













where A is the level of total factor productivity, Ri is the amount extracted of re-
source i 2 {H,L}, ´H and ´L are positive technology parameters and ¾ 2 (0,1) is
the constant elasticity of substitution. The use of fossil fuels causes emissions of
carbondioxide. ThetwoinputsdifferintheirCO2 emissionintensityperunitofen-
ergy and we denote the (constant) CO2 emission coefﬁcients of H and L by "H and
"L respectively, with "H È "L so that H is the relatively dirty or high-carbon input.
The total amount of emissions is denoted by Z.15 If the economy is subject to an
emissions constraint, total emissions cannot exceed a maximally allowed amount
¯ Z, according to the following constraint:
"HRH (t)Å"LRL(t)Æ Z (t)· ¯ Z. (2.4)
As we are interested in the reaction of the economy to the constraint rather than
in optimal climate policy itself, we assume that the constraint ¯ Z is exogenous. The
government allocates tradable emission permits over producers in the ﬁnal goods
industry, who trade them at a market price pZ and buy resources of type i at price
15Our notation is consistent with the measurement of Ri in units of energy and Z in units of
carbon. By rescaling Ri and Z it is possible to normalize - without loss of generality - three of the
four parameters "L, "H, ´L, and ´H, to unity. However, to facilitate interpretation and comparison
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pRi.16 The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one for every period. Firms










Æ pRi Å"ipZ. (2.5)
This equation states thatthemarginalrevenue fromresourceinputi (the marginal
product at the left-hand side) equals its marginal cost (the user price at the right-
hand side), which consists of the price of the resource augmented with the cost of
pollution in case the constraint is binding.17
The two fossil fuels are extracted from stocks of non-renewable resources, SH and









Resource owners maximize the net present value of proﬁts from exploiting the
non-renewableresourcestocks,takingresourcepricepRi asgiven. Extractioncosts
are assumed to be zero so the resource price is a pure scarcity rent. For each of the
resources this results in the familiar Hotelling rule:
b pRi (t)Ær (t). (2.7)
FromthisweseethattherelativeresourcerentpRH/pRL willbeconstantovertime,
as both rents grow at the same rate.
Wearenowreadytostudyextractionofthetworesources. Weﬁrststudyextraction
in an economy without a CO2 emission constraint and then move to a constrained
but otherwise identical economy.
2.2 Theeconomywithout(theprospectof)climatepol-
icy
Suppose that from some instant T (possibly equal to 0) on the economy is uncon-
strained and does not expect future climate policy. In this case the economy is
16Although we present the results for the decentralized economy with regulation through trad-
able pollution permits, it can be shown that a planner who maximizes utility subject to the exoge-
nous emission constraint chooses exactly the same allocation. Hence, the setting we study is one
of cost-effective environmental regulation.
17Note that we will always have an interior solution. If Ri Æ0 we would have Y Æ0 for ¾·1, while
@Y /@Ri Æ A
¾¡1
¾ ´i (Y /Ri)1/¾ !1 for ¾È1 which violates (2.5) for ﬁnite pRi and pZ.32 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
described by a pure depletion or cake eating model from t Æ T on (see e.g. Heal,
1993). Time differentiating (2.5) (with pZ Æ 0) and substituting (2.7), we ﬁnd that
both inputs grow at the same rate. Combining the results with (2.3), we ﬁnd that
the two scarcity rents grow at rate d pRi Æ r Æ b A. Finally, substituting (2.2), we ﬁnd
that extraction and emissions decrease at a rate equal to the utility discount rate:
b RH Æ b RL Æ¡½ 8 t ¸T, (2.8)
After integrating (2.8) and imposing the constraint that forward-looking resource
owners anticipate that eventually all reserves will be sold, we ﬁnd that the extrac-
tion rates of the two resources can be expressed as:
Ri (t)Æ½Si (t) 8 t ¸T. (2.9)
Consequently total emissions equal
Z(t)Æ½¢("HSH(t)Å"LSL(t)) 8 t ¸T (2.10)
(see(2.4)). Accordingto(2.8)and(2.9),relativeextractionisconstantovertimeand






8 t ¸T. (2.11)
From the ﬁrst order conditions (2.5) and equilibrium relative extraction (2.11) we











These results reveal that as long as the economy is unconstrained and does not
expect future climate policy, relative extraction in the unconstrained economy is
constant and equals relative stocks at each point in time. Since conservation of
bothresourcestocksrequiresthatresourceownersearnthesamereturnonthetwo
resources, both resource prices grow at the common rate r in equilibrium. Hence,
the relative price is constant over time and the constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion function then implies that relative demand is constant as well. As resource
owners want to fully exploit the available reserves, from (2.1) and (2.7), stock dy-
namics require relative extraction to equal relative stocks which implies that the
initial relative scarcity rent in an unconstrained economy is determined by initial
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2.3 An unexpected emission constraint
We now introduce the constraint on emissions. The constraint is unexpectedly
introduced at time t Æ 0 and is binding by then. It will stay at the level ¯ Z forever,
which is known by all agents. The constraint will not bind forever, though, since
resource stocks, from which emissions stem, are depleted over time (cf. (2.10)). In
particular, we derive the following result:
Lemma 2.1. Deﬁne T as the instant from which onward emissions cease to be con-








Proof. The total amount of CO2 that will be emitted from t Æ 0 on can be writ-
ten as "HSH0Å"LSL0 Æ["H (SH0¡SH(T))Å"L(SL0¡SL(T))]Å["HSH(T)Å"LSL(T)].
The ﬁrst term in square brackets represents total emissions in the period that the
economy is constrained, so this term equals T ¯ Z. For any t ¸ T, we can use (2.4)
and (2.9), from which we ﬁnd that the second term in square brackets equals ¯ Z/½.
Combining results, we ﬁnd (2.13).
Clearly, a larger initial stock or a stricter environmental policy implies a longer pe-
riod of being restricted. A lower discount rate, and hence more patient consumers,
implies that the economy is suffering the constraint for a shorter period as the
economy tends to extract and pollute less (see (2.10)).
To meet the emissions constraint, (2.4), resource use can be reduced equi-propor-
tionally, or its composition can be changed (relative to the period before t Æ 0). In
the latter case, emissions per unit of output will change:
Lemma 2.2. Deﬁne ¯ S ´ (´H"L/´L"H)¾. Emissions intensity Z/Y reaches a mini-
mum for RH/RL Æ ¯ S and increases in jRH/RL ¡ ¯ Sj.
Proof. From (2.3) and (2.4) we ﬁnd that Z/Y is a function of RH/RL only. Taking
the ﬁrst order derivative d(Z/Y )/d(RH/RL), we ﬁnd the result.
Because of imperfect substitutability, a very high or very low level of one of the
resource inputs – while still meeting the emission constraint – results in relatively
little output and a high emission intensity. The more polluting one input relatively
is (as indicated by a relatively large "i), the less intensively this input must be used
should one want to minimize emissions intensity. Similarly, if one input is much
more productive than the other one (as indicated by the ´i’s), intensive use of this
input results in relatively high output and low emission intensity.34 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
In equilibrium, the development of relative extraction in the constrained economy
with an unannounced emission constraint can be summarized by the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.1. Suppose a CO2 emission constraint is unexpectedly introduced.
Then
1. if the high-carbon input (low-carbon input) is relatively scarce, that is if
SH0/SL0 Ç(È) ¯ S,
(a) the relative scarcity rent pRH/pRL jumps up (down) on impact;
(b) relativeextractionRH/RL jumpsup(down)onimpact,butdecreases(in-
creases) over time as long as the economy is constrained;
(c) relativeextractionstaysabove(below)theleveloftherelativestocksSH/SL
aslongastheeconomyisconstrained,butequalsrelativestockswhenthe
constraint ceases to be binding;
(d) the high-carbon resource stock declines faster (less fast) than the low-
carbon resource stock as long as the economy is constrained;
2. if the high- and low-carbon input are equally scarce (that is, if SH0/SL0 Æ ¯ S),
the relative scarcity rent, relative extraction and relative stocks do not change
after the imposition of the emission constraint;
3. if the two inputs are not equally scarce, emissions per unit of output jump
down but increase over time to a higher level compared to the period before
the constraint was imposed; they remain constant after the constraint ceases
to be binding.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
The proposition states that at the instant on which emissions become unexpect-
edly constrained, substitution takes place towards the relatively scarce input, that
is towards input i for which Si0/Sj0 Ç ¯ S, where ¯ S ´ (´H"L/´L"H)¾ see lemma 2.2.
The increase in the relative use of the scarce input implies that over time this input
will become even scarcer, since the relative stock Si/Sj decreases over time (part
1(d) of the proposition). This explains the jump in the relative scarcity rent (part
1(a) of the proposition).
We illustrate the paths of extraction, for the case in whichSH0/SL0 Ç ¯ S, by the thick
arrows in Figure 2.1. The constrained economy moves along line ¯ Z, at which emis-
sions are at the imposed ceiling and which is deﬁned byRH Æ( ¯ Z ¡"LRL)/"H. Since
over time the economy moves to lower production isoquants, pollution per unit ofCHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 35
GDP gradually increases over time. The unconstrained economy, which according
to(2.9)extractsaconstantfractionofeachavailablestock, movesdownalongaray
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Figure 2.1: Extraction paths for SH(0)/SL(0)Ç ¯ S: the unconstrained economy (thin
arrows) and the economy with an unannounced constraint (thick arrows)
Two basic forces drive the evolution of relative energy use: physical scarcity and
marginal productivity per unit of pollution. The emission constraint induces the
economy to save on pollution per unit of GDP. If relative energy use, RH/RL, was
equal to ¯ S, output per unit of emissions would be maximized; the closer relative
use approaches ¯ S, the higher output per unit of emissions. As the unconstrained
economy aligns relative resource use with resource supply, as measured by relative
stocks, it uses relatively little of the relatively scarce resource, while this resource
might have the highest marginal product per unit of CO2. Once the constraint is
imposed, the economy starts to use more of the resource that has highest marginal
productivity per unit of pollution, and hence relative extraction jumps closer to
¯ S. However, relative use cannot deviate too much from relative stocks, since at
the time the constraint no longer binds (time T), relative resource use and avail-
able stocks have to be aligned again. Therefore the pollution constraint makes the
economy intertemporally reallocate the extraction of resources, such that output
per unit of pollution is high when the pollution constraint is most binding, and
then gradually substitutes towards the resource with lower productivity per unit of
pollution as the constraint becomes less binding. Eventually, once the constraint
does not bind anymore, the economy smoothly ends up at the point where re-36 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
source use and supply are aligned.
The implication is that the high-carbon input might be used intensively ﬁrst. This
"dirty-ﬁrstresult"ariseswhenthehigh-carbonresourceisphysicallyrelativelyscar-
ce, such that resource use in line with relative stocks implies that the high-carbon
input has higher productivity per unit of CO2. For future reference it is useful to








´ ¯ S. (2.14)
To further explain why relative resource use changes over time and intertempo-
ral substitution between high- and low-carbon resources takes place in the con-
strained economy, we divide (2.5) for the low-carbon input by that for the high-















carbon resources. This equation reveals that relative demand for energy sources
depends on the relative user price, which is a weighted average of relative scarcity
rents and relative pollution costs. Relative scarcity rents (pRH/pRL) and pollution
costs ("H/"L) are constant over time (see (2.12)). However, the share of pollution
cost in the user price ³ gradually falls, since scarcity rents increase and the price of
pollution permits falls. As a result, the relative user price of high-carbon resources
changes over time, thus inducing intertemporal substitution.
Whethertherelativeuserpricerisesorfallsdependsonthesignof"H/"L¡pRH/pRL
(see (2.15)). If "H/"L Ç pRH/pRL, the relative user price of high-carbon resources
increases over time. Intuitively, with this inequality the high-carbon resource is
relatively costly mainly because of scarcity cost rather than pollution cost, and this
resource beneﬁts the least from lower pollution costs. Users then gradually sub-
stitute towards the low-carbon resource during the period that the emissions con-
straint is binding. This case arises if the inequality in (2.14) is satisﬁed.18 In the
opposite situation, with"H/"L È pRH/pRL and (2.14) holding with reverse inequal-
ity, the high-carbon resource mainly beneﬁts from pollution price reductions and
users gradually substitute to the high-carbon resource.
We conclude this section by a comparative static result. As climate change agree-
mentstypicallyspecifyﬁxed-terminstallmentsofpollutionreductionandaresub-
ject to renegotiation, it is relevant to study the effects of a change in the stringency
of the pollution cap. If the emission constraint becomes tighter, pollution costs
18If SH0/SL0 Ç ¯ S, we have RH/RL Ç ¯ S, from (2.22) in the appendix, and then "H/"L Ç pRH/pRL,
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become a more important determinant in the cost of resource use as compared to
scarcity rents, ceteris paribus. As a consequence the relative extraction rate jumps
closer towards ¯ S (where ¯ S is the level that would apply if scarcity did not matter),
as is stated by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. Suppose a binding CO2 constraint is unexpectedly further tight-
ened, and let input i be the relatively scarce input: Si0/Sj0 Ç (´i"j/´j"i)¾. Then,
compared to the case with the initial (looser) constraint,
1. the economy is constrained for a longer period;
2. relative extraction jumps further towards the relatively scarce input;
3. Si/Sj is lower at the instant the constraint ceases to be binding, and hence
relative extraction Ri/Rj will be lower when unconstrained;
4. the relative scarcity rent pRi/pRj jumps further upwards;
5. the carbon-intensity of output jumps further downwards.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
With a more stringent constraint, fewer resources can be extracted so that it takes
longer before unconstrained emissions are below the level of the ceiling and the
economy is constrained for a longer period. Furthermore, the tighter constraint
induces the economy to further increase the productivity per unit of emissions.
The resulting relative extraction rate and relative resource rent are closer to the
level (viz. ¯ S) that would apply in an economy in which pollution only (rather than
scarcity) would matter.
2.4 The empirical relevance of the “dirty-ﬁrst condi-
tion”
The necessary condition for the relative use of high-carbon inputs to go up (our
"dirty-ﬁrst result") is, as given in inequality condition (2.14), that the high-carbon
input is relatively scarce in a physical sense, but relatively productive in terms of
its marginal contribution to output per unit of CO2 emissions. We now want to
explore whether this inequality could hold in reality. We use data on prices, con-
sumption, and stocks of coal, oil and gas, for the period 1984-2005 (1987-2005 for38 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
coal due to availability of data on coal prices), to see for which fuels the inequality
(2.14) holds.19
Productivity parameters ´i in (2.14) cannot be directly observed, but can be de-
rived from observed equilibrium prices and quantities: assuming the data reﬂect a
zero pollution tax and using the ﬁrms’ optimality conditions (2.5) (with pZ Æ 0) to











A ﬁrst look at the data shows that roughly the following relations hold:
Scoal(t) À Soil(t) ¼ Sgas(t); Roil(t) À Rcoal(t) È Rgas(t);
poil(t)/"oil ¼ pgas(t)/"gas È pcoal(t)/"coal. Firstweconsiderthecombinationwith
H Æ coal and L Æ oil: the left-hand side of the inequality in (2.39) exceeds unity
and the right-hand side is smaller than unity (for any ¾¸0). Hence, the inequality
(the "dirty-ﬁrst condition") does not hold and we conclude that, according to the
data, climate policy will induce substitution from high-carbon coal to low-carbon
oil. If we make the same comparison for H Æ coal and L Æ gas, we see that with
¾¸0 the inequality is again likely to be violated. Hence the data suggest that, after
the introduction of a ceiling on the amount of CO2 emitted, there will be substi-
tution from high-carbon coal towards low-carbon gas. With H Æ oil and L Æ gas,
however, the inequality in (2.39) is likely to hold. That is, the data suggest that
climate policy induces substitution from low-carbon gas to high-carbon oil.
In the next step, we looked at the inequality in (2.39) for individual years. With
a production function with coal and oil as inputs, we then ﬁnd that the inequal-
ity is indeed violated for any ¾ ¸ 0, for all years, and the pattern of substitution
is towards the low-carbon input oil. The same result holds when H Æ coal and
L Æ gas: climate policy induces substitution from high-carbon input coal towards
the low-carbon input gas. However, when H Æ oil and L Æ gas, the results are in-
decisive. For 11 out of our 22 observations we ﬁnd that the result depends on the
size of ¾, while for the other half of our observations the inequality holds for any
¾ ¸ 0 (hence substitution towards the high-carbon input). In the former case the
inequality holds for values of ¾ that are not too large, where the critical value of ¾
ranges from 0.6 to 17.5.
As a ﬁnal exploration, we used our data to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between oil and gas. We used both country-level panel data and world-level time
series data to estimate productivity parameters and both short-run and long-run
19We used data from the 2006 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, available at
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview. We converted all data in Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalents.
We use relative emission coefﬁcients that are compatible with US and German data. Appendix 2.B
contains further details on data collection, the calibration, and regressions.CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 39
elasticities of substitution. All regressions that report a positive value for the elas-
ticity of substitution, and for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no au-
tocorrelation, report an elasticity of substitution between oil and gas that is sufﬁ-
ciently low for the inequality in (2.39) to hold. Hence, the regressions suggest that,
following from Proposition 2.1, with a ceiling on carbon dioxide emissions, it is
optimal to substitute from low-carbon gas towards high-carbon oil.
In sum: Our data suggest that both oil and gas are more productive per unit of
CO2 than scarce, relative to coal, and hence climate policy is likely to induce sub-
stitution from the high-carbon fuel coal to the low(er)-carbon inputs oil and gas.
However, according to our data the marginal productivity of carbon coming from
the use of oil is higher than the marginal productivity of carbon coming from gas,
while the two resources are roughly equally scarce in a physical sense. As our the-
ory suggests, this would make it optimal to substitute from gas towards oil when
climate policy constrains CO2 emissions, and the "dirty-ﬁrst result" might be of
more than just theoretical interest.
2.5 Announcement effects
We now investigate how the economy reacts to an emission constraint in the case
that agents anticipate the actual implementation of the policy.20 In particular, we
study the path of resource extraction for the situation in which the carbon con-
straint starts to be effective at time tK È 0, but is announced at time t Æ 0, so that
preparations can be made over the period t 2(0,tK). In chapter 3 we have a closer
look at the effects of an announced emission constraint, but then we focus on the
path of emissions after announcement, and restrict ourselves to the case of only
one fossil fuel.
Agents maximize the same objective functions subject to the same constraints as
in the previous section, with the only difference that the constraint (2.4) is now
binding from t Æ tK instead of t Æ 0. The resulting path of relative extraction can
be characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. Suppose a CO2 emission constraint is announced before it is actu-
ally implemented. Then,
1. if SH0/SL0 Ç(È) ¯ S,
20Kennedy (2002) also studies the effect of an announced emission constraint. Using a two-
period model without resources he shows that it may be optimal for a small country to reduce
emissions before the 2008-2012 commitment period, either because of co-beneﬁts (e.g. reductions
in emissions of other pollutants than CO2 that go together with a reduction in fossil fuel combus-
tion) or because early investments in physical capital help reducing adjustment costs.40 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
(a) relative extraction RH/RL (i) jumps down (up) at the announcement,
(ii) stays constant until actual implementation, (iii) jumps up (down) at
actual implementation and (iv) gradually declines (increases) until the
pollutionconstraintceasestobebinding,attainingthelevelithadbefore
implementation;
(b) the high-carbon resource stock (i) gets depleted less fast (faster) than the
low-carbon resource stock between announcement and start of imple-
mentation; (ii) the opposite happens when the pollution constraint is
binding;
(c) attheinstantofimplementation, emissionsperunitofGDPjumpdown;
2. if SH0/SL0 Æ ¯ S, relative extraction, relative stocks, and emissions per unit of
GDP remain constant forever;
3. at the instant of implementation, both output and emissions jump down.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
The proposition implies that the announcement of an emission constraint at a
future date immediately causes a drop in the rate of extraction of the relatively
more productive resource (in terms of GDP per unit of emissions) and a rush on
resources that will be used less after implementation. As a consequence the con-
strained period starts with (relatively) more of the productive resource, and re-
sourceownersoftheotherresourcefaceasmallerloss(i.e.asmallerdropinscarcity
rent), as compared to the situation without announcement. At the instant the con-
straint becomes binding the extraction rate of the productive input jumps up, and
from then on relative extraction develops as would be the case with an unantici-
pated constraint.
We illustrate the extraction paths for the case where SH0/SL0 Ç ¯ S in Figure 2.2 by
the thick arrows. For the same case, Figure 2.3 illustrates the development of rel-
ative extraction and relative stocks over time. Initially relative extraction is below
relative stocks, causing an increase in the latter, while after the introduction of the
constraint relative extraction jumps up to a level higher than that of the relative
stocks, and hence the latter decline until relative extraction and relative stocks are
equal at the instant that the constraint ceases to be binding (part 1 of proposition
3).
At the time the constraint is implemented, the economy substitutes towards the
more productive resource, in terms of GDP per unit of CO2). As a consequence,
the economy’s pollution intensity Z/Y decreases. Since the introduction of the
constraint is expected and fully anticipated, the period between announcement
and implementation is used to intertemporally shift resource extraction in order
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Figure 2.2: Extraction paths for SH(0)/SL(0)Ç ¯ S: the unconstrained economy (thin
arrows) and the economy with an announced constraint (thick arrows)
2.6 Alternative policies and technical change
In this section we check whether our results, and particularly the possibility of
a “dirty-ﬁrst” result, are robust with respect to alternative policies (a stock con-
straint and an emission intensity constraint) and to the introduction of technolog-
ical change in the model.
2.6.1 Stock and emission intensity constraints
The emissions reduction policy studied so far constrained the ﬂow of pollution, as
the simplest interpretation of the Kyoto protocol. However, it is widely recognized
that not the ﬂow but the stock of cumulative emissions, or CO2 concentration lev-
els, should be the criterion of sound climate change policy. Moreover, even a ﬂow
constraint can be combined with a ﬂexibility provision that ﬁrms could “bank”
emission permits, allowing them to keep permits for later use or borrow against
the future. To check how our results could change with an emissions concentra-
tion target or banking policy, we study how a permanent constraint on cumulative
emissions affects relative extraction of high- and low-carbon resources.
Wedenotecumulativeemissionsby X,sothat ˙ X Æ Z. Thepolicythatisannounced
and implemented at time zero caps cumulative emissions, X(t) · ¯ X, at any point
intime. Theamountofpollutionpermitsintroducedattime0inthemarketequals
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ted line) with announced constraint, for SH(0)/SL(0)Ç ¯ S
is binding at introduction, which requires that cumulative pollution from uncon-
strainedresourceuseexceedstheamountofpermits,i.e. X(0)Å"HSH(0)Å"LSL(0)¸
¯ X.
Each unit of CO2 emissions reduces the remaining stock of permits. Hence, the
stock of permits is like a non-renewable resource and the permit price, pZ, must
grow at rate r to make owners of permits indifferent between selling now or selling
in future. Now the users of permits, the producers, face resource price as well as
pollutionpricesgrowingatthesamerater, sothattheuserprice, attheright-hand
side of ﬁrst-order condition (2.5), grow at rate r as well and the relative user price
of the two resources stays constant over time. Hence, while the ﬂow constraint
inducedsubstitutionovertime, thestockconstraintﬁxesrelativeresourceuseover
time. The question now is whether the relative use of high-carbon inputs could be
higher under the stock constraint than in the unconstrained economy, in which
case we would ﬁnd again the “dirty-ﬁrst result”.
With both resource inputs growing at the same rate, we ﬁnd – as demonstrated al-
ready above for the unconstrained economy – that c RH Æ c RL Æ b Y ¡ b A Æ(r ¡½)¡r Æ
¡½ so that cumulative extraction of resource i and cumulative pollution from re-
source i after t Æ 0 equal Ri(0)/½ and "iRi(0)/½, respectively. In addition, relative
resource extraction RH/RL is constant over time, even though the economy is con-
strained. The market sector now chooses levels of resource inputs so as to max-CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 43
imize net present value of output under the constraints that cumulative extrac-
tion does not exceed available resources, and cumulative pollution equals avail-
able emissions permits. Using our solutions for the growth rates of resource input
and interest rate, we can write the maximization problem as a static one (at time
t Æ0; we omit this time indicator):








where F(.) is the CES function in (2.3). From the solution of (2.17) we derive the
following:
Proposition 2.4. Suppose a binding stock constraint is unexpectedly introduced.
Then
1. relative extraction RH/RL jumps up (down) if SH0/SL0 Ç(È) ¯ S, and
2. leaves relative extraction unaffected if SH0/SL0 Æ ¯ S.
Proof. See appendix 2.A.
Hence, under exactly the same conditions as under the ﬂow constraint, SH0/SL0 Ç
¯ S, also the stock constraint induces the economy to use relatively more of dirty
input.
Note that a constraint on cumulative emissions is not equivalent to an emissions
concentration target, since it abstracts from decay of the emissions stock in the at-
mosphere that comes from ocean CO2 uptake and other carbon sinks. If we model
the change in CO2 concentrations, C, in the simplest possible way as the balance
between emissions and proportional decay, viz. ˙ C Æ Z ¡±C, and assume a policy
that caps emissions forever by imposingC(t)· ¯ C, the equilibrium path for relative
extraction has features of both the stock-constraint path and the ﬂow-constraint
path. Initially, C(t) Ç ¯ C, so the concentration level can increase but a rising pollu-
tion price reﬂects that the ceiling is being approached, like in the stock constraint
case. Once concentrations hit the ceiling, the ﬂow of pollution is restricted to total
decay
¡
Z Æ± ¯ C
¢
until resource stocks are so small that unrestricted resource use re-




i "iSi Ç± ¯ C
¢
, like
in the ﬂow constraint case. Again, the dirty-ﬁrst result will appear for SH0/SL0 Ç ¯ S.
As an alternative route to mitigate climate change, one that is claimed to be po-
litically more attractive, there have been proposals to set targets for emissions in-
tensity (in particular in the USA when it voted down the Kyoto Protocol and in
Canada recently). In our model this implies an upper bound on Z/Y . Recall that
RH/RL Æ ¯ S minimizes Z/Y and that, because of the linear homogeneity of the pro-
duction function, Z/Y increases with jRH/RL ¡ ¯ Sj. Hence, the equilibrium relative44 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
extraction rate must be close enough to ¯ S under an intensity constraint. Starting
from an unconstrained equilibrium in which high-carbon inputs have the high-
est productivity per unit of CO2
¡
SH0/SL0 Ç ¯ S
¢
, the economy will satisfy a (binding)
intensity constraint by increasing relative high-carbon use. Hence, our dirty-ﬁrst
result shows up under the same conditions as with ﬂow or stock constraint.
Insum,weﬁndthathoweverpollutionisconstrained(asaﬂow,stock,atmospheric
concentration, or per unit of GDP alike), the economy starts using more of the
resource input that has the highest marginal productivity per unit of pollution.
This input is the one with high CO2 emissions per unit of energy if its physical
scarcity (relative to productivity) forces unconstrained use of it to be small (i.e. if




tion of climate policy. While we saw that neutral technological change, b A, has no
impact on the relative use of the two resources, this changes with non-neutral or
biased technical change, to be modeled by different rates of increase in ´H and
´L. An increase in ´H/´L implies an increase in the cost-share of the dirty input,
i.e. dirty-input-using technological change: the prospect of higher relative pro-
ductivity of the high-carbon input in the future induces users to postpone use of
this resource. Compared to the situation with neutral technological change, dirty-
input-using technological change would shift the use of the high carbon input to
the future and would partly offset any dirty-ﬁrst effect of a emissions constraint.
However, if technological change has a high-carbon-saving bias (causing´H/´L to
decrease), the opposite would happen: frontloading of the high-carbon input, as
compared to the neutral technological change case, and reinforcing any dirty-ﬁrst
result.
Theinterestingquestionisthereforewhetherhigh-carbon-using(i.e.anincreasein
´H/´L) or high-carbon-saving technological change is the likely equilibrium out-
come after the introduction of climate policy. To answer this question we need a
model of endogenous innovation, for example along the lines of the model of di-
rected technological change by Acemoglu (2002). Although the full development
of such a model is left for future research, we can try to use the following general
insight from Acemoglu’s model without natural resources: when the use of fac-
tor x increases relative to factor y, innovation tends to be factor-x using (see also
Di Maria and Smulders, 2004). This suggests that if users tend to shift to high-
carbon inputs in immediate reaction to the emissions constraint (our dirty-ﬁrst
result), innovation becomes high-carbon-using. However, later on relative use ofCHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 45
the high-carbon input must be necessarily lower than without the emissions con-
straint,whichwilltriggerhigh-carbon-savingtechnologicalchange. Asaresult,the
productivity of the high-carbon input will be higher especially in the medium-run,
but not in the short-run (innovation takes time) and not in the long-run, when in-
novation becomes pollution-saving (all in comparison to the unconstrained case).
The optimal reaction is then to concentrate extraction and use of the high-carbon
resource in the medium-run, rather than the short-run and the long-run, as com-
pared to the case without endogenous biased technological change. We therefore
expect that endogenous technological change mitigates the reaction of relative
extraction to the emissions constraint (RH/RL stays closer to the unconstrained
level), but that the direction of the change in relative use as well as the conditions
for a dirty-ﬁrst result are not affected.
2.7 Concluding remarks
In reaction to a ceiling on the amount of carbon dioxide emissions an economy
maywanttosubstitutebetweenhigh-carbonandlow-carbonfuels. Wehaveshown
that in the standard Hotelling model extended with a second, imperfectly substi-
tutableresource, theeconomyoptimally decreasesCO2 intensityofGDP.However,
this is not always obtained through substitution of low-carbon for high-carbon in-
puts (e.g. natural gas for oil). Since producers want to maximize output, given the
emission constraint, resource users initially substitute towards the input which, at
the margin, has the highest level of output per unit of carbon dioxide. This may be
theinputwithmostCO2 emissionsperunitofenergy,inparticularwhenthisinput
is physically relatively scarce: it is then used in production at relatively low levels
and hence diminishing returns cause its productivity to be relatively high. With
an anticipated constraint, the reaction is more complex: the economy switches to-
wards the less productive input (in terms of GDP per unit of carbon) before the
constraint becomes binding and jumps towards a relatively more intensive use of
the more productive input when the emission ceiling becomes binding.
Apreliminaryempiricalinvestigationindicatesthatitisoptimaltosubstituteaway
from coal towards gas and oil, but also at the same time to substitute away from
low-carbon input gas towards high-carbon input oil. Hence, in order to cope with
climate change, energy policies should not necessarily be directed to a fast transi-
tiontolow-carbonenergysources. Inadditiontorelativepollutioncontent,scarcity
ofresourcesaswellastheirproductivitydifferences,asshapedbysubstitutionpos-
sibilities, should be taken into account.
The general insight from our analysis is that incorporating scarcity and intertem-
poralsubstitutioninextractionintotheanalysisofpollutionconstraintsmayrevert46 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
conclusionsfromtheusualstaticmodels. Thelimitedsubstitutionbetweenenergy
resources in production plays an essential role as well: demand factors are crucial
in determining to which resource the economy should substitute to minimize the
cost of climate change policy. These factors include the sectoral composition of
the economy and the degree to which technologies of energy users is biased to a
particular type of energy.
For future research it is interesting to consider the role of induced technological
change in more detail, as well as that of extraction costs, uncertainty, and strategic
supply reactions from monopolistic resource owners. A more detailed calibration
or estimation of the model then becomes possible as well.CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 47
2.A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
We simplify notation using variables without subscripts to denote high-carbon to
low-carbonratios: R(t)´RH(t)/RL(t),S(t)´SH(t)/SL(t)andp(t)´ pRH(t)/pRL(t),
and similarly ´´´H/´L, "´"H/"L, and S0 ´SH0/SL0. For any variable x we deﬁne
x(¿¡)´limt"¿x(t) and x(¿Å)´limt#¿x(t).
Beforeprovingthepropositions, wepresentandprovethefollowinglemma, which
summarizes the dynamics of relative extractionR over three relevant time periods:
when the constraint is announced but not yet effective, when the constraint binds,
when the constraint is not binding anymore.
Lemma 2.3. Let t Æ0 be the instant at which the constraint is announced, tK be the
instant at which the constraint becomes binding, and TU the instant at which the
constraint ceases to be binding. Then without further shocks
R(t)ÆS(TU), 8 t 2(0,tK) (2.18)
R(t)ÆR(T ¡
U),8 t ¸TU. (2.19)




,8 t 2(tK,TU), (2.20)





















8 t 2[tK,TU) (2.21)
dR(t)/dt Q0,(´/")¾ RR(t)RS(t)RR(TU),8 t 2(tK,TU). (2.22)
Proof. Forallt 2[0,tK)[[TU,1)wehavepZ Æ0and,from(2.5), p(t)Æ´(R(t))¡1/¾.
For all t ¸ TU, we have, from (2.11), R(t) Æ S(t). Since p is constant over time (see
(2.7)), we ﬁnd p(t)Æ´(S(TU))¡1/¾ 8 t; this proves (2.18).
Prices cannot jump in absence of unexpected events due to arbitrage. Then R can
only jump if output Y jumps (see (2.5)), which is ruled out by the concavity of the
utility function. This proves (2.19).
To derive (2.20), substitute one of the ﬁrst-order conditions (2.5) into the other to
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Time differentiating the binding emission constraint (2.4), we ﬁnd c RH Æ ¸L b R and
c RL Æ ¡(1¡¸L) b R. Time differentiating the production function and inserting the
two expressions from the emission constraint, we ﬁnd:
b Y Æ b AÅ(¸L ¡µL) b R. (2.26)













, we can write (2.27) as in (2.20). This proves (2.20).




("LSL Å"HSH)/("LSL"HSH) Æ RL/SL ¡RH/SH. Evaluat-
ing Z and R at time ¿ and S at time t, and integrating over ¿ from t to inﬁnity, the
right-hand side becomes zero because of full depletion (from (2.1) and (2.7)), so





d¿ Æ 0. For ¿ È tK, Z(¿) Æ ¯ Z up till TU and
Z(¿)Æ ¯ Ze½(TU¡¿) afterTU andR is constantafterTU andcontinuous atTU, accord-
ing to (2.19). Then the above integral can be rewritten as in (2.21).
Toproof(2.22),notethat(2.21)impliesthatifR monotonicallydecreasesovertime,
then R(t) must ﬁrst exceed, but eventually fall short of S(t). More generally, for
8 t 2 (tK,TU), we have: if dR(¿)/d¿ Q 0, 8¿ 2 (t,TU), then R(t) R S(t) R R(TU).
Equation (2.20) shows that, indeed, dR/dt cannot switch sign between tK and TU.
Hence we have (2.22).
2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Prior to the unexpected constraint (t Ç tK Æ 0), the economy acts like the uncon-
strained economy, so that, from (2.11), R(0¡)ÆS(0¡)ÆS(0). Then part 1(b) follows
from (2.22) with tK Æ 0. Part 1(c) follows from (2.19) and (2.22). Part 1(a) follows
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Combined with part 1(b) of the proposition, this proves 1(d). This completes the
proof of part 1 of proposition 1. The proof of part 2 is analogous.
Finallyweprovepart3usinglemma2.2. From1(c)and(2.11),wehave
¯ ¯R(0¡)¡ ¯ S
¯ ¯Æ ¯ ¯S0¡ ¯ S
¯ ¯ È
¯ ¯R(0Å)¡ ¯ S
¯ ¯ and with lemma 2.2 this proves the downward jump. The
”increase over time” follows from 1(b). From 1(c) and (2.11), we have
¯ ¯R(0¡)¡ ¯ S
¯ ¯ Æ ¯ ¯S0¡ ¯ S
¯ ¯ Ç
¯ ¯R(T)¡ ¯ S
¯ ¯. With lemma 2.2, this proves the higher end-level. The last
part follows from (2.11).
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Denote by ¯ Zo the "old" constraint that is introduced at t Æ 0 and which would, in
theabsence of shocks, cease to bind atT o. Denoteby ¯ Zn the "new"constraintthat
at time tn unexpectedly replaces ¯ Zo, where ¯ Zo È ¯ Zn, and ceases to bind at T n.
We prove part 1 by using the procedure we used for the proof of lemma 2.1 and
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1
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¶ ¯ Zo ¡ ¯ Zn
¯ Zo
This explicitly solves for T n. Since by assumption the new constraint is binding
when introduced, we must have tn ÇT n, and hence T n TT o () ¯ Zo S ¯ Zn, which
proves part 1.
We prove parts 2-4 for SH0/SL0 Ç
¡
´/"
¢¾ ´ ¯ S only; the other cases are analogous.
We continue the notation of the proof of proposition 1. Since @f /@ ¯ Z Æ 0 in (2.20),
a decline in ¯ Z affects the equilibrium path of R(t) only through an increase in
TU. Write Ro(t) and Rn(t) for relative extraction with the old and the new value
for ¯ Z respectively. Suppose the unexpected change in the constraint would not
on impact change relative extraction, i.e. Rn(tnÅ) Æ Ro(tnÅ). Then, from (2.20),
Rn(t)ÆRo(t) 8 t 2(tn,T o], but Rn(t)ÇRo(t) 8 t 2(T o,T n) and the integral at the
left-hand side of (2.21) with R Æ Rn, t Æ tn and TU Æ T n exceeds the integral with
R ÆRo,t Æ tn and TU ÆT o. But this violates the equality in (2.21) for the new path.
IfRn(tnÅ)ÇRo(tnÅ), thentheintegralfor thenew pathis positivea fortiori. Hence,
we must have Rn(tnÅ)ÈRo(tnÅ), which proves part 2 of the proposition.50 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
We prove part 3 in a similar way. Suppose Rn(T n) Æ Ro(T o), then Rn(t) Æ Ro(t ¡
T n ÅT o) for t 2 (tn ÅT n ¡T o,T n) and Rn(t) È Ro(tn) for t 2 (tn,tn ÅT n ¡T o).
But then (2.21) is violated on the new path since the integral becomes negative.
A fortiori (2.21) is violated with Rn(T n) È Ro(T o). Hence we must have Rn(T n) Ç
Ro(T o). From (2.11) it follows that Sn(T n)ÇSo(T o), which proves part 3.
Combining the results in part 3 with (2.18), we ﬁnd Ro(T o) Æ So(T o) È Sn(T n) Æ
Rn(T n). From (2.12), we then have po(T o)Ç pn(T n).
Part 5 directly follows from part 3 of proposition 2.1.
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Suppose the constraint is announced at t Æ 0, becomes binding at t Æ tK È 0 and
ceases to be binding at t ÆTA.
Assume that S(tK) Ç
¡
´/"
¢¾ ´ ¯ S. Then, from part 1 of proposition 1 and (2.28), we
have
S(tK)ÈS(TA). (2.29)
Suppose S0 · R(0Å). Then from (2.18), (2.19), and (2.28) the relative stock has to
jump up at t Æ tK for (2.29) to hold, which violates continuity of stocks. So S0 È
R(0Å) Æ S(TA). It follows from (2.28) that dS/dt È 0 8 t 2 (0,tK) so that S0 Ç S(tK).
Since we started from the assumption S(tK)Ç ¯ S, we must have S0 Ç ¯ S. The reason-
ing for the cases S(tK)¸ ¯ S are analogous. This proves parts (i) and (ii) of part 1(a),
part (i) of part 1(b), and the ﬁrst two results of part 2 of the proposition; parts 1(a)
(iv) and 1(b)(ii) then follow from part 1 of proposition 1.
Combining (2.2) and (2.7), we ﬁnd ˆ pRi Æ ½Å ˆ Y . Hence, either pRi and Y jump in
the same direction, or both are continuous around tK. Suppose all are continuous.
Then, since a binding constraint implies pZ(t¡
K) Æ 0 Ç pZ(tÅ
K), it follows from (2.5)
that both RL and RH jump down. However, from (2.3) this is inconsistent with
constant Y . Hence we have a contradiction and pRi and Y must jump. Suppose
they jump up. Then from (2.5) both RL and RH have to jump down percentage-
wise less than Y does. But this violates the constant returns to scale property of
(2.3). Hence Y must jump down. This proves the ﬁrst result of part 3.
Continue with the case S0 Ç ¯ S (again, the reasoning for the other cases is analo-
gous). From part 1(a)(iv) of the proposition, ˆ R Ç 0 for t 2 (tK,TA). From (2.18)
and (2.19) we ﬁnd R(t¡
K) Æ R(T Å
A) Æ R(T ¡




From lemma 2 and the result that R jumps closer to (or stays at) ¯ S (see 1(a)(iii), or
the ﬁrst result of part 3, of the proposition), we ﬁnd that Z/Y jumps down (or stays
constant) at implementation. This proves statement 1(c) and the last statement in
part 2. Since output jumps down (ﬁrst statement in part 3), Z must jump down asCHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 51
well. This proves the second statement of part 3.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
First, a binding constraint implies "HSH(t)Å"LSL(t) È ¯ X ¡X(t), where the rate of
change of both the left-hand side and the right-hand side equals Z(t), so that if
the inequality holds at t Æ 0, it holds at all t È 0. This allows us to drop the time
indicator. Second, in section 2.6 we have shown that with the pollution constraint




. Combining both results, we may write:







"L Å"H ¯ S
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extraction rates that give the highest possible level of output when constrained.
Then the solution to (2.17) reads and implies:
1. if SH ÈRH/½ and SL ÈRL/½ then RH ÆRH and RL ÆRL so that R Æ ¯ S;




È RL so that,
given (2.30), S ÇR ÇR;




È RH so that,
given (2.30), S ÈR ÈR.
Line 1 (line 2 and 3) proves the statements in part 2 (1) of the proposition.52 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
2.B Appendix: Data, calibration, and regressions
In this document we describe our calibrations and empirical ﬁndings, to comple-
ment the analytical results of this chapter. We describe the construction of the
data, the calibrations, and the regressions we ran to estimate technology and sub-
stitution parameters. The purpose of the calibrations and the regressions is to say
something about the empirical relevance of our result that it might be optimal to
substitute towards the high-carbon input, after the introduction of climate policy.
We will provide evidence that it might be optimal to substitute from coal to oil and
from coal to gas, but from low-carbon gas to high-carbon oil after the introduction
of climate policy.
Whether there will be substitution towards the high-carbon or low-carbon input,









When the left-hand side is smaller (larger) than the right-hand side, it is optimal
to increase (decrease) relative extraction, that is it is optimal to substitute from
(towards) the low-carbon input towards (from) the high-carbon input.













where A is the level of total factor productivity, Ri is the amount extracted of re-
source i 2 {H,L}, ´H and ´L are positive technology parameters and ¾ 2 (0,1) is
the constant elasticity of substitution. The use of fossil fuels causes emissions of
carbondioxide. ThetwoinputsdifferintheirCO2 emissionintensityperunitofen-
ergy and we denote the (constant) CO2 emission coefﬁcients of H and L by "H and
"L respectively, with "H È "L so that H is the relatively dirty or high-carbon input.
The total amount of emissions is denoted by Z. If the economy is subject to an
emissions constraint, total emissions cannot exceed a maximally allowed amount
¯ Z, according to the following constraint:
"HRH (t)Å"LRL(t)Æ Z (t)· ¯ Z. (2.33)
As we are interested in the reaction of the economy to the constraint rather than in
optimal climate policy itself, we assume that the constraint ¯ Z is exogenous.
The government allocates tradable emission permits over producers in the ﬁnal
goods industry, who trade them at a market price pZ and buy resources of type i at
price pRi. The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one for every period. FirmsCHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 53










Æ pRi Å"ipZ. (2.34)
This equation states thatthemarginalrevenue fromresourceinputi (the marginal
product at the left-hand side) equals its marginal cost (the user price at the right-
hand side), which consists of the price of the resource augmented with the cost of
pollution in case the constraint is binding.
Taking the ratio of the ﬁrst order conditions for the high- and low-carbon input,

















































This equation is the basis for our regressions, and together with (2.31) for our cali-
brations.
Inthenextsectionwedescribehowweconstructedourdataseries. Wethenpresent
our calibrations, using world-level data, in section 2.B.2. We present the results of
ourregressionsusingworld-leveldemanddatainsection2.B.3,andusingcountry-




Review 2006, June 2006. This is available as a Microsoft Excel ﬁle at
www.bp.com/statisticalreview. In order to have all data in the same units, we con-
structed our data such that all prices and quantities represent million tonnes of
oil equivalents (Mtoe). Unless mentioned otherwise, our conversion factors come
from the same BP Statistical Review. We picked the emission coefﬁcients for coal,
oil, and gas such that they are compatible with those used by the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (2006) and the German Deutsche Emissionshan-
delsstelle(2004),andchose"coal/"oil Æ1.26,"coal/"gas Æ1.73and"oil/"gas Æ1.37.54 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Stock data
The data for coal (proven reserves, world total) are available in million tonnes, for
anthracite and bituminous, and for sub-bituminous and lignite, but only for the
year 2005. To convert these in million tonnes of oil equivalents, we use a conver-
sion factor of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively, where we took the conversion factor from
www.globallngonline.com. Since then the stocks are in Mtoe, we can sum the two
stocks such that we have a global stock of coal.
The stock data for oil (proven reserves, world total) are available in billions of bar-
rels, from 1980 onwards. We convert the data into million tonnes of oil using the
conversion factor of the BP Statistical Review.
Data for stocks of gas (proven reserves, world total) are available in trillions cubic
meters, from 1980 onwards. We use the conversion factors provided by the BP
Statistical Review to convert these data in Mtoe.
Demand data
The consumption data for the three fossil fuels are all available in Mtoe, for over 70
countries and regions, and in world totals, for 1965-2005. Since the smallest unit
of observation (and changes) is 0.1 Mtoe, we only include countries for which the
smallest amount consumed of a particular fuel is 2.0 Mtoe or higher in our panel
dataregressions. Thatis,weremoveseriesinwhichchangesindemandof0.1Mtoe
are equivalent to a percentage change of more than 5%, due to lack of scale. In
additionweexclude(formerly)centrallyplannedcountriesandcountriesinwhich
the oil sector has a considerable share in GDP, as we cannot assume that for all
years fuel prices in these countries were determined by market forces. Finally we
canonlyusecountriesthathavedataandfulﬁltherequirementsforatleast2fuels.
This gives us 31 countries.
Construction of price data
In this subsection, we describe how we construct series for world prices for coal,
oil, and gas. We have several prices for each of these inputs, e.g. Brent, Dubai,
Nigerian Forcados and West Texas Intermediate for oil. We computed correla-
tion coefﬁcients for the prices for each input, to see how e.g. the 4 oil prices are
correlated. For each input, the prices are highly correlated with (for the time pe-
riod relevant for our analysis) correlation coefﬁcients ranging from about 0.5 to
0.8 for coal, around and close to 0.99 for oil, and ranging from 0.91 to 0.98 for
gas. To construct global fuel prices, we use quantities consumed or produced to
construct weights. Data on quantities consumed and produced are available for
several countries (over 70 countries in case of consumption), for 1965-2005.CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 55
Coal price For coal, the following prices are available: Northwest Europe Marker
Price(1987-2005),USCentralAppalachianCoalSpotPrice(1990-2005),JapanCok-
ing Coal Import CIF Price (1987-2005), Japan Steam Coal Import CIF Price (1987-
2005). Prices are in dollars per tonne, hence we ﬁrst have to convert prices into US
dollars per Mtoe. We obtain the heat contents of coal production, in thousand Btu
per short tonne, for several years and several countries from
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/contents.html. We convert these into million
Btu per metric tonne using 1 short ton Æ 0.9071847 metric tonne (source:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec13_12.pdf). Then we convert
from million Btu into Mtoe using the conversion factor of the BP Statistical Re-
view (1 million Btu Æ 0.025 toe), such that we have the heat contents of coal and
coke in Mtoe per metric tonne, for several years.
We assign country heat contents to prices using the following scheme:
1. Northwest Europe Marker Price - Germany, France, UK, Norway, using pro-
duction-weighted average;
2. US Central Appalachian Coal Spot Price - United States;
3. Japan Coking Coal Import CIF Price - Production-weighted average of Ger-
many, France, UK, Norway and United States;
4. Japan Steam Coal Import CIF Price - Production-weighted average of Ger-
many, France, UK, Norway and United States.
Using this scheme, we get prices per Mtoe, for the several prices.
The next step is construct a world coal price, giving quantity weights to the prices
mentioned above. We match quantities consumed (as coal is generally consumed
within the region covered by the price’s name) to the respective prices in the fol-
lowing manner:
1. Northwest Europe Marker Price - Germany, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Den-
mark, Netherlands, UK, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Austria, Switzerland;
2. USCentralAppalachianCoalSpotPrice-NorthAmerica(Canada,USA,Mex-
ico);
3. Japan coking coal import cif price - 0.5*Japan;
4. Japan steam coal import cif price - 0.5*Japan;
This gives us a world coal price in US dollars per Mtoe for 1987-2005 and for 1990-
2005, where the years 1987-1989 exclude the US in constructing the world price, as
the price series for US Central Appalachian Coal starts in 1990.56 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Oil price For oil, the following prices are available: Dubai (1972-2005), Brent
(1976-2005), Nigerian Forcados (1976-2005), West Texas Intermediate (1976-2005),
all in US dollars per million tonnes of oil. To construct a world price, we give quan-
tity weights to these prices, based upon quantities produced, as the prices can be
considered prices ”at the well”, using the following matching scheme:
1. West Texas Intermediate - North America (Canada, USA, Mexico);
2. Nigerian Forcados - Nigeria;
3. Brent - UK, Norway;
4. Dubai - Total Middle East.
This gives a world price for oil in US dollars per million tonnes of oil for 1976-2005.
In practice we will use shorter series as we are constrained by the availability of
prices of coal and gas.
Gas price The following natural gas prices are available: European Union CIF
(1984-2005), UK (Heren BNP Index, 1996-2005), USA (Henry Hub, 1989-2005), Ca-
nada(Alberta,1990-2005). InadditionwehavedataonLNGpricesforJapan(1985-
2005). All prices in dollars per million Btu. Using the conversion factors of the BP
Statistical Review, we convert these prices into million dollars per Mtoe. We con-
structaworldpriceusingquantitiesconsumed,asgasislesstradedovertheoceans
than is oil, using the following matching scheme:
1. USA - USA;
2. Canada - Canada;
3. European Union - Austria, Belgium & Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland,
France,Greece,Germany,Ireland,Italy,Netherlands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland;
4. UK - United Kingdom;
5. Japan - Japan.
This gives us a world price for 1984-2005, where the period 1984-1988 excludes the
US due to missing price data.CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 57
2.B.2 Calibrations
In this section we use our data on stocks, consumption and prices to determine
for which values of the elasticity of substitution between the high- and low-carbon
fossil fuel it would be optimal to substitute from the low-carbon input to the high-
carbon input. This will be the case if the inequality (2.31) turns out to have a
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For every year in our data set, we can see whether this inequality holds or not.
Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 present (the natural logarithm of) relative stocks, relative







Since for the stock of coal we only have data for the year 2005, we use this number
for every year t in (2.39). However, since the stock of coal is nearly three times as
large as the stocks of oil and gas (all in Mtoe), and we don’t expect the stocks of
the resources to ﬂuctuate a lot, our results are probably not affected by this lack of
data.





. For every year t this fraction






every year, the ratio of these two fractions is negative. As can be seen from (2.39),
this implies that there will be substitution towards the high-carbon input coal if
and only if ¾ is smaller than a negative value. Of course, this is not possible with
a CES production function, and we conclude that it will not be optimal to substi-
tute towards coal, when compared to oil, after the introduction of a ceiling on CO2
emissions.
Coal vs. gas
For the comparison between coal and gas, we again only have the stock of coal for

































































is positive for every year. As a consequence, we can conclude
that it will not be optimal to substitute from low-carbon gas to high-carbon coal,
after the introduction of climate policy.
Oil vs. gas
For oil and gas we have stock data for the period 1984-2005, for which we have
price and quantity data as well.





is not constant over time. For 11 of our 22 ob-
servations it is positive. In the 1980s and in the 2000s the sign is mostly negative,






always negative, and we conclude that for half of our observations it would be op-
timal to substitute from the low-carbon input gas to high-carbon oil, for any (pos-
itive) value of the elasticity of substitution. For the other half of observations this
dependsontheexactsizeofthiselasticity. Fortheseobservationsitwillbeoptimal
to substitute from gas to oil if the elasticity of substitution is not too large, where
the critical value of ¾ ranges from 1.6 to 17.5 for the period 1989-2005, and from
0.6 to 4.9 for the period 1984-1988. It should be noted that the latter series is less





















































Figure 2.5: Logarithm of relative extraction
and Japan only (while for later years prices for Canada and the US are included as
well).
Our calibrations suggest that, after the introduction of a ceiling on the emissions
of carbon dioxide, it might be optimal to substitute from low-carbon gas to higher-
carbon oil. Half of our observations give us this result, while for the other half of
our observations it depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution between
oil and gas. The next two sections of this document are devoted to estimating the
parameters of the CES functions.
2.B.3 Regressions with world data
Although our calibrations suggest that we only need to estimate our parameters
for the comparison between oil and gas, we estimate elasticities for all three com-
parisons (coal-oil, coal-gas, and oil-gas), and use the results for our comparison




















































Figure 2.6: Logarithm of relative price per unit of emissions
Short-run elasticities
In this section, we take the global consumption of the fuels as the demand data,
instead of the country-speciﬁc (panel) data. We present the outcomes of our com-
parisons (2.31), using the results from regressions using OLS. If we detected ﬁrst-
orderautocorrelation,wealsoweranregressionswiththePrais-Winstenestimator.
Logs Coal vs. oil When we take the time series 1990-2005 for coal and oil, we ﬁnd
that the sign of (2.31) is positive. That is, according to our theory, the introduction
of a ceiling on emissions will induce substitution towards oil, i.e. towards the low-
carbon input. With the Prais-Winsten estimator we ﬁnd the same results, but with
both regressions we seem to have ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
When we extend the time series to the period 1987-1990, we ﬁnd a negative elas-
ticity of substitution for both estimators. Since this contradicts the properties of
the CES production function, we cannot make a sensible comparison as in (2.31).
Again we seem to have ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, even with the Prais-Winsten es-
timator.
Coal vs. gas Both the time series 1990-2005 and the series 1987-2005 give us neg-
ative substitution elasticities with OLS. With Prais-Winsten we ﬁnd the same forCHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 61
the short series, while the longer series give as outcome that the sign of (2.31) is
positive (substitution towards the clean input). However, we still seem to have au-
tocorrelation.
Oil vs. gas The time series 1989-2005 gives us a negative elasticity of substitution.
If we extend the series to 1984, however, we ﬁnd a positive elasticity of substitu-
tion. In this case, the comparison in (2.31) turns out to have a negative sign, both
with the elasticity resulting from OLS and with the one from Prais-Winsten. Ac-
cording to our theory, then, the introduction of a ceiling on emissions will lead
to substitution away from gas towards oil, i.e. from the low-carbon input towards
the high-carbon input. Unfortunately we seem to have autocorrelation in both the
OLS and the Prais-Winsten regressions.
Dlogs If we take ﬁrst differences (i.e. for each variable we take its value at time t
minus its value at time t ¡1), we can run our regressions in percentage changes.
This should reduce the risk of having spurious regressions or unit roots, and prob-
ably autocorrelation. However, if we take ﬁrst differences, we see from (2.36) that
the constant term of our regressions will drop out, as (´H/´L)¾ is constant over
time. This implies that we have to run our regressions without an intercept. We
then derive (´H/´L)¾, which we need for our comparison (2.31), for the average
































































































































In addition, we perform the same analysis assuming that ´H/´L is a function of
time. In this case we do have an intercept in our regressions.
Constant
´H
´L : no intercept
Coal vs. oil Although for the longer series we ﬁnd a negative elasticity of substi-
tution with the Prais-Winsten estimator, for all three other estimates we ﬁnd that
21Notethatwehavetotaketheaveragesoftheratios,nottheratiosoftheaverages,ortheaverages
of the logarithms of the data.62 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
the left-hand side (LHS) of (2.31) is larger than its right-hand side (RHS). That is,
our theory says that after the introduction of a ceiling on emissions, substitution
will take place towards oil, the low-carbon input. All estimates seem to suffer from
autocorrelation.
Coal vs. gas Except for the estimate for the longer series using OLS (in which case
we ﬁnd a negative elasticity), we ﬁnd that the LHS of (2.31) is larger than its RHS.
Thatis, ourtheorysaysthataftertheintroductionofaceilingonemissions,substi-
tution will take place towards gas, the low-carbon input. However, all four regres-
sions seem to suffer from autocorrelation.
Oil vs. gas Our ﬁndings for the data in percentage changes conﬁrm what we have
found when we had our data in logarithms: for the shorter time series we ﬁnd a
negative elasticity of substitution (and hence we cannot draw a conclusion regard-
ing (2.31)), while for the longer series the comparison in (2.31) turns out to give a
’smaller than’ sign. Our theory then suggests that climate policy will induce substi-
tution from gas to oil at the moment of the introduction of a ceiling on emissions.
Apparently, at the margin, oil gives more output per unit of emissions than gas.
Again all regressions seem to suffer from autocorrelation.
Non-constant
´H
´L : regression with intercept
If we assume that
´H
´L is a function of time, we do have a constant in our regres-
sions, which is the percentage change in
´H
´L , multiplied by ¾. However, since we
do not know the initial
´H
´L , we cannot derive
´H(t)
´L(t). We use this regression as a ’ro-
















in the same way as above. The use of an intercept in our regressions might give us
















a different result for our comparison (2.31), compared to the regressions without
intercept.
Coal vs. oil The short series gives us a positive elasticity that does not suffer from
autocorrelation, for the OLS estimator. In addition, it gives us a ’greater than’ sign
in (2.31). With the longer series we ﬁnd a negative elasticity. The Prais-Winsten
estimator gives us twice a ’greater than’ sign, but for both series we reject the null
of no autocorrelation.
Coal vs. gas The regressions with an intercept conﬁrm what we found with the
regressions without an intercept: a negative elasticity for the short series with OLS,
and a ’greater than’ sign in (2.31) for the other estimates. All regressions seem to
suffer from autocorrelation.
Oil vs. gas For OLS, the regressions with the short series gives a negative elasticity
of substitution. The other estimates give us ’less than’ sign in (2.31). Again all 4CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 63
regressions seem to suffer from autocorrelation.
Long-run elasticities
In the previous section we constructed our comparison (2.31) using the results
from regressions for short-run elasticities. In this section, we present the results
from regressions based upon long-run elasticities. For this, we include a lagged-


























When we estimate this equation, we do not only ﬁnd estimates for ´H/´L and for
the short-run elasticity ¾SR, we also ﬁnd the coefﬁcient for the lagged dependent
variable °.













































. Substituting this into

























This shows that we can derive the long-run elasticity of substitution as ¾LR Æ
¾SR
1¡°,
where we obtain estimates for ¾SR and ° from (2.44).






























where s2 is the variance of the error term. Since a variance cannot be negative, we









ence of a lagged dependent variable.
Thequestioniswhetherwecanhave°Ç0. Thechaptersuggeststhatwhenthereis
no climate policy, the ratio of the two extraction rates is constant over time, which
imposes no further restrictions on ° (see (2.46)). In the presence of climate policy,64 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
however, the ratio of the extraction rates monotonically increases or decreases, or
is constant, and the same holds for the relative user’s price (i.e. the price including
the permit price). From (2.44) then follows that we must have ° È 0, since other-
wise we would have oscillations in the relative extraction rate, which contradicts
what we ﬁnd in the main text. We conclude, therefore, that we have to restrict our
analysis to regressions that give an estimated 0Ç°Ç1.
Coal vs. oil For the both time series, we ﬁnd that the estimate for the coefﬁcient
for the lagged dependent variable, °, is larger than 1. This contradicts stationarity,
and hence we cannot derive an estimate for the long-run elasticity of substitution.
Coal vs. gas For the short time series, we ﬁnd ° È 1. For the longer time series we
ﬁnd a ’larger than’ sign for (2.31). Durbin’s test rejects the null of no serial correla-
tion at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
Oil vs. gas For the 1989-2005 time series, we ﬁnd a negative elasticity of substitu-
tion. However, when we extend our time series to 1985, we ﬁnd both a positive
short-run elasticity of substitution and 0 Ç ° Ç 1. When we plug the estimates for
our parameters into (2.31), we ﬁnd a ’smaller than’ sign. This result is in line with
what we have found so far for the comparison between oil and gas: whenever we
ﬁnd parameter-values that do not contradict the properties of the CES produc-
tion function (and in this case do not contradict stationarity), we ﬁnd that it might
be optimal to substitute from gas towards oil at the instant of the imposition of a
ceiling on emissions. Durbin’s test rejects the null at the 5% level, so we have an
indication of autocorrelation.
Dlogs Ifwewanttoestimatelong-runelasticitiesusingdatainpercentagechanges
(ﬁrst differences of logarithms), we have to combine the steps of section 2.B.3, and
the steps described above. As when we estimated short-run elasticities with data
in ﬁrst differences of logarithms, we ﬁrst look at regressions without an intercept,




of relative extraction, instead of an oscillating level.
Constant
´H
´L : no intercept
Coal vs. oil For both the 1991-2005 and 1989-2005 time series, we ﬁnd that the sign
in (2.31) is a ’greater than’ sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for
the short-run elasticities, when we compare coal and oil. The regression with the
longer series seems to suffer from autocorrelation.
Coal vs. gas For both time series, we ﬁnd that the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater than’
sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for the short-run elasticities,CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 65
when we compare coal and oil. We cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation for
both series.
Oil vs. gas The 1991-2005 series gives a negative long-run elasticity of substitution,
while the 1986-2005 series gives a ’smaller than’ sign for our comparison (2.31),
which is what we found for some of the short-run elasticities as well. We cannot
reject the null of no autocorrelation for both series.
Non-constant
´H
´L : regression with intercept
Coal vs. oil As in the case of no intercept, we ﬁnd a ’greater than’ sign for (2.31) for
both time series. We cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation for both series.
Coal vs. gas As in the case of no intercept, we ﬁnd a ’greater than’ sign for (2.31) for
both time series. We cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation for both series.
Oil vs. gas As in the case of no intercept, the 1991-2005 series gives a negative
short-run elasticity of substitution, while the 1986-2005 series gives us the result
thatclimatepolicy inducestheeconomytoincreaserelativeextraction, i.e.userel-
atively more of the high-carbon input oil compared to the situation before climate
policy. We cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation for both series.
2.B.4 Regressions with panel data
In this section, we use country-level data for the demand for fuels. However, we




Logs When we use the data in logarithms, as in (2.37), the ﬁxed-effects models
give negative elasticities for all estimations In addition, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that all ﬁxed effects have the same value, in which case we could use
OLS or GLS. When testing for autocorrelation, the null hypothesis of no serial cor-
relation is rejected in all cases, and we conclude that the models with panel data in
logarithms suffers from speciﬁcation errors.
Dlogs When we use ﬁxed effects, we can by construction only estimate models
with an intercept. We can never reject the null hypothesis that all ﬁxed effects are
the same (in which case we could use OLS or GLS with an intercept), and given
that in each regression several of the ﬁxed effects differ signiﬁcantly from zero, we
22Note that we cannot use the between-group estimator, as the price series are identical for each
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can neither reject the null of no intercept. In addition, we can never reject the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation, so the model seems to be well-speciﬁed.
Coal vs. oil For the 1989-2005 time series, we ﬁnd that the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater
than’ sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for the short-run elastic-
ities, when we compare coal and oil. The short series gives us a negative elasticity
of substitution.
Coal vs. gas For both time series, we ﬁnd that the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater than’
sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for the short-run elasticities,
when we compare coal and oil.
Oil vs. gas Both series give a negative elasticity of substitution.
Long-run elasticities
Including a lagged dependent variable in a panel data implies that we estimate a
dynamic panel data model. For this we use the Arellano-Bond estimator, where
the ﬁrst difference of the exogenous variable is used as an instrument for the ex-
ogenous variable (the logarithm of the relative price, or the ﬁrst difference of the
logarithm of the relative price). An important assumption here is that there is no
second-orderautocorrelationintheregressionindifferences, andthisassumption
holds for all our regressions.
Logs Coal vs. oil For both the 1991-2005 and 1989-2005 time series, we ﬁnd that
the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater than’ sign. This is in line with what we have found
so far for the short-run elasticities and above for the long-run elasticities, when we
compare coal and oil. We cannot reject the null of no second-order serial correla-
tion.
Coal vs. gas For both time series, we ﬁnd that the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater than’
sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for the short-run elasticities
and above for the long-run elasticities, when we compare coal and oil. We cannot
reject the null of no second-order serial correlation.
Oil vs. gas Both series give a negative elasticity of substitution. We cannot reject
the null of no second-order serial correlation.
Dlogs Contrary to the case where we estimated short-run elasticities, we can es-
timate the long-run elasticities both for the models with and without intercepts,
since we now use the Arellano-Bond estimator instead of ﬁxed effects.
Constant
´H
´L : no intercept
Coal vs. oil For both the 1991-2005 and 1989-2005 time series, we ﬁnd a negative
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relation.
Coal vs. gas For both time series, we ﬁnd that the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater than’
sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for the short-run elasticities
and above for the long-run elasticities, when we compare coal and oil. We cannot
reject the null of no second-order serial correlation.
Oil vs. gas Both series give a negative elasticity of substitution. We cannot reject
the null of no second-order serial correlation.
Non-constant
´H
´L : regression with intercept
Coal vs. oil For both the 1991-2005 and 1989-2005 time series, we ﬁnd a negative
elasticity of substitution.
Coal vs. gas For both time series, we ﬁnd that the sign in (2.31) is a ’greater than’
sign. This is in line with what we have found so far for the short-run elasticities
and above for the long-run elasticities, when we compare coal and oil. The model
seems to contain no second-order serial correlation.
Oil vs. gas The short series gives a negative elasticity of substitution. The longer
series gives a ’smaller than’ sign, which is what we have found so far for this case
(if we found a non-negative elasticity). Both models seems to contain no second-
order serial correlation.
2.B.5 Conclusion
In this document we have confronted our analytical result that, under certain con-
ditions, it is optimal to substitute from a low-carbon input to a high-carbon input,
after the introduction of a ceiling on the emissions of carbon dioxide.
We ﬁrst used our data to calibrate (2.39). From this calibration we concluded that
it will never be optimal to substitute from low-carbon oil to high-carbon coal, or
from low-carbon gas to high-carbon coal. For the comparison between oil and
gas, however, our calibration gave mixed results. For some years in our data it
was optimal to substitute from the low-carbon input to the high-carbon input. For
other years this depended on the exact size of the elasticity of substitution.
Our regressions conﬁrm what we found for coal-oil and for coal-gas in our calibra-
tion: it is never optimal to substitute towards coal after the introduction of climate
policy. For the comparison between oil and gas we found weak evidence that it is
optimal to substitute from low-carbon gas to high-carbon oil: although our regres-
sionsshowseveralproblems(negativeelasticities,autocorrelationand/orinsignif-
icant results for many regressions), those regressions without autocorrelation and
with positive elasticities all suggest that it is optimal to substitute from low-carbon
gas to high-carbon oil.
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regressions in sections 2.B.3 and 2.B.4. Our results are consistent over short- and
long-runelasticities,overthetypeofdataused(world-leveldemanddata,country-
level demand data) and over whether we use data in logarithms or in percentage
changes. Whenever we have a result, we see that the sign for the comparison
between coal and oil is ’greater than’, for the comparison between coal and gas
’greater than’, and for the comparison between oil and gas ’smaller than’. This sug-
geststhataftertheintroductionof aceilingon emissions, substitutionfromcoal to
the cleaner inputs oil and gas will take place (thereby conﬁrming the results of the
calibrations), while at the same time there will be substitution from gas towards
the dirtier input oil.
Of course the results from our regressions are very preliminary. We use quite short
data series for the world-level demand data, and the construction of some of the
price series was quite problematic due to missing data (especially for that part of
the ’longer series’ that was missing in the ’shorter series’). In addition there seems
to be autocorrelation in virtually all our regressions for the short-run elasticity us-
ing world data, and for the short-run elasticities with panel data in logarithms.
However, about half of our regressions for long-run elasticities, both using panel
and for world-level data, give a positive substitution elasticity and do not suffer
from serial correlation, and the same holds for the estimates for short-run elas-
ticities using panel data in percentage changes. All these results show the same
pattern in substitution regarding our analytical results: the introduction of climate
policyinducessubstitutionfromcoaltooilandfromcoaltogas(i.e.fromthehigh-
carboninputtothelow-carboninput),butfromgastooil(i.e.fromthelow-carbon
input to the high-carbon input). The former result followed from our calibration.
The latter result gives us a decisive answer for half of our observations for the oil-
gas comparison: for those years where the calibration could not give a decisive
answer, our regressions indicate that it would be optimal to substitute from low-
carbon gas to high-carbon oil.
Ouranalyticalresultthatitmightbeoptimaltosubstitutefromalow-carboninput
towards a high-carbon input after the introduction of a ceiling on carbon dioxide
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Table 2.1: Overview of results of comparisons: world dataa
Short-run elasticities Long-run elasticities
Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas
OLS
Logarithms
Short series È n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Longer series n.a. n.a. Ç n.a. È Ç
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series È n.a. n.a. È È n.a.
Longer series n.a. È Ç È È Ç
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series È n.a. n.a. È È n.a.
Longer series n.a. È Ç È È Ç
Prais-Winsten (short-run only)
Logarithms
Short series È n.a. n.a.
Longer series n.a. È Ç
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series È È n.a.
Longer series È È Ç
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series È È Ç
Longer series È È Ç
a ’n.a.’ means that no result is available, due to ¾Ç0 or °Ç0 or °È1
or ±Ç0 or ±È1.70 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Table 2.2: Overview of results of comparisons: panel dataa
Short-run elasticities Long-run elasticities
Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas
Fixed effects Arellano-Bond
Logarithms Logarithms
Short series n.a. n.a. n.a. È È n.a.
Longer series n.a. n.a. n.a. È È n.a.
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series n.a. È n.a.
Longer series n.a. È n.a.
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series n.a. È n.a. n.a. È n.a.
Longer series È È n.a. n.a. È Ç
a ’n.a.’ means that no result is available, due to ¾Ç0 or °Ç0 or °È1
or ±Ç0 or ±È1.
2.B.6 Regression results
World data
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the estimated substitution elasticities, plus indications
of signiﬁcance and autocorrelation. Only 1 estimate for short-run elasticities does
not suffer from autocorrelation and have the right sign. For the long-run elastic-
ities we have better results: 9 out of 18 elasticities are positive and come from re-
gressions without serial correlation.
Table 2.5 shows the values for ´H/´L we use for our comparisons using world data.
The results seem generally not realistic, due to extremely large or extremely small
values. This is due to the sensitivity of the expression for ´H/´L for the size of the
intercept in the regression and the size of the elasticity of substitution, as ´H/´L Æ
eintercept/¾. For the regressions in ﬁrst differences of logarithms, we had to derive
our ´H/´L using the ’average observation’, see equation (2.43). Here we also use
powers and logarithms to derive ´H/´L, and hence our results are sensitive to, for
example, the mean relative price to be larger or smaller than 1.CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 71
Table 2.3: Overview of elasticities: world data, short-run elasticities
Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas
OLS with robust std. errors
Logarithms
Short series 0.0083a -0.0887a¤¤¤ -0.1696¤¤¤
Longer series -0.0335a -0.1174a¤¤¤ 0.0267a
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series 0.0127a -0.0038a -0.0236a
Longer series -0.0008a 0.0054a 0.0154a
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series 0.0108 -0.00042a -0.0192a
Longer series -0.0014a 0.0093a 0.0162a
Prais-Winsten
Logarithms
Short series 0.0144a -0.0097 -0.0290a
Longer series -0.0002a 0.0013a 0.0148a
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series 0.0138a 0.0121a -0.0219a
Longer series 0.0029a 0.0131a 0.0161a
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series 0.0132a 0.0129a 0.0008a
Longer series 0.0027a 0.0134a 0.0208a¤¤
a Null hypothesis ’no serial correlation’ rejected at 5%
level.
¤/¤¤/¤¤¤ denotes coefﬁcient signiﬁcant at 10/5/1% level.72 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Table 2.4: Overview of elasticities: world data, long-run elasticities
Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas
OLS with robust std. errors
Logarithms
Short series °È1 °È1 -0.1455¤¤
Longer series °È1 3.1820a 0.1881a
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series 0.0567 0.0757 -0.0206
Longer series 0.0271a 0.1479 0.0159
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series 0.0518 0.0755 -0.0105
Longer series 0.0261 0.1322 0.0072
a Null hypothesis ’no serial correlation’ rejected at 5% level
¤/¤¤/¤¤¤ denotes coefﬁcient signiﬁcant at 10/5/1% level.
Panel data
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the estimates of the substitution elasticities from panel
data. Only 3 out of 12 estimates have the correct sign and do not suffer from serial
correlation. Again, for the long-run elasticities the results are better, with 9 out of
18 elasticities having the right sign and no autocorrelation, of which 3 differ signif-
icantly from zero.
As with the world-level demand data, the values for ´H/´L are generally extremely
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Table 2.5: Overview of ´H/´L: world dataa
Short-run elasticities Long-run elasticities
Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas
OLS
Logarithms
Short series 4.0e-20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Longer series n.a. n.a. 5.2e+8 n.a. 0.58 12.4
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series 2.1e-13 n.a. n.a. 1.2e-6 105.0 n.a.
Longer series n.a. 9.9e+14 1.6e+15 7.3e-12 213.1 5.2e+13
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series 1.1e-15 n.a. n.a. 4.6e-7 103.1 n.a.
Longer series n.a. 3.6e+8 3.0e+14 3.3e-12 221.5 2.5e+22
Prais-Winsten (short-run only)
Logarithms
Short series 5.2e-11 n.a. n.a.
Longer series n.a. 9.5e+67 8.9e+15
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series 1.9e-12 4.2e+4 n.a.
Longer series 1.8e-53 1.1e+6 3.2e+14
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series 5.0e-13 2.1e+4 2.5e+274
Longer series 2.0e-57 8.1e+5 1.9e+11
a ’n.a.’ means that no result is available, due to ¾Ç0 or °Ç0 or °È1
or ±Ç0 or ±È1.74 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS




Short series -0.0664a¤¤ -0.4389a¤¤¤ -0.6316a¤¤¤
Longer series -0.1422a¤¤¤ -0.5007a¤¤¤ -0.0930a¤
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series -0.0020 0.0197 -0.0100
Longer series 0.0056 0.0080 -0.0051
a Null hypothesis ’no serial correlation’ rejected at 5% level
¤/¤¤/¤¤¤ denotes coefﬁcient signiﬁcant at 10/5/1% level.




Short series 0.1836 0.5067¤ -0.2015
Longer series 0.2637¤¤ 0.5923¤ -0.4402
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series -0.0038 0.0273 -0.0209
Longer series -0.0009 0.0203 -0.0018
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series -0.0029 0.0335 -0.0207
Longer series -0.0023 0.0061 0.0020
a Null hypothesis ’no serial correlation’ rejected at 5%
level.
¤/¤¤/¤¤¤ denotes coefﬁcient signiﬁcant at 10/5/1% level.CHAPTER 2: OPTIMAL EXTRACTION OF HIGH- AND LOW CARBON FUELS 75
Table 2.8: Overview of ´H/´L: panel dataa
Short-run elasticities Long-run elasticities
Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas Coal-oil Coal-gas Oil-gas
Fixed effects Arellano-Bond
Logarithms
Short series n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.95 0.89 n.a.
Longer series n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.94 0.92 n.a.
Percentage changes, without intercept
Short series n.a. 5.9e+8 n.a.
Longer series n.a. 4.3e+17 n.a.
Percentage changes, with intercept
Short series n.a. 2.2e+11 n.a. n.a. 8.9e+6 n.a.
Longer series 5.1e-26 3.3e+42 n.a. n.a. 2.3e+58 8.5e+260
a ’n.a.’ means that no result is available, due to ¾Ç0 or °Ç0 or °È1
or ±Ç0 or ±È1.CHAPTER 3
Optimal paths of extraction and emissions when climate
policy is announced in advance23
Climatepolicychangestherelativepriceoffossilfuels, e.g. throughacarbontaxor
through a cap and trade system, and induces ﬁrms in most sectors of the economy
to substitute away from fuels and intermediate inputs with high carbon content.
Thesebehaviouraladjustmentsarerestrictedbythestocksofmachinesandequip-
ment currently installed, as well as by available alternative technologies. An unex-
pected restriction of the production possibilities frontier might lead to high costs
for ﬁrms, for example through a sudden drop in the value of the capital stock. An-
nouncementofclimatepolicy,however,canreducetheoverallburdenofthepolicy
by giving agents time to prepare.
Although the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon in December 1997, it only entered
force in February 2005, due to the underlying requirements.24 Had the Protocol
been ratiﬁed by a sufﬁcient number of countries immediately, then still the Pro-
tocol stated that it would only enter into force 90 days after the requirements had
been met. In any case, agents were well before the start on January 1, 2008, of
the Protocol’s ﬁrst ’commitment period’ informed that a policy on greenhouse gas
emissions was likely to enter force. Such anticipated policy still leaves agents free
to emit in the period between announcement and implementation. This raises the
question how carbon dioxide emissions respond to the announcement of future
climate policy.
23This chapter is based upon joint work with Corrado Di Maria and Sjak Smulders.
24At least 55 Parties, with Annex I countries representing at least 55% of 1990 Annex I carbon
dioxide emissions, needed to ratify the Protocol before it could enter into force.
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Inthischapterwestudyhowemissions, intheperiodbetweenannouncementand
implementation of a ceiling on carbon dioxide emissions, are affected by the an-
nouncement. WeuseaHotelling(1931)-stylemodelinwhichutilityisderivedfrom
consuming electricity, which is produced using a non-renewable resource. We ab-
stract from physical capital and inter-fuel substitution (see chapter 2), and focus
on the optimal extraction path of the resource and the associated optimal emis-
sion path, following the announcement. When the economy faces a future con-
straint on carbon dioxide emissions, consumers face a trade-off between consum-
ing more in the short-run while knowing that emissions will have to be reduced at
a known point in time on the one hand, and avoiding a jump in consumption at
the instant of implementation through consumption smoothing, at the other.
We show that optimal resource extraction induces an increase in emissions at the
instant of announcement. The announcement of a restriction on future emissions
causes an abundance effect: whereas it is optimal to extract the entire resource
stock over time, it is known that at some future date less can be extracted than
agents would like to. The difference between this restriction level and the optimal
path has then to be extracted either after the instant at which optimal unrestricted
emissions equal the level of the ceiling, or between the instants of announcement
and implementation. The solution is to do a bit of both: postponing all extraction
implieshighlevelsofutilityinthefuture,whicharethenseverelydiscounted,while
extracting all of the ’extra’ resource before the constraint becomes binding brings
along low levels of marginal utility in comparison with a more gradual extraction
path. As a consequence, resource extraction and emissions increase at the instant
of the policy’s announcement.
Furthermoreweshowthatitisoptimaltohaveadownwardjumpinextractionand
utility at the instant of implementation. Finally, we show that the upward jump in
emissions at announcement is larger when the instant at which the policy comes
into force is closer.
Few papers study the effects of announced climate policy, and none has studied
the effect of announcement on emissions. In chapter 2 of this thesis (and in Smul-
ders and van der Werf, 2008) we studied climate policy in a 2-resource model and
focused on relative extraction. We showed that when the resources are imperfect
substitutes, announcement of a ceiling on the ﬂow of emissions induces substitu-
tion towards the high- or the low-carbon input, depending on the marginal pro-
ductivity of carbon for and the relative scarcity of the two fuels. However, as we
focussed on the relative extraction of the two fuels, we did not study the effect of
announced policy on emissions of carbon dioxide. Kennedy (2002) and Parry and
Toman(2002)focusondomesticclimatepoliciesintheperiodbetweenannounce-
ment and implementation of international climate policy, and argue that policies
aimedatemissionreductionsinthisperiodmaybecostlyandinefﬁcient. KennedyCHAPTER 3: ANNOUNCED EMISSION CONSTRAINT 79
(2002) shows that, given a future ceiling on emissions, additional policy aimed at
emissionreductionsbeforethefuturepolicybecomesenforcedleadstotoolowin-
vestment in research and development and too much early capital investment, as
the latter lead to immediate emission reductions whereas the former only lead to
future emission reductions. Parry and Toman (2002) show that emission reduc-
tions before the commitment phase are efﬁcient when banking of credits is al-
lowed. This was not the case for the Kyoto Protocol. In this chapter we do not look
atadditionalpoliciesaimedemissionreductioninthepre-commitmentphaseand
only focus on the effects of announcement of the climate policy on emissions.
The remainder of this chapter develops as follows. In section 3.1 we introduce
the basic model, which is used throughout this chapter. We then study extraction
in an economy that never faces a binding emission constraint in section 3.2. We
introduce an initially binding constraint in section 3.3, and study an announced
constraint in section 3.4. Our main results are summarized in Proposition 3.1. In
section 3.5 we study comparative dynamics with respect to some parameters rep-
resenting preferences . We conclude in section 3.6.
3.1 The model
Consumers maximize intertemporal utility, while instantaneous utilityU (which is
a C 2 function such thatU0 È0 andU00 Ç0) comes from the use of a nonrenewable
resource. One unit of resource use causes " units of emissions of carbon dioxide
Z. At some point in time T ¸ 0, the economy faces a ceiling on the amount of
emissions, denoted by ¯ Z.







˙ S(t)Æ¡R(t), R(t)¸0, S(0)ÆS0; (3.2)
Z(t)´"R(t)· ¯ Z 8t ¸T; (3.3)
R(t) denotes extraction of the nonrenewable at time t, and ½ is the rate of time
preference. Equation (3.2) shows that the stock S of the nonrenewable declines
withextraction(wedeﬁne,foranyvariable x, ˙ x ´dx/dt). Theinitialendowmentof
the resource, S0, is ﬁnite and given. Climate policy is described in (3.3): emissions
Z arisefromresourceuse, butstartingattimeT, theycannotexceed ¯ Z (i.e., weput
a constraint on the control variable R).80 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
3.2 Aneconomywithout(theprospectof)climatepol-
icy
Let us ﬁrst look at the case where the constraint will never be binding ( ¯ Z !1). To
ﬁnd the optimal path of resource use, we apply a variational argument.
Along the optimal trajectory, a shift over an inﬁnitesimal interval of time of an in-
ﬁnitesimal amount of resources should not affect the value of the functional (3.1).
If we decrease extraction at time t by ¢R for a period of length ¢t, and instead
extract and consume this amount during an interval of length ¢t starting at time
s È t, this should not affect total welfare. That is,
U0(R(t))e¡½t¢R¢t ÅU0(R(s))e¡½s(¡¢R)¢t Æ0. (3.4)




that is, discounted marginal utility should be equal at each point in time, or equiv-
alently, along the optimal trajectory the marginal rate of substitution equals the
marginal rate of transformation. When s approaches t, we ﬁnd that the RHS of
(3.5) approaches 1. Hence, R(s)ÆR(t), and extraction must be continuous.
Secondly, we can substitute (3.2) in (3.1) and derive the Euler equation. First, de-
ﬁne
´(R(t))´¡U00(R(t))R(t)/U0(R(t))È08t (3.6)










For the rest of this chapter, denote extraction of an economy that is unconstrained
at all points in time by e R(t). We summarize our results in the following Lemma:
Lemma3.1. Let {e Z(t)Æ"e R(t)}1
0 denote the path of emissions of the economy that is
unconstrained at all points in time, as described in (3.1)-(3.2). Then





U0(e R(s)) Æe¡½(s¡t), 8t,s;
3. e Z(t) is continuous.
Proof. Proofs of parts 1 and 2 in text; part 3 follows from part 1.CHAPTER 3: ANNOUNCED EMISSION CONSTRAINT 81
3.3 An economy with an initially binding constraint
When an economy is initially constrained in its emissions of carbon dioxide (that
is, T Æ 0) such that Z(t) · ¯ Z 8t, and e R(0) È ¯ Z/", it is effectively constrained in its
resource extraction for the period during which the emissions constraint is bind-
ing. The extraction path of the economy after the constraint ceases to be binding
is described by the following Lemma:
Lemma3.2. Let { ˘ Z(t)Æ" ˘ R(t)}1
0 denote the path of emissions of the economy facing
an initially binding emissions constraint ˘ Z(t)· ¯ Z Ç"e R(0)8t, as described in (3.1)-
(3.3) with T Æ0. Deﬁne TH ´{tj ˘ Z(t)Æ ¯ Z 8 t ·TH \ ˘ Z(t)Ç ¯ Z 8 t ÈTH}. Then
1.
U0( ˘ R(t))
U0( ˘ R(s)) Èe¡½(s¡t), 8t ÇTH,s È t;
2.
U0( ˘ R(t))
U0( ˘ R(s)) Æe¡½(s¡t), 8t,s ¸TH;
3. 9TX , 0ÇTX ÇTH, such that ˘ R(t)Æ ¯ Z/"Ç e R(t)8t ÇTX; ˘ R(t)È e R(t)8t ÈTX;
4. ˘ R(t) is continuous.
Proof. Suppose TH Æ1. Then ˘ R(t)Æ ¯ Z/"8t. But then
R 1
0 ˘ R(t)dt Æ1ÈS0, which





for t Ç s ·TH. From (3.4) follows that ˘ R(t) is continuous at TH, and declining from
that instant onwards. This proves parts 1, 2 and 4.






˘ R(t)dt ÆS0. (3.9)
From part 1 of the lemma and part 2 of Lemma 3.1 follows that if ˘ R(t) S ˜ R(t) for
some t ¸ TH, then ˘ R(t) S ˜ R(t) 8 t ¸ TH. Then, since e R(0) È ˘ R(0) Æ ¯ Z/" and since
˜ R(t) and ˘ R(t) are continuous, part 3 follows from (3.9).
The extraction paths for the economies described in this section and in the pre-
vious section are illustrated by Figure 3.1. Initially, the path of extraction, and
hence of emissions, of the initially constrained economy is below the extraction
path of the unconstrained economy (more precise: the economy that never faces
a binding emission constraint). The trajectories cross during the phase in which
the former economy is still constrained, at t ÆTX, and emissions from the uncon-




















Figure 3.1: Emission paths for unconstrained economy, denoted e Z, and of econ-
omy with same endowments but initially binding constraint, denoted ˘ Z.
constrained economy. The intuition is quite simple. In both economies the entire
resource stock has to be extracted over time, for otherwise intertemporal utility
can be increased by simply extracting the remaining resource. Hence there is an
’abundance effect’ as more of the resource becomes available for other periods:
the initially constrained economy will have to extract more, compared to the un-
constrained economy, at later points in time. Accordingly from TX onwards emis-
sions of the constrained economy are higher than emissions of the unconstrained
economy.
3.4 An economy with an announced constraint
Now suppose that the constraint on emissions is announced at t Æ 0 but only be-
comes binding from t Æ T È 0 onward. As long as the economy is unconstrained,
i.e. for all t,s 2{(0,T),[TH,1)}, optimality requires (3.4) to hold. For all t 2[T,TH],
we have R(t) Æ ¯ Z/", and from Lemma 3.2 we know that extraction is continuous
at t Æ TH. The question remains, however, what the path of extraction is between
announcement and the instant of implementation (the interim period).
Our ﬁrst result concerns extraction at the instant of implementation:
Lemma3.3. Let {Z(t)Æ"R(t)}1
0 denote the path of emissions of the economy facing
an announced emissions constraint Z(t) · ¯ Z Ç "e R(T)8t ¸ T È 0, as described inCHAPTER 3: ANNOUNCED EMISSION CONSTRAINT 83
(3.1)-(3.3) with T È 0. Then limt"T R(t) È R(T) Æ ¯ Z/": emissions and extraction
jump down at t ÆT.





where R(T ¡) ´ limt"T R(t). The constraint and the deﬁnition of TH give R(T) Æ




Hence extraction and emissions must jump down at t ÆT.
Before we can describe the entire path of extraction and emissions, we ﬁrst need
to know whether R(0)S e R(0).
Lemma 3.4. "R(0)È"e R(0); that is, extraction and emissions jump up at the instant
of announcement of a future binding emissions constraint.
Proof. From Lemma 3.2, we know that R(t) È e R(t)8t È TH (note that the proof of
Lemma 3.2 is independent of T being larger than or equal to zero). From (3.5) and
the ﬁrst step of the proof of Lemma 3.3 then follows that R(t)È e R(t)8t ÇT.
We can now describe the optimal path of emissions and extraction in an economy
with an announced constraint:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the economy described in (3.1)-(3.3), faces an announced
constraint on emissions (T È0). Then
1. the level of emissions of this economy is initially higher than the level of emis-
sions of the same economy when it would always be unconstrained (“the un-
constrained economy”);
2. emissions jump below the level of emissions of the unconstrained economy at
the instant of implementation;
3. from the instant at which the constraint ceases to be binding onwards, the
level of emissions is higher than the level of emissions of the unconstrained
economy.
Proof. FollowsfromLemmas1-4. AnalternativeproofisgiveninAppendix3.A.84 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Weillustratetheemissionpathoftheunconstrainedeconomyandoftheeconomy
with an announced constraint in Figure 3.2. Initially, the level of emissions of the
economy with an announced constraint is higher than the level of emissions of
the economy without a constraint. This result can be interpreted as saying that
the level of emissions jumps up at the instant of announcement. At the instant of
implementation, emissions jump down, to a level that is below emissions of the
unconstrained economy (for otherwise the constraint would not be binding). The
path of extraction (emissions) of the unconstrained economy falls below the path
of extraction (emissions) of the constrained economy during the period in which
the latter is restricted in its emissions. When the constraint ceases to be binding,
emissions and extraction of the constrained economy continue to be higher than
those of the unconstrained economy.
As noted in the previous section, the entire resource stock must be extracted over
time in both the unconstrained economy and in the economy with an announced
ceiling on emissions. When the economy is constrained over some period of time,
its extraction is less than what it would be without the constraint, and some of the
resource is not extracted. This causes an abundance effect, as more of the resource
isavailabletoallocateovertheperiodsinwhichtheconstraintisnotbinding. With
an unannounced constrained, all of the resource that is not extracted due to the
constrained must be extracted later (see section 3.3). In the case of an announced
constraint, however, the trade-offis to postpone extraction (and hence emissions),
or to bring it forward. The solution to this trade-off is to do a bit of both. If all ex-
traction were postponed, then this would give higher utility at future dates, which
is then severely discounted. However, bringing all extraction forward implies low
marginal utility at early dates. Indeed, it is optimal to equate discounted marginal
utility in times that the constraint is not binding. As a consequence, some extrac-
tion is brought forward and some postponed, leading to an increase in emissions
at the instant of announcement.
As the analysis shows that the optimal response to a future restriction on carbon
dioxide emissions is an immediate increase in emissions, the short-run effect of
announced climate policy goes directly against the policy’s goal: although climate
policy is aimed at postponing harmful emissions, such that the concentration of
greenhousegasesdoesnotbecometoohigh,theoptimalreactionofresourceown-
ersandconsumerstothispolicyistoinitiallyextractandconsumemorecompared
to the status quo, thus increasing emissions.
A second surprising result is that at the instant of the policy’s implementation,
emissionsandextraction(andhenceutility)jumpdown. Thisisasurprisingresult,
since it might be expected that risk-averse consumers smooth their consumption
over time, as they know in advance of the binding constraint. However, consump-



















Figure 3.2: Emission paths for unconstrained economy , denoted e Z, and of same
economy but with announced emissions constraint, denoted Z.
omy: at any two points in time at which the economy is not restricted in its extrac-
tion, discounted marginal utility has to be equal. While the entire resource stock
has to be extracted over time, a binding constraint for some period of time implies
that less can be extracted during that period, and more has to be extracted during
other periods. Consumption smoothing then implies that some of the ’additional’
resource must be extracted before the constraint becomes binding, and some after
theconstraintceasestobebinding. Attheinstantatwhichtheconstraintbecomes
binding, consumers would like to smooth consumption by increasing extraction
right after this instant, but due to the constraint they cannot.
In the coming sections we study how these results are affected by changes in pref-
erences and policy.
3.5 Effects of changes in preferences and policy when
the constraint is announced
The previous section not only showed that emissions will jump up at the instant of
announcement, it also showed that extraction and consumption will jump down
at the instant of implementation. That is, consumption is not fully smoothed dur-
ing the interim period. These results summon several new questions themselves.86 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Does a higher willingness to smooth consumption reduce the downward jump in
utility at the instant of implementation? How does a longer interim period affect
the jumps, and how does it affect the instant at which the constraint ceases to be
binding? These are some of the questions that will be discussed in this section.
3.5.1 Effects on the duration of the constraint
An announced constraint will lead to an upward jump in extraction and emissions
at the instant of announcement, and a downward jump in both at the instant of
implementation. In this section we study the effect (ceteris paribus) of a change in
the willingness to smooth consumption (the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion),
in the degree of patience of society ½, and in the climate policy itself, both through
a change in the instant of implementation T and a change in the tightness of the
constraint, ¯ Z.
Throughout this section, we assume a constant coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
That is, we assume that ´(R(t)) in (3.6) is constant over time, and hence that the






















The total stock of emissions initially ’available’ to the economy, "S0, is allocated











Using R(TH) Æ ¯ Z/", the fact that (3.5) must hold for any t,s outside the interval
[T,TH) so that (3.7) holds for any t outside this interval, and using the assumption







This can be used to solve the ﬁrst integral in (3.12). From t Æ TH on, the economy
is unconstrained. Hence, at this instant, (3.11) must hold with R(TH)Æ ¯ Z/", which
can be used to solve the last integral. Noting that "R(t) Æ ¯ Z 8t 2 [T,TH] for the
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With this implicit function, we can derive the following result:
Proposition3.2. Changes in preferences and policy havethe followingeffects on the
length of the constrained period TH:
1. The higher the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion ´ (ceteris paribus), or the
lower the rate of time preference ½ (ceteris paribus), the shorter will be the du-















´TH Å1 È 0, and















2. The later the instant of implementation (a higher T), the shorter the duration
of the constraint;



















































































A higher coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion ´ (a lower rate of pure time preference
½) has two effects on the duration of the constraint. First, it can be seen that the
ﬁrst part of (3.14) vanishes when T Æ 0, in which case dTH/d(´/½) Æ ¡1. In that
case, discussed in section 3.3, an increase in ´/½ implies a higher (less negative)
growth rate of extraction from TH onwards (see (3.7)), as consumers are more pa-
tient and/or more willing to smooth consumption over time. This higher cumula-
tive level of extraction in the period after the initial TH has to be compensated by
a decrease in TH in order for total extraction to be feasible, given the initial stock.
However,whenT È0,achangein´/½ hasanadditionalopposingeffectontheﬁrst
term. Intuitively, the counter-effect is that an increase in ´/½ leads to a reduction
in the level of extraction through R(0) (see (3.13) and the ﬁrst term in (3.14)). Note88 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
that initially (in the interim period) the growth rate of extraction is determined by
(3.7), as can be seen by the term ´/½ in the ﬁrst part of (3.14). Hence, there are two
terms that positively affect the growth rate of extraction due to an increase in ´/½,
andonetermthatnegativelyaffectsthelevelofextraction, outsidetheconstrained
phase. Which of these two effects dominates, and hence in which directionTH has
to be adjusted for extraction to be both feasible and not to leave some of the re-
source in the ground, depends on the initial values of parameters.
An increase in T unambiguously leads to a shorter duration of the constraint. As
moreoftheresourceisextractedduringtheinterimphase,theeconomyisatS(t)Æ
(´/½) ¯ Z/" sooner, and hence the period in which the economy is constrained is
shorter.
A looser constraint also unambiguously leads to a shorter period in which the
economy is constrained. The underlying intuition is the same as for the previous
case: when ¯ Z is larger, the economy is at S(t) Æ (´/½) ¯ Z/" sooner, and hence the
period in which the economy is constrained is shorter.
3.5.2 Effects on the jumps in extraction and emissions
We now study how changes in preferences (´/½) and policy (T, ¯ Z) affect the jumps
in emissions at t Æ0 and t ÆT.
Proposition3.3. Changes in preferences and policy havethe following effects on the
optimal path of emissions and extraction:
1. The higher the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion ´ (ceteris paribus), or the
lower the rate of time preference ½ (ceteris paribus), the smaller will be both
the size of the upward jump in emissions and extraction at t Æ 0 and the size
of the downward jump in emissions and extraction at t ÆT;
2. The later the instant of implementation (a higher T), the smaller will be both
the size of the upward jump in emissions and extraction at t Æ 0 and the size
of the downward jump in emissions and extraction at t ÆT;
3. The looser the constraint (a higher ¯ Z), the smaller will be both the size of the
upward jump in emissions and extraction at t Æ 0 and the size of the down-
ward jump in emissions and extraction at t ÆT.
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Although consumption smoothing cannot prevent a downward jump in extraction
and utility at the instant of implementation, the size of the jump is negatively af-
fected by the willingness to smooth. That is, the higher the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion ´, the smaller is the jump at t Æ T. Furthermore, the jump is smaller
when society is more patient (smaller ½). At the same time, the higher is ´ (or the
smaller is ½), the smaller is the upward jump in utility and emissions at the instant
of announcement t Æ 0. These results are as expected, as a higher ´ (smaller ½)
implies a lower willingness to accept changes in utility, that is one would prefer a
ﬂatter extraction path over time. An increase in this willingness not only leads to
smaller jumps at the instants of announcement and implementation, but also to
a ﬂatter extraction path in the interim period. However, as Proposition 3.1 shows,
the two jumps occur irrespective the size of ´ and ½.
The second part of Proposition 3.3 shows that a longer interim period, i.e. a longer
period between the instant of announcement and the instant of implementation
of the policy, leads to smaller jumps in utility and emissions at t Æ 0 and t Æ T.
Indeed, a longer interim period gives the economy time to burn some of the re-
sources, leading to a lower stock and hence lower unconstrained emissions just
before the instant at which the constraint becomes binding (see (3.11)). This in
turn reduces the pressure to increase extraction (compared to an economy that
is always unconstrained) in the interim period; this pressure comes from the fact
that it is optimal to extract the entire resource stock over time. When an economy
facessomeperiodinwhichitisconstrainedinitsextraction,itwillneedtoincrease
extraction during another period in order to still extract the entire stock.




In addition, a looser constraint implies less need to increase emissions during the90 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
interim phase (in order to extract the entire resource stock), and hence a smaller
upward jump in emissions and extraction at the instant of announcement.
3.6 Conclusions
Announcingclimatepolicyinadvancegivesﬁrmstimetoadjust,andcantherefore
lower the overall burden of the policy on the economy. In this chapter, we have
studied the effect of pre-announcement of a ceiling on carbon dioxide emissions
(“Kyoto forever”) on emissions in the period between the policy’s announcement
and its implementation. When carbon emissions come from a non-renewable re-
source like coal or oil, climate policy will affect the optimal path of extraction and
emissions.
Our ﬁrst result is that announcement of the policy induces an increase emissions
at the instant of announcement. This increase in emissions is due to an increase
in extraction, which in turn comes from an abundance effect. The ceiling on emis-
sions directly causes a reduction in extraction during some period of time. As it is
optimal to extract the entire resource stock over time, the difference between this
restricted emissions and the optimal path has then to be extracted either after the
instantatwhichoptimalunrestrictedemissionsequaltheleveloftheceiling,orbe-
tween the instants of announcement and implementation. Proposition 3.1 states
that the solution is to do a bit of both. Postponing all extraction implies high levels
of utility in the future, which are then severely discounted, while extracting all of
the ’extra’ resource before the constraint becomes binding brings along low levels
of marginal utility in comparison with a more gradual extraction path. As a con-
sequence, resource extraction and emissions increase at the instant of the policy’s
announcement. As the idea underlying the policy is to stabilize the concentration
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Article 2 of the UNFCCC), this emissions in-
crease goes directly against the spirit of the policy. Hence, there seems to be a
trade-off between the economic gain of pre-announcement of climate policy, and
the environmental loss coming from it. For future research it would be interesting
to include a second resource in the model (as in chapter 2 of this thesis, but then
focussing on extraction and emission levels), to study whether substitution effects
will enhance or mitigate the abundance effect we found in this chapter.
In addition we show that, although emissions and extraction jump up at the in-
stant of announcement of climate policy, both jump down at the instant of im-
plementation. That is, even when climate policy is announced some years in ad-
vance, consumption will not be smoothed to avoid a jump in utility at the instant
at which the constraint is put into practice. The upwards force on extraction in
the interim phase, from being able to beneﬁt from resource use while not yet be-CHAPTER 3: ANNOUNCED EMISSION CONSTRAINT 91
ing constrained, outweighs the possible beneﬁt from avoiding a downward jump
in utility. However, we show that some consumption smoothing does take place:
the higher the coefﬁcient of risk aversion, the smaller the initial upward jump and
the smaller the downward jump in utility at the instant of implementation. The
possibility of a downward jump in utility, even when the policy is announced in
advance, is intriguing, and deserves further research. For example, when emission
reductions in the interim period can be banked for use during the constrained pe-
riod, this jump might disappear as the prices of the two periods are then linked.
This brings an opportunity cost for emissions in the interim period.
We also show that a longer interim period and a looser constraint reduce the sizes
ofbothjumps. Furthermore, thelengthoftheperiodinwhichtheeconomyiscon-
strained is shorter if the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is higher, the interim
period is longer, and the constraint is looser.
The key message of this chapter is that there is a trade-off between the economic
gain from pre-announcing a ceiling on carbon dioxide emissions, and the envi-
ronmental loss stemming from an increase in emissions in the period between
announcement and implementation. The shorter the interim period, the larger
will be the instantaneous effect. Of course, immediate implementation postpones
emissions until the constraint ceases to be binding, which is the main purpose of
climate policy. This lesson should be taken into account by countries that do not
yet have a binding constraint on carbon dioxide emissions.92 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
3.A Appendix: Solving the problem of an announced
constraint with a Hamiltonian
In this Appendix we study the same problem as in the main text, but using a differ-
ent approach to solve the problem.
3.A.1 The model
Again, consumers maximize intertemporal utility, while instantaneous utility U
(which is a C 2 function such that U0 È 0 and U00 Ç 0) comes from the use of a
nonrenewable resource. One unit of resource use causes " units of emissions of
carbon dioxide Z. At some point in time T ¸0, the economy faces a ceiling on the







˙ S(t)Æ¡R(t), R(t)¸0, S(0)ÆS0; (3.23)
Z(t)´"R(t)· ¯ Z 8t ¸T; (3.24)
R(t) denotes extraction of the nonrenewable at time t, and ½ is the rate of time
preference. Equation (3.23) shows that the stock S of the nonrenewable declines
withextraction(wedeﬁne,foranyvariable x, ˙ x ´dx/dt). Theinitialendowmentof
theresource,S0, isﬁniteandgiven. Climatepolicyisdescribedin(3.24): emissions
Z arisefromresourceuse, butstartingattimeT, theycannotexceed ¯ Z (i.e., weput
a constraint on the control variable R).
Since the constraint is announced in advance, the planning horizon is divided in
two phases: a ﬁrst period when the constraint is not yet enforced (the interim
phase), and a second period when the constraint is enforced and (at least ini-
tially) binding (the enforcement phase). The problem in (3.22)-(3.24) is therefore
an inﬁnite-horizon discounted two-stage optimal control problem, with a ﬁxed
switching time at t ÆT.







where superscript 1 indicates the Lagrangian covering the period t 2 [0,T) and 2
indicates the Lagrangian covering t ¸ T. Furthermore, ¸ is the co-state variable
associated to (3.23), ° is the multiplier for the nonnegativity constraint on the ex-
traction rate, and ¿ is the multiplier associated with the emission constraint.CHAPTER 3: ANNOUNCED EMISSION CONSTRAINT 93




where j 2{1,2}, need to be complemented by the following matching condition for
the co-state variable in the two stages:
¸1(T)Æ¸2(T). (3.29)
This guarantees the continuity of the co-state variable at the time of the switch.
For the remainder of the chapter we therefore drop the superscripts to ¸.
The complementary slackness conditions for the constraints are,




Æ0, 8t ¸T; (3.30)
°j(t)¸0, R(t)¸0, °j(t)R(t)Æ0; (3.31)




3.A.2 The laissez faire economy
In this section we look at the economy described above, focussing on the case in
whichtheconstraintneverbinds( ¯ Z !1and¿(t)Æ0). Thiswecallthelaissezfaire
economy as government policy does not inﬂuence the agent’s choices. Denote by
˜ x the value of variable x for a laissez faire economy.
As can be seen from (3.27) and (3.28), marginal utility along the optimal trajectory
grows in parallel with the scarcity rent ˜ ¸ at rate ½. At each point in time, total ex-
traction equals energy demand, and is simply given by ˜ R(t)Æd(˜ ¸(t))´U0¡1(˜ ¸(t)).
Thus, extraction is continuous and declines along the optimal path.
From (3.32) and (3.28) follows that the entire resource stock gets extracted over




dt Æ S0. Hence, the
larger the initial (total) resource stock, the lower ˜ ¸(0), and the higher initial extrac-
tion (see (3.27)).
3.A.3 The optimal path of energy consumption: the abundance
effect
We now study the optimal path of energy consumption R in the presence of an
announced and binding emission constraint ¯ Z. Suppose that the constraint on
25In the interest of compactness, and with a slight abuse of notation, we have indicated the nec-
essary conditions for the two stages as one. Note that ¿(t)Æ0 for all t ÇT.94 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
emissions is announced at t Æ0 but only becomes binding from t ÆT È0 onward.
We denote the (endogenous) instant at which the constraint ceases to be binding
by TH.
In the previous section we have shown that as long as the economy is uncon-
strained, i.e. for all t 2{(0,T),[TH,1)}, marginal utility grows at rate ½. From (3.29)
then follows thatU0(t)e¡½t ÆU0(s)e¡½s for t,s 2(0,T) and t,s 2[TH,1). The ques-
tion remains, however, what the path of extraction is between announcement and
the instant of implementation (the interim phase).
Lemma 3.5. Suppose an emission constraint is announced at t Æ 0 and becomes
binding at t ÆT È0. Then energy use jumps up at the instant of announcement due
to an abundance effect.
Proof. By deﬁnition of a binding emissions constraint, U(R(T)) Ç U( ˜ R(T)) and
hence R(T) Ç ˜ R(T). Hence, during some strictly positive period of time, R(t) Ç
˜ R(t). From (3.32) and (3.28) then follows that during other periods R(t) È ˜ R(t), as
energy becomes more abundant for the rest of the time horizon. Since for all t,s 2
{(0,T),[TH,1)},marginalutilitygrowsatrate½,andsinceU0(t)e¡½t ÆU0(s)e¡½s for
t 2(0,T) and s 2[TH,1), it follows that ifU0(R(t))e¡½t ?U0( ˜ R(t))e¡½t for some t 2
{(0,T),[TH,1)}, then this is the case for all t 2 {(0,T),[TH,1)}. Suppose
U0(R(t))e¡½t ¸ U0( ˜ R(t))e¡½t at some t 2 {(0,T),[TH,1)}. Then R(t) · ˜ R(t)8t 2
{(0,T),[TH,1)}. Since energy extraction must be continuous at TH (for otherwise
the Hamiltonian U(R(t))¡¸(t)R(t) in (3.26) is not continuous, which cannot be
optimal), and since R(T) Ç ˜ R(T), the transversality condition is violated. Hence
R(t)È ˜ R(t)8t 2{(0,T),[TH,1)}.
From this proof follows the following result:
Corollary 3.1. Suppose an emission constraint is announced at t Æ 0 and becomes
binding at t Æ T È 0. Then energy use, utility, and the value of the Hamiltonian
jump down at t ÆT.
AsshowninMakris(2001),aspecialfeatureofatwo-stageoptimalcontrolproblem
with a ﬁxed switching point is the possibility of a jump in the value of the Hamil-
tonian at the switching point. When the switching point T is at the interior of the
interval (0,1), the Hamiltonian will jump down, as is the case in our model.
From (3.32) and (3.28), continuity of extraction andU0(t)e¡½t ÆU0(s)e¡½s for t,s 2
(0,T) and t,s 2 [TH,1) follows that 9TX such that Z(t) Æ ¯ Z Ç e Z(t) 8t 2 [T,TX);
Z(TX)Æ ¯ Z Æ e Z(TX); and Z(t)Æ ¯ Z È e Z(t)8t 2(TX,TH].
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Proposition 3.4. Let e Z(t) Æ "e R(t) denote carbon dioxide emissions of an economy
thatwillalwaysbeunconstrainedinitsemissions, andlet Z(t)Æ"R(t)denoteemis-
sions of an economy that is constrained for some period of time. Then the optimal
path of emissions in an economy with an announced emissions constraint, as de-
scribed in (3.22)-(3.24), evolves as follows:
1. Z(t)È e Z(t)È ¯ Z 80· t ÇT;
2. Z(t)Æ ¯ Z Ç e Z(t)8t 2[T,TX);
3. Z(TX)Æ ¯ Z Æ e Z(TX);
4. Z(t)Æ ¯ Z È e Z(t)8t 2(TX,TH];
5. e Z(t)Ç Z(t)Ç ¯ Z 8t ÈTH.
Proof. In text.Part II
Climate policy, input substitution, and technological changeCHAPTER 4
Carbon leakage revisited: unilateral climate policy with
directed technical change26
An important threat to climate policy is that actions undertaken without universal
participation may prove to be ineffective: any partial agreement to reduce emis-
sions, of carbon dioxide (CO2) for example, may be undermined by the behaviour
of countries outside the agreement. Indeed, increases in CO2 emissions by un-
constrained countries can off-set the reductions secured by the agreement partic-
ipants, a phenomenon known as carbon leakage.27
The behaviour of unconstrained countries in reaction to a reduction of CO2 emis-
sions of other countries is mainly driven by two economic mechanisms. First,
when the production of energy-intensive goods is reduced in constrained coun-
tries due to the introduction of an emission constraint, the international prices of
such goods will increase. This gives countries outside the abating coalition incen-
tivestoexpandtheirproductionofthesegoodsandexportthemtosignatorycoun-
26Thischapteris a slightly adjusted reprintofDiMariaandvander Werf (2008). Wearegreatlyin-
debted to Sjak Smulders, Emiliya Lazarova and Maurizio Zanardi for fruitful discussions. We would
alsoliketothankErwinBulte,HenkFolmer,CeesWithagen,AartdeZeeuw,conferenceparticipants
in Zürich, Bremen and Amsterdam, and two anonymous referees for useful comments.
27Estimates of the size of this effect rely on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. The
leakage rates for the Kyoto Protocol (the percentage of the reduction in emissions offset by the
increase in emissions by countries outside the Protocol) reported in the literature range from 2%
to 41% (see for example Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2000, Light et al., 2000). Babiker (2005)
even ﬁnds a leakage rate of 130% for one of his scenarios. These differences in the estimates stem
from widely differing assumptions with respect to the degree of international market integration,
substitution and supply elasticities, and market structure.
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tries (the terms-of-trade effect). Clearly, this implies an increase in emissions by
countries outside the agreement. The second mechanism of carbon leakage works
through the price of fossil fuels: as the price of fossil fuels decreases following the
reduction in demand on the part of the constrained countries, countries outside
the agreement might decide to substitute other inputs with fossil fuels, thus in-
creasing their emissions (the energy-market effect).
In sum, climate change policy affects the relative prices of both goods and factors,
thusinducingtheleakageofcarbonemissions. Theseprice changes, however, also
modifytheincentivesforinnovation,changingtheleveland,mostimportantly,the
directionoftechnologicalchange(i.e.howtechnologylevelsdevelopacrossindus-
tries). This effect, known as induced technological change, was already postulated
by Hicks (1932), and has since been the focus of many inﬂuential contributions,
both theoretical and empirical.28 Once the available technology changes as a re-
sultofclimatepolicy,however,sodotheresponsesoftheunconstrainedcountries.
Yet, this additional mechanism has to date been almost completely ignored in the
climate change policy literature.29
In this chapter, we study the consequences of induced (directed) technological
change on carbon leakage using a stylized theoretical model of the interactions
betweenconstrainedandunconstrainedcountries,whichfocusesontransmission
mechanisms based on terms-of-trade effects. In order to be able to highlight the
effects of induced technological change, we model two countries that are perfectly
symmetric as refers to preferences, technology and endowments. In this way we
rule out any other potential source of carbon leakage, which would cloud the ef-
fects of technological change. Indeed, we only allow the two countries to differ in
one crucial respect: one country imposes a binding emission cap, while the other
remains unconstrained. As the countries are symmetric before the imposition of
the cap, the adjustment process represents a pure response to policy. In this sense,
the chapter analyzes a ‘policy-induced pollution-haven effect’.
To single out the contribution of technological change in the adjustment process,
28For early contributions, see Kennedy (1964) and Drandakis and Phelps (1966). Recently, Ace-
moglu 1998, 2002 has provided a tractable theoretical framework to investigate the issue. Among
the empirical contributions, Newell et al. (1999) study the effect of energy prices and government
regulations on energy-efﬁciency innovation. They show that changes in energy prices affect the
direction of innovation for some products, and induce changes in the subset of models offered for
sale. They conclude that "the endogeneity of the direction, or composition of technological change
is surely at least as signiﬁcant [as] the overall pace of technological change" (p. 971). Popp (2002)
shows that changes in energy prices (including the effects of environmental policy) positively and
quickly affect environmentally friendly innovations.
29Grubb et al. (1995) ﬁrst noted the importance of induced technological change for carbon leak-
age. However, in their paper induced technological change does not come from proﬁt-maximizing
behaviour. Instead, it is assumed to occur through an exogenous decrease in the emissions inten-
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our analysis proceeds in two steps. We start from a situation of complete symme-
try and analyze the effect of introducing an exogenous emission cap. The ﬁrst step
refers to analyzing a model where unilateral climate policy induces trade (in either
energy-intensivegoods,ordirectlyinenergy),but(thecompositionof)technology
does not change. This is what we call the ‘undirected technical change’ scenario,
where purely trade effects are at work. We then compare this benchmark to the
case where technology levels of the labour- and energy-intensive industries are al-
lowed to develop at different rates, i.e. the ‘directed technical change’ scenario.
We show that, when (the composition of) technology is allowed to adjust endoge-
nously, induced technological change always leads to a reduction in the degree of
carbon leakage. We refer to this as the induced-technology effect.
This chapter contributes to the theoretical literature on carbon leakage by high-
lighting the role of directed technical change in this framework. The early litera-
ture on the topic addressed asymmetric international environmental policy from
a public economics point of view (e.g. Hoel, 1991, Barrett, 1994, Carraro and Sinis-
calco, 1998). Stressing the roles of free-riding incentives and strategic behaviour
amongnations,butabstractingfrombothtechnicalchangeandinternationaltrade,
this literature concludes that emissions among countries are strategic substitutes
and that unilateral climate policy will lead to leakage of emissions. More recently,
however, Copeland and Taylor (2005) show that in the presence of international
tradeandenvironmentalpreferences,acountry’sresponsetoarest-of-worldemis-
sions reduction is ambiguous: emissions among countries can be either strategic
complements or substitutes depending on key elasticities in the model. In their
static two-good, two-factor, K-country model without technical change, this result
followsfromallowingforincomeandsubstitutioneffectsontheconsumptionside
tooffsettheterms-of-tradeeffectontheproductionside. Themechanismunderly-
ing their result therefore differs from ours, both in terms of modelling and in terms
of economic content.
Closer in spirit to our work, Golombek and Hoel (2004) study the effect of interna-
tional spillovers of abatement technology on leakage, using a static partial equilib-
rium two-country, one-good model with transboundary pollution. In each coun-
try a central planner chooses research and development (R&D) expenditures and
abatement levels to minimize total costs that include environmental damages. Re-
search activities lead, by assumption, to reductions in abatement costs, while in-
ternational technology spill-overs allow technology to diffuse across borders at no
cost. Hence, the authors effectively build in their model a mechanism that coun-
teracts the free-riding incentives underlined by previous literature. In our model,
on the other hand, the nature of technical change is endogenous, as it is itself
driven by proﬁt incentives, and depends on the characteristics of production.
The rest of the chapter develops as follows. We introduce the model in section 4.1102 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
and present the key equilibrium conditions in section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains the
main results of the chapter. Here we ﬁrst introduce the terms-of-trade effect and
study carbon leakage when entrepreneurs cannot aim new technologies to one of
the sectors; we then focus on carbon leakage under directed technical change and
show how the induced-technology effect changes the previous results. In section
4.4 we discuss how our results relate to the existing literature and conclude, point-
ing at possible extensions.
4.1 The Model
Our economy consists of two countries, c and u, that have identical production
technologies and endowments, while only differing in their environmental poli-
cies. We focus on a situation of free trade noting that, as long as the two countries
do not differ in environmental policies, there will be no actual scope for trade. We
assume that country c (for constrained) imposes an exogenously imposed bind-
ing cap on polluting emissions. By imposing an exogenous constraint, rather than
modelling asymmetries in (environmental) preferences, we are able to identify the
pure effect of technological change on carbon leakage. If we were, instead, to as-
sume differences in preferences across countries, we would introduce additional
(asymmetric) effects through income and substitution mechanisms. In this case,
however, itwouldbeimpossibletoisolateandemphasizetheroleofdirectedtech-
nical change in the ﬁnal outcome. Since the focus of this chapter is on carbon
leakage, we do not discuss economic growth or welfare, as such we do not need to
solveexplicitlyfortheinterestrate. Moreover,consumptiononlyoccursintermsof
the ﬁnal good and hence does not affect the relative demand for the intermediate
goods, thus, we can abstract from the consumer’s side of the economy altogether.
Ineachcountry,ﬁnaloutputY isobtainedasaCESaggregateoftwo(intermediate)















where r Æ c,u is the country index.30 We assume that good YE is produced using
energy (E) and a specialized set of differentiated machines. The range of types of
machines available to produce energy intensive goods is indicated by NE. Instead,
YL is produced using labour (LL) and a different set of machines, whose range is
30For simplicity, we set the share parameters in the CES to one, as they will only introduce an
additional constant term in the expressions. The choice of this speciﬁc functional form is done for
tractability. However, as shown in Acemoglu (2007), the results pertaining to the bias of technical
change are applicable to any production function featuring factor-augmenting technical change.CHAPTER 4: CARBON LEAKAGE WITH DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE 103
indicated by NL. Following Acemoglu (2002), the production functions for the in-
























where ¯ 2 (0,1) and kr
j (i) is the amount of machines of type i employed in sector
j ÆE,L in country r.
Toproduceeachtypeofmachine,producersneedablueprintinventedbytheR&D
sector, as will be discussed below. We assume that machines developed to com-
plement one factor of production cannot be usefully employed in the other sector
and that blueprints can be traded internationally. Accordingly, NE and NL repre-
sentgloballevelsoftechnologyandproducersineachcountrycanuseallmachine
types globally available for their sector.
We assume that in each country an amount of labour equal to L is inelastically
supplied at each point in time, and that it is immobile across countries. Labour






E is the amount of labour in energy production in country r. As in Babiker
(2005), we assume that energy has to be produced using labour and some ﬁxed







that CO2 emissions, Z, are proportional to the amount of energy produced, so that
Z ÆE.
When country c introduces a binding constraint on the amount of carbon dioxide
emitted, it de facto imposes a cap on the amount of labour allocated to energy
production. Indeed, when Zc is the maximum amount of emissions permitted at
any point in time, the allocation of labour in country c must satisfy Lc
E Æ(Zc)
1/Á.
The last part of our model consists of the process of technical change. As men-
tioned in the introduction, in our analysis we aim at comparing the outcomes ob-
tained under two alternative technology regimes: ‘directed’ and ‘undirected’ tech-
nical change (DTC and UTC, respectively henceforth).
Under directed technical change, prospective innovators decide on the amount of
their R&D outlays, and are also able to choose the sector they want to target their104 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
innovation efforts to. They know from the onset which intermediate sector will
use their innovation. Hence, they will invent new machines for the sector that
promises the highest returns. Using a lab-equipment speciﬁcation for the process
of technical change, we assume that investing one unit of the ﬁnal good in R&D
generates º new innovations in any of the two sectors.31 Thus, the development
of new types of machines takes place according to the following production func-
tions:32















j indicates R&D expenditure in country r, and sector j, while a dot on a
variable represents its time derivative, i.e. ˙ x Ædx/dt.
In order to have a meaningful comparison for the DTC regime, we model the fol-
lowing variant, that we call undirected technical change (UTC). In this case, pro-
spective innovators invest in the development of blueprints whenever it is prof-
itable to do so, yet they cannot choose the sector they want to develop a new ma-
chinefor. Wearethusabletoemphasizetheeffectofthe‘directedness’oftechnical
change on carbon leakage, while technological change is endogenous in both ver-
sions. We imagine that with UTC the outcome of the R&D investment is uncertain
in the sense that innovators are not sure in which sector their blueprint will ﬁnd
utilization, and hence they maximize expected, rather than certain, proﬁts from
R&D. To keep matters simple, we assume that the newly developed blueprint will
be energy-complementing with probability ° 2 (0,1), and labour-complementing
with probability (1¡°). Consequently, the (expected) relative marginal produc-
tivity is constant, as is common in traditional (one-sector) models of endogenous
growth.33 As innovators can only determine the total outlays in R&D activities, but





where Rr indicates total R&D investment by country r.
In both versions of the model, a new blueprint must be developed before the in-
novator can sell it to producers, thus the costs of R&D are sunk. Hence, machine
producers must wield some monopoly power in the market for machines, in order
31See Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) for the lab-equipment model.
32For simplicity, we assume that R&D is equally productive in the two sectors. Relaxing this as-
sumption introduces a constant in the expressions that follow, but does not alter our qualitative
results.
33With undirected technical change the relative level of technology in the two sectors, NE/NL,
is exogenous and constant. Moreover, since NE/NL equals °/(1¡°), any value of NE/NL can be
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to recoup the development costs. For this we assume that an innovator is awarded
a global patent for her invention and that patents are perfectly enforced in both
countries. Thus, each innovation takes place only once, and no international over-
lap in blueprints occurs.34
Finally, we simplify the analysis by assuming that machine production is local,
that is innovators license their blueprints to one producer in each region, so that
blueprints are traded across countries, but machines are not.
4.2 Equilibrium
Themainfocusofthechapterisonthelevelofcarbonemissionsinbothcountries.
As emissions are proportional to the amount of energy produced in each region,
the key to derive the results in the following section is to understand the alloca-
tion of labour between production of the labour-intensive good YL, and energy.
Appendix 4.A presents the complete solution of the model, here we only highlight
some key elements of the solution.



















j is the price of input j, and pr
j the price of intermediate Yj, in country r.
These equations allow a brief discussion of international trade in our model. Con-
sidering (4.9) and (4.10), it is immediate that goods’ and factors’ price equalization
always obtains in our model. Consider ﬁrst the case where no emission ceiling is
imposed. Trivially, in this case the two countries are identical and all prices are
the same across regions. Now, consider what happens when country c introduces
an emission cap. The prices of both energy and the energy-intensive good tend to
increase, creating the scope for trade. The constrained country exports the labour-
intensivegood,YL,againstimportsofYE and/orE. However,itisimmaterialwhich
ofthesegoodsisactuallyimported. Indeed,from(4.9)and(4.10), aslongas pL and
either pE or wE are the same across countries, which follows from the law of one
34Our focus in the current chapter is on the interaction between two highly developed countries,
or coalitions thereof. To ﬁx ideas one can think of the European Union as country c, and the United
States as country u. In this context, it is natural to assume that patents are perfectly enforced in-
ternationally. Di Maria and Smulders (2004), instead, present a North-South trade model featuring
directedtechnicalchange. There, thecentralassumptionisthattheprotectionofintellectualprop-
erty rights is asymmetric, with patents being protected only in the developed North.106 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
price, all prices equalize. In this sense, it makes no difference to allow for trade in
energy-intensivegoods,ordirectlyinenergy. Sincepricesalwaysequalize,wedrop
the country index when this does not induce confusion.
Taking the ratio of the ﬁrst-order conditions above, and using the expression for
equilibrium prices – (4.24) in Appendix 4.A – we get the following expression for
the relative factor rewards, w ´ wE/wL, for given technology
w Æ N(¾¡1)/¾¡
Sw¢¡1/¾, (4.11)








ing (4.11) for Sw gives Sw Æ N¾¡1w¡¾, elucidating the role of ¾ as the elasticity of
relative factor demand with respect to their relative price. Hence, the relative price
of energy decreases with energy supply, while, as will be discussed later, the effect
ofchangesinthetechnologyratioN onrelativefactorrewardsdependsonwhether
the relative energy demand is elastic or inelastic.35
In the energy sector, producers employ labour, Lr
E, so as to satisfy the ﬁrst-order








E ÅLE ÆL. (4.12)
Here LE ÆLc
E ÆLu
E is the amount of labour employed in energy production in each
country, when both countries are unconstrained, and technology N is given.
When country c faces a binding emission constraint, its emissions, energy gen-
eration and amount of labour in energy production are determined by the cap:
Lc
E Æ(Zc)1/Á. In the unconstrained country however, energy producers still choose
the amount of labour so as to maximize proﬁts. Taking the value of the cap into
account, we ﬁnd the following expression representing the equilibrium allocation

















So far we have assumed that N is constant, in accordance with our deﬁnition of
undirected technical change. When technical change is directed, instead, innova-
tors choose (the amount and) the direction of their innovation efforts. They will
invest in the sector which is expected to yield the highest rate of return. In Ap-
pendix 4.A, we show that the relative proﬁtability of innovations in the two sectors,
¼Æ¼E/¼L is given by:
¼Æ p1/¯Sw,
35Since ¾ ´ 1Å("¡1)¯, it follows that ¾? 1 , "? 1. Thus, the relative factor demand is elastic
(¾ È 1) if and only if intermediate goods are gross substitutes in the production of the ﬁnal good
("È1), and inelastic (¾Ç1) if and only if they are gross complements ("Ç1).CHAPTER 4: CARBON LEAKAGE WITH DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE 107
where p ´ pE/pL. At each point in time, the direction of innovation will be de-
termined by relative proﬁts. When ¼ È 1 innovators will concentrate on energy-
complementingresearchactivitiesand N increases,whilewhen¼Ç1labour-com-
plementing activities are more proﬁtable, and N decreases. The expression above
shows that the entrepreneurs’ choice of the sector to invest in is determined by the
relativepriceoftheintermediategoods(thepriceeffect)andbytherelativeamount
of factors to which a machine type is complementary (the market-size effect). In
particular, for given technology, a decrease in energy supply leads to a reduction in
relative proﬁts through the market size effect and to an increase through the price
effect, see (4.24). Which of the two effects prevails depends on the elasticity ¾, as
will be discussed later. In equilibrium, however, both types of innovation occur at
the same time, leading to the no-arbitrage expression: ¼Æ1.
Using this no-arbitrage relation, we can solve for the equilibrium level of the tech-
nology ratio, N:
N Æ(Sw)¾¡1. (4.14)
As noted above, the effect of a decrease in energy supply on the direction of tech-
nical change, that is on whether N increases or decreases, depends on the size of
¾. Whenlabour-andenergy-intensivegoodsaregrosscomplementsinﬁnalgoods
production (¾Ç1), the price effect outweighs the market size effect and a decrease
in energy supply induces an increase in the range of energy complementary ma-
chines. However, when ¾ È 1 the result is reversed, and the reduction in energy
supply induces an increase in the range of labour-complementary machines.
Substituting the expression for the equilibrium value of N in (4.12) and (4.13) pro-
vides the key expressions for the equilibrium allocation of labour under directed
technical change:
Á1/(¾¡2)L(Á(¾¡1)¡1)/(¾¡2)
E ÅLE ÆL, (4.15)
















when country c faces a binding ceiling on its CO2 emissions.
Thus, (4.12) and (4.13) summarize the long-run equilibrium of our model with and
withoutunilateralclimatepolicyunderundirectedtechnicalchange, whilethelast
two equations do the same for the case of directed technical change.
4.3 Unilateral climate policy and carbon leakage
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of unilateral climate policy, in terms of
carbon leakage, across different regimes of technical change. To compare differ-
ent scenarios, we need to start from a common baseline. The natural baseline to108 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
choose is the long-run equilibrium of the model with directed technical change
when both countries are unconstrained, equation (4.12). This baseline is charac-
terized by the (symmetric) equilibrium level of labour devoted to energy genera-
tion LE and by the corresponding (endogenous) technology ratio N. In order to
have comparable baselines across technology regimes, we need to choose °, the
probability for an innovator to end up with an energy-complementing blueprint,
such that °/(1¡°)Æ N equals the level prevailing under directed technical change
(see Section 4.1).
Starting from this common equilibrium, we introduce an emissions constraint in
one of the countries and study the degree of carbon leakage that occurs along the
balanced growth path. We ﬁrst study carbon leakage when technical change is
undirected. Then we move on to the model with directed technical change and
discuss how and why the results from this model differ from the model with ’tradi-
tional’ endogenous growth.
4.3.1 Carbon Leakage under undirected technical change
Carbon leakage occurs when the unconstrained region increases its emissions in
reaction to a reduction in emissions by the other country (i.e. whenLu
E ÈLE). Intu-
itively it would seem clear that there should always be some carbon leakage: when
a country exogenously reduces its supply of energy by introducing a limit to the
amount of emissions, the energy intensive good becomes scarcer on its domes-
tic market, giving rise to an increase in its relative price. This creates some scope
for trade: the unconstrained economy now enjoys a comparative advantage in the
production of the dirty good and will expand its production thereof. As a conse-
quence Lu
E and hence emissions Zu increase. We call this the terms-of-trade effect
of a unilateral emission constraint. This result indeed holds in the case of undi-
rected technical change, as formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. When technical change is undirected, carbon leakage will always
be positive along the balanced growth path.



























E ·LE. Then the right hand side is larger than or equal to one while
the left hand side is smaller than one. So we have a contradiction, hence Lu
E È
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Figure 4.1: Emissions in the unconstrained model (Z), in the constrained model
under undirected technical change (ZuUTC), and under directed technical change
(ZuDTC)
We illustrate this result in Figure 4.1, where the dark dashed line represents emis-
sions (or equivalently energy production) in each country when both are uncon-
strained. The amount of emissions by the unconstrained country when the other
country faces a binding emission constraint, under undirected technical change
is represented by the solid black line.36 The ﬁgure clearly shows that emissions in
the unconstrained region always increase following the introduction of the cap. In
addition, we see that the amount of energy produced in the unconstrained region
is declining with ¾, the elasticity of relative demand for energy with respect to its
relative price. The higher this elasticity, the lower the demand for energy in the
constrained economy following the imposition of the constraint, hence the lower
the export-led increase in energy generation.
When technical change is endogenous but undirected, unilateral climate policy is
36The ﬁgures in this chapter are obtained from numerical simulations, using as baseline parame-
ters values: L Æ1, ÁÆ0.4, and ¾2(0, 3.5). For each value of ¾ the corresponding value for N for the
model with directed technical change were computed and the appropriate ° calibrated such that
both models start from the same baseline. For the sake of graphical clarity, the graphs are plotted
over a smaller range for ¾.110 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
undermined by emission increases by unconstrained countries. However, it seems
intuitively clear that changes in relative prices cœteris paribus will not lead to an
increase in global emissions. Climate policy will shift production to the uncon-
strained country (Proposition 4.1), but the increase in the relative price of the car-
bon intensive good will at the same time lead to a reduction in global energy de-
mand. Toaddressthisformally, welookattheimpactofachangeinthelevelofthe









, and derive the following result:
Proposition4.2. Whentechnicalchangeisundirected,globalemissionswillalways
decrease following a tightening of the emission constraint.






























be total emissions. Thus, Ew de-
creases with a tightening of the cap whenever dEw/dLc
E È 0. Differentiating Ew,











































E and Á2(0,1), the above inequality is always true.
To illustrate this result, we present the leakage rate, the ratio of the induced in-
crease in emissions in the unconstrained country and the emission reduction in











, as a function of ¾ in
Figure 4.2. The leakage rate for the case of undirected technical change is repre-
sented by the dark line. As the ﬁgure shows, the leakage rate is always positive, but
less than 1.CHAPTER 4: CARBON LEAKAGE WITH DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE 111
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Figure 4.2: Leakage rate under undirected (UTC) and directed (DTC) technical
change
4.3.2 Carbon leakage under directed technical change
Inthissectionwefocusonthecentralpointofouranalysisandderiveourmainre-
sults comparing the effects of an emission cap across regimes of technical change.
We start by noting that allowing for directed technical change effectively provides
the economy with an additional instrument to cope with the consequences of the
introduction of a binding cap in the constrained country. Changes in the compo-
sition of technology may enable the unconstrained country to meet the increased
demand for energy intensive goods while diverting less labour from its relatively
more productive use in the YL sector. This is what we call the induced-technology
effect ofaunilateralemissionconstraint. Wewillshowthatthiseffecthastheoppo-
site sign to the terms-of-trade effect introduced above and hence tends to reduce
carbon leakage.
We can compare the two versions of the model using the Le Chatelier principle
(see e.g. Silberberg, 1990). Taking the total differential of (4.13) and rearranging we























whereDTCindicatesdirectedtechnicalchangeandUTCundirectedtechnicalchan-112 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
ge. Wecaninterpretthisexpressionassayingthattheoveralleffectofthecapwhen
allowing for directed technical change (the left hand side) can be decomposed in
a terms-of-trade effect, represented by the ﬁrst term at the right-hand side, and an
induced-technology effect. Whether these two effects act in the same direction or
not ultimately determines under which regime we can expect leakage to be higher.
In order to draw any conclusion, we need to sign the components of the above
equation, thus getting the following result:
Proposition 4.3. For ¾ 6Æ 1 carbon leakage will be smaller with directed technical
change than with undirected technical change. For ¾ Æ 1 it will be identical across
regimes.









E Ç0. Moreover,from(4.13),when N (andhence N1¡¾)increases,
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Consider now ¾ È 1. By symmetric arguments, dN/dLc
E È 0 and @Lu
E/@N È 0, im-
plying once more @Lu
E/@N ¢dN/dLc
E È0.
Finally, consider ¾ Æ 1. In this case N equals 1, irrespective of the value of Sw,
hence dN/dLc
E Æ0.
This result shows that the induced-technology effect works against the standard
terms-of-trade effect of Proposition 4.1. It thus lowers the amount of carbon leak-
age that would occur if technical change were not directed. Figure 4.1 shows the
two effects. The pure terms-of-trade effect can be read from the upwards shift of
emissions from the dashed dark line (the model without a cap) to the dark solid
line (the model with a cap and undirected technical change). The induced tech-
nology effect is summarized by the move from the solid black line to the light gray
one (the model with a cap and directed technical change). Indeed, the amount
of emissions is lower when technical change is directed, with the exception of the
case where ¾ Æ 1. This is due to the fact that when ¾ Æ 1 our CES speciﬁcation
in (4.1) reduces to a Cobb-Douglas production function, in which case technical
change will always be neutral to the inputs concerned.37
The key mechanism at work here, is that the type of technical change induced by
the emission constraint proves to be always energy-saving. To show this, we ﬁrst
analyze how the composition of technology is affected by the introduction of the
cap. Successivelyweaddresstheinteractionbetweenchangesin N andthelevelof
37Notice that, formally, we would need share parameters summing up to one in (4.1) to obtain a
constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function as " (and hence ¾) goes to 1.CHAPTER 4: CARBON LEAKAGE WITH DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE 113
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Figure4.3: Technology ratios (N) under undirected and directed technical change
¾, to explain the impact of technical change on the evolution of the relative factor
shares in our economy.
The composition of technology evolves according to the relative proﬁtability of
R&Dinthedifferentsectors. Asnotedinsection4.2,theﬁnaleffectofintroducinga
cap (i.e. a change in Sw) on relative proﬁts depends both on changes in the relative
market size and in relative prices. Climate policy reduces the amount of energy
produced, and hence decreases the potential size of the market for new energy-
complementing innovations. At the same time, it makes energy scarcer, thereby
rising the price of energy and making an innovation for the energy intensive good
more valuable. Whether the negative market size effect or the positive price effect
dominates depends on ¾, the elasticity of the relative demand for energy with re-
spect to its relative price. Since in the long-run equilibrium the technology ratio
is given by (4.14), we see that whenever ¾ Ç 1 the price effect dominates and the
introduction of a cap induces an increase in N. When ¾ È 1 on the other hand,
the market size effect dominates and N decreases. This relation between N and ¾
is plotted in Figure 4.3, where the dark line represents the ratio of technology un-
der undirected technical change, while the lighter one depicts the case of directed
technical change.
Recalling the expression for relative factor productivity from (4.11), we can write114 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS




´ wSu Æ N(¾¡1)/¾(Sw)¡1/¾Su.
We see that, for given N, the effect of the introduction of the cap (a decrease in
Sw) is to unambiguously increase the share of energy in the unconstrained coun-
try. We know from the result in Proposition 4.1 that, when N is constant, leakage
is always positive. Once we allow N to change in response to economic incentives,
however, some form of induced energy-saving technical change occurs. The ex-
pression above shows how the effect of a change in the technology ratio on relative
factor shares depends on ¾. As discussed above, when ¾ Ç 1, N is higher than in
the case of undirected technical change (see Figure 4.3). Thus, N(¾¡1)/¾ is lower,
and the increase in the energy share due to the cap is counteracted by the induced
change in technology. The same is true when ¾ È 1. In this case, however, both N
and N(¾¡1)/¾ are below their baseline levels. Thus, irrespective of the level of¾, the
effect of the induced change in technology (N(¾¡1)/¾) is to mitigate the terms-of-
trade effect (which works through (Sw)
¡1/¾). We can conclude that the technical
change induced by the introduction of unilateral climate policy reduces the share
of energy. Thus, technical change is endogenously energy-saving in our model. As
shown in Proposition 4.3, directed technical change unambiguously leads to lower
rates of carbon leakage.
The last question we want to address is whether the induced-technology effect we
just highlighted can more than offset the terms-of-trade effect, and lead to a sit-
uation where carbon leakage is negative. Figure 4.1 shows that an afﬁrmative an-
swer is in order. Indeed, the curve representing emissions under directed techni-
cal change (the light curve) dips below the graph of the baseline case (the dashed
curve), as ¾ gets larger. The following proposition makes it formal using a log-
linearized version of our model, derived in Appendix 4.B:38
Proposition 4.4. When technical change is directed, carbon leakage due to a mar-
ginal tightening of the emission constraint will be positive for ¾ Ç 2, zero for ¾ Æ 2,
and negative for ¾È2.
Proof. Insection4.B.2oftheAppendixweusealog-linearizedversionofthemodel






















38Although this proposition represents a local result, all our simulations conﬁrm this pattern for
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Asdiscussed inAppendix4.B, anecessary conditionfor astableequilibrium isthat
thetermatthedenominatorbepositive. Moreover, thesecondterminparenthesis
at the numerator is always positive. Hence, around a stable equilibrium, we have
f Lu
E/f Lc
E T0 whenever ¾T2.
This proposition shows that, when technical change is directed, the induced-tech-
nology effect can outweigh the terms-of-trade effect, provided that the elasticity
of the relative demand for carbon-based energy is ‘sufﬁciently large’. Whether ¾
larger than two is a plausible case, however, is difﬁcult to assess from the available
literature. Inourmodelenergy,E,implicitlystandsforenergygeneratedfromfossil
fuels rather than energy tout-court, as its generation directly causes the emissions
of carbon dioxide. Where long-run own-price elasticities for ‘broad’ energy are es-
timated in the range 0.2 to 1.76 (see e.g. Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983, Popp, 2001,
Gately and Huntington, 2002), the estimates for fossil fuel products have values
of up to 2.72 (see e.g. Bates and Moore, 1992, Espey, 1998, Taheri and Stevenson,
2002). Since ¾ can be interpreted as the price elasticity for aggregated fossil fuels,
the former estimates may provide a lower bound for¾ while the latter may be seen
as an upper bound. In this respect, a long-run value for the demand elasticity of
fossil fuels of around 2 does not seem implausible.
4.4 Discussion and conclusions
The refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is seen by many as
a serious threat to the Protocol’s effectiveness. If a coalition of technologically ad-
vanced(andhencefossil-fueldependent)economiesdecidestovoluntarilyreduce
itsemissionsofcarbondioxide,thiswillincreasethepriceofdirtygoodswithinthis
coalition. Unconstrained countries, such as the US, might beneﬁt from increasing
their production of dirty goods and exporting them to coalition members, thereby
offsetting the decrease in emissions by the ratifying countries (carbon leakage).
However, environmental policy affects relative prices, and hence it modiﬁes the
relative proﬁtability of inventing for the clean or dirty goods industry. The effects
of changes in the direction of technical change on carbon leakage cannot be ig-
nored. In this chapter we studied these effects taking explicitly into account that
a technologically advanced country is outside the coalition. We presented a styl-
ized theoretical model, which compares the results of a scenario where technology
in the clean and dirty sectors is allowed to develop differently (directed techni-
cal change), to those derived from a model of ‘traditional’ endogenous technical
change. We have shown that taking into account the endogeneity of the direction
of technical change always leads to lower leakage rates than when this induced
technology effect is ignored. We have also discussed the possibility that the sign of116 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
carbon leakage be reversed. When the elasticity of demand for carbon-based en-
ergy is sufﬁciently high, the change in technology due to the emission constraint
is such that it becomes optimal for the unconstrained country to cut back on its
emissions.
In order to emphasize the role of technical change on carbon leakage as clearly
as possible, we had to abstract from several other mechanisms that play a role in
determining the degree of leakage. Clearly, preferences, endowments, and pro-
duction possibilities all play a role in determining the global effect of unilateral
climate policy. However, by abstracting from these aspects, we were able to high-
lighttheeffectofproﬁtincentivesoninnovationandultimatelyoncarbonleakage.
Comforted by the empirical literature (see footnote 28), we believe that our results
highlightageneralandrelevantmechanism: energy-savingtechnicalchangeinthe
presenceofclimatepolicy. Indeed,whentechnologyisgiven,theglobalratioofen-
ergy to other inputs decreases (see Proposition 4.2), a result that has been found in
virtually all of the CGE literature. This, in turn, induces energy-saving technologi-
calchange,aswediscussedinsection4.3.2. Relativetoasituationwithoutdirected
technicalchange,theglobaldemandforcarbon-basedenergy,thedemandforfos-
sil fuels in the unconstrained country, and hence the degree of carbon leakage, will
all be lower.
Ofcourserealityismorecomplicatedthanourstylizedmodel. Asmentionedinthe
introduction, there is at least one other important channel through which emis-
sions leak from one country to the other. This we can broadly label the energy-
market channel. When an emission cap is introduced, the price of carbon inten-
sive fuels tends to decrease relative to cleaner ones, due to the decreased demand
by constrained countries. As dirtier inputs become cheaper, countries outside the
climate agreement tend to increase their demand, leading to additional carbon
leakage.39 The strength of this mechanism depends on the ease of inter-fuel sub-
stitution (whether it is technically possible to substitute natural gas for coal, for
example), on the elasticity of supply of the different fuels, and on the possibility of
trading different types of fuel internationally. The technical possibility to substi-
tute one fuel for the other affects the size of the shift in demand following a change
intherelativeprice. Ontheotherhand, changesinrelativepricesalsodependcru-
ciallyonthedecisionoffuelsproducerswhethertoreducesupplyasthepricefalls,
and to what extent. Finally, if fuels (or some of them) are not easily traded interna-
tionally, the scope for substitution (and for carbon leakage through this channel)
might also be limited.
39Given the differences in model assumptions for CGE models (see footnote 1), it is hard to say
anything about the relative sizes of the energy market channel and the channel that works through
trade in CO2-intensive goods. According to Kuik (2005), CGE modelers seem to agree that the for-
mer channel is quantitatively the most important, at least in the short to medium term.CHAPTER 4: CARBON LEAKAGE WITH DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE 117
The sensitivity of carbon leakage rates to changes in the key elasticities determin-
ing substitution, supply responses and trading ﬂows have been comprehensively
analyzed by Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000). They conclude that the rate of
leakage is higher, the higher the inter-fuel elasticity of substitution, the lower the
elasticity of supply, and the higher the Armington elasticities among different fu-
els. Any of these elements could be the focus of possible extensions to our model.
However, as long as the elasticities of supply are not too small (as seems reason-
able, given the long-run perspective of our analysis), and as long as trade in coal is
limited (which seems sensible, given that coal is a very bulky fuel which requires
expansive infrastructures and entails high transport costs), the degree of carbon
leakage will be lower than 100%. Recalling the discussion above on energy-saving
technicalchange,thissuggeststhatalsointhismorecomplexframework,thesame
mechanism would be preserved and carbon leakage would be lower when the di-
rection of technical change is endogenous.
Our results lend some support to the position of those who advocate the Kyoto
Protocol, and other forms of unilateral climate policy as effective means to reduce
carbon emissions. We have shown that the leakage rates that inform the current
debate might prove overestimated, since the available quantitative literature ne-
glects the role of endogeneity in the direction of technical change. As a conse-
quence, unilateral climate policy might be more effective than generally claimed.
Moreover, we also hint at the (theoretical) possibility that, when the demand for
carbon-based energy is sufﬁciently elastic, ratiﬁers’ efforts could be compounded
by emission reductions by unconstrained countries.
Finally, we should note that the quantitative impact of the mechanisms we have
highlighted in this chapter depends on the key elasticities of the model. Thus, our
theoretical conclusions need to be assessed through quantitative methods, ﬁrst
and foremost using CGE models that incorporate directed technical change. The
calibration of such a model, however, would require reliable sector-speciﬁc data
on technical progress. Building such a model, and ﬁnding the necessary data, con-
stitutes a formidable challenge for future research.118 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
4.A Appendix: Model solution
4.A.1 Undirected technical change











where pj is the price of good Yj , j ÆE,L. The superscript d indicates demand and
avoid confusion with supply in (4.2) and (4.3).
Producers of the intermediate good Yj maximize proﬁts taking prices and tech-
























j(i) is the demand of machine of type i in sector j and country r, pj is the
price of good Yj, and Sj is short-hand for primary inputs: SE ÆE, and SL ÆLL.
Locallicenseesofblueprintsactasmonopolists. Assumingconstantmarginalcosts
equal to ! units of the ﬁnal good, proﬁt maximization implies pkj(i) Æ !/(1¡¯).
Letting ! Æ 1¡¯, the price of machines in both sectors equals 1. As all machines
are equally productive in production, and all entail the same cost, the demand of
each machine will be the same, kj say.
Usingthis, andsubstitutingfrom(4.21)into(4.2)and(4.3), weobtainthefollowing
expression for the relative supply of intermediate goods:
Y w Æ p(1¡¯)/¯SwN; (4.23)
























Substituting (4.21) into (4.22), taking ratios and using (4.24), we get the relative
factor rewards, for given technology (expression (4.11) in the main text):
w Æ N(¾¡1)/¾¡
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where w ´ wE/wL.








Equating this to the previous expression gives (implicitly) the equilibrium alloca-
tion of labour, for given N (expression (4.12) in the main text):
Á¡¾N1¡¾L
Á(1¡¾)Å¾
E ÅLE ÆL. (4.25)
Under the cap, the amount of labour in energy production is determined as Lc
E Æ
(Zc)1/Á. Using this, and solving as before, gives the equilibrium allocation in the
unconstrained country, for given N and Lc
















4.A.2 Directed technical change
Potential innovators maximize the net present value of the stream of expected fu-
ture proﬁts. In standard dynamic programming equations:
r(t)Vj(t)¡ ˙ Vj(t)Æ¼j(t),
whereVj isthevalueofaninnovationinsector j andr(t)istheinterestrateattime
t.
Alongthebalancedgrowthpath(BGP)oftheeconomy–i.e.asituationinwhichthe
prices are constant, and NE and NL grow at the same constant rate – proﬁts do not
change over time, so that ˙ Vj Æ 0. Since entry is free in the R&D sector, the value of
an innovation cannot exceed its cost, i.e. Vj ·1/º in each sector. Moreover, along
the BGP both types of innovation must occur at the same time, hence Vj Æ 1/º in
both sectors, leading to the no-arbitrage equation:
¼EºÆ¼Lº, or ¼E/¼L Æ1.
Using (4.21), the instantaneous proﬁts of machine produces are:
¼E Æ¯p
1/¯




Plugging this into the no-arbitrage equation above, yields,
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Using (4.24), we solve this last expression for N, obtaining (expression (4.14) in the
main text):
N Æ(Sw)¾¡1. (4.27)
Substituting this into (4.25) yields the following expression for the equilibrium un-
der DTC and in the absence of climate policy (expression (4.15) in the main text)
Á1/(¾¡2)L(Á(¾¡1)¡1)/(¾¡2)
E ÅLE ÆL.
Using (4.27) and (4.26), instead, provides the same expression for the case when
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4.B Appendix: The log-linearized model
In this appendix we (log-)linearize the model around the steady state and derive
several results.
4.B.1 Deriving the log-linearized model
The linearized version of the goods market equilibrium condition (4.13) reads:


















where a tilde, e , over a variable denotes a small percentage change, and where we




















The percentage changes in Lu
E and Lc
E denote any marginal change in the respec-
tive variable. For example, a decrease in Lc
E (that is a f Lc
E Ç 0) from Lc
E Æ LE would
represent the introduction of a marginal emissions cap in the country, while a de-
crease from any Lc




















4.B.2 Appendix to Proposition 4.4
























of the goods market equilibrium condition be steeper than the R&D equilibrium
conditioninthe(LE,N)space. Therelevantslopescanbeeasilyderivedfrom(4.28)
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where the subscripts GME and R&DE indicate the goods markets and the R&D
market equilibrium conditions, respectively. The sign of the inequality is reversed
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4.C Appendix: Existence and stability of the equilib-
rium
The general equilibrium of the model requires that equilibrium on the goods mar-
ket(18)andequilibriumonthemarketforinnovations(21)aresatisﬁedatthesame



















We have the following result:






there exists a unique stable (interior) equilib-
rium. When ¾È
1ÅÁ
Á , the stable equilibrium collapses to the corner where LE Æ0.
Sketch of proof: We proceed to prove the proposition resorting to a graphical anal-
ysis, interpreting TECH and GME as lines in the (LE,N) plane. We distinguish four
different cases:
i. ¾ 2 (0,1). In this case both TECH and GME are downward sloping, and both
have a vertical asymptote at LE Æ 0 (See Figure 4.4). Moreover, both cross the
horizontal axis at LE Æ L. Since the limit of the ratio of TECH/GME as LE ! 0,
goes to 0, it is clear that GME is above TECH in a neighbourhood of LE Æ 0.
Analyzing the slope of both curves at LE ! L reveals that, since the slope of
TECH! 1 while GME’s tends to 0, TECH is above GME as LE approaches its
maximum value (L). This is enough to prove that there is at least one point
of interception such that LE 2 (0,L). Moreover, since GME is strictly convex
while TECH is convex-concave with one inﬂection point, it follows that this
equilibrium is unique.
Letusnowconsiderthedynamicsofthesystemoutsidetheequilibrium. From





we see that when ¾ Ç 1 an increase in LE above the level that satisﬁes the no





Figure 4.4: Stable Equilibrium when ¾Ç1
proﬁtability of innovation in the energy sector decreases. The subsequent ad-
justment requires an increase in innovation effort (and thus in the number of
blueprints)inthelabour-intensivesector,thatisadecreaseinN. Theopposite
is true for a decrease in the amount of labour employed in the energy sector.
Since the composition of labour across sectors adjusts immediately, the dy-
namics of the system will be such that it will always move along the GME lo-
cus. As the graphical illustration in Figure 4.4 makes clear, an equilibrium will
be stable only if there GME is steeper that TECH. In the case depicted in the
picture, the only stable equilibrium will be the interior one, since at the corner
solution where LE ÆL the TECH curve is steeper than the curve of GME.
ii. ¾ 2 (1,2]. The analysis of this case is specular to the one above. In this case
both curves are upward sloping and both have an asymptote at LE Æ L. Ana-
lyzing the relative positions and the curvatures, we can conclude once again
that only one stable equilibrium exists and it is the interior one. The corner







. As in the previous case, both curves are upwardsloping. However,
the curvatures of the two curves change with ¾, and when ¾È2 GME falls be-
low TECH in the neighbourhood of L so that the previous argument does not
hold anymore. In order to prove that an equilibrium still exists we focus on
a marginal change in ¾, starting from ¾ Æ 2, for which case we know that an
interior stable equilibrium exists at LE Æ Á1/1¡Á. Simple comparative staticsCHAPTER 4: CARBON LEAKAGE WITH DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE 125
tell us that GME pivots clockwise around a point whose abscissa is LE Æ
Á
1ÅÁL,
whereas TECH pivots counter-clockwise around a point further to the right.
Since LE Æ
Á
1ÅÁL is necessarily to the right of LE Æ Á1/(1¡Á) for L ¸ 1, it follows
that the two curves will move in opposite directions, and they will cross even
after the marginal change. The equilibrium point will shift to the left and to-
wards the origin. We can iterate this argument as long as the curvatures are
stable, tracing the stable equilibrium in its approach to the origin. When ¾
reaches the boundary point
1ÅÁ
Á , the interior equilibrium collapses to the ori-
gin which becomes the only stable equilibrium.
Since TECH is above GME around LE Æ 0 and LE Æ L, and since we have just
proved that they cross at least once, this implies that they will actually cross
twice. Another equilibrium point indeed exists, but it can be shown to be un-






. In this (degenerate) case the two curves only cross at the origin
of the axes, thus the only equilibrium obtains where LE Æ 0. As this case is






This concludes our sketch of the proof.CHAPTER 5
Production functions for climate policy modeling:
an empirical analysis40
The recent literature on the long run effects of climate policy focusses on the al-
leviating effect of endogenous technological change on the costs of climate pol-
icy. That is, it studies the welfare gains from research and development or from
learning-by-doing effects when the economy faces some form of climate policy,
compared to a scenario without endogenous technological change. Next to invest-
inginnewtechnologies, appliedclimatepolicymodelsallowﬁrmstoreacttoprice
changes, caused by climate policy, through input substitution, e.g. shifting away
from energy towards capital or labour. Since the endogenous changes in technol-
ogy are themselves determined by the price changes and the substitution possibil-
ities–theeasieritistosubstituteawayfromenergy,thesmallermaybetheneedto
invest in energy-saving technologies –, it is important that the substitution possi-
bilities in applied climate policy models are not only empirically founded, but also
disentangled from changes in the production isoquant that come from technolog-
ical change: too high or too low elasticities may lead to under- or overestimates of
the effects of endogenous technological change. In addition, the results of simu-
lations without technological change are sensitive to the elasticity of substitution.
Indeed, Jacoby et al. (2006) found that, in the MIT EPPA model, the elasticity of
substitution between energy and value-added (the capital-labour composite) is
the parameter that affects the costs of ”Kyoto forever” for the U.S. economy the
40ThischapterisaslightlyadjustedreprintofVanderWerf(2008). IamgratefultoDaanvanSoest
and Sjak Smulders for their help and useful discussions. In addition I thank Katie Carman, Anne
Gielen and Johannes Voget for discussions and comments.
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most.
Unfortunately, in most applied dynamic climate policy models, neither the pro-
duction structure nor the accompanying elasticities of substitution have an em-
pirical basis. The current chapter therefore estimates production functions for
climate policy models. We study all possible nesting structures for the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, while taking into account that
bothsubstitutionpossibilitiesandtechnologicalchangeaffecttheproductionpos-
sibilities frontier.
In applied climate policy models the ease with which one can substitute one input
foranotherisgenerallyrepresentedbyelasticitiesofsubstitution. Astheygenerally
use CES production functions with capital, labour and energy as inputs, applied
climate models can choose between different structures for the production func-
tion. For example, capital and energy can be combined ﬁrst using a two-input CES
function with a speciﬁc elasticity of substitution, and subsequently this composite
can be ’nested’ into another CES function, where it is combined with labour (with
possibly a different elasticity).
Table5.1presentsanoverviewoftheproductionstructures,elasticitiesofsubstitu-
tion and types of technological change of some dynamic models that simulate the
effect of climate policy on the economy. The table shows that the nesting structure
differs between the various papers. Moreover, 3 out of 10 models do not nest at all
and treat all inputs at the same level. A second observation is that in all models but
one,capitalisinthesamenestaslabour. Onecouldneverthelessarguethatcapital
and energy should be combined ﬁrst, as is done in the GREEN model (Burniaux et
al., 1992), since (physical) capital and energy generally operate jointly.
When we look at the elasticities of substitution in Table 5.1, we see that models use
different values for the elasticities of substitution, even when they use the same
nesting structure. In addition, many models use the knife-edge case of a unit elas-
ticity and hence neutral technological change in (part of) the production function.
When the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, the CES function reduces to a
Cobb-Douglas function, in which case relative factor productivity is unaffected by
technological change. Hence the choice for a unit elasticity greatly affects the role
of technological change in model simulations.
The way in which technological change enters the production function differs as
well (we deﬁne technological change as a change in the position or shape of the
production isoquant, for a given elasticity of substitution). Focussing on endoge-
nous technological change, we see that four of the models in Table 5.1 use en-
ergy speciﬁc technological change, two models use total factor productivity (TFP)
growth (both at the industry level), and only one model uses factor-speciﬁc tech-
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In sum, dynamic climate policy models differ along three dimensions: nesting
structure, the sizes of the elasticities, and the way in which technological change
affects marginal productivities. Surprisingly, the production functions used by the
models in Table 5.1 generally lack empirical foundation. While authors refer to
other papers – that don’t have empirical validations themselves – for the nesting
structures and elasticities chosen, technology is generally modeled in a way that
the modeler suits best, or to best answer the question under scrutiny. The cur-
rent chapter offers an empirical analysis of all three dimensions by estimating CES
production functions for all possible nesting structures. Accordingly, we report the
accompanying elasticities of substitution for each nesting structure and conclude
which nesting structure ﬁts the data best.
We ﬁnd that the (KL)E nesting structure, that is a nesting structure in which capi-
tal and labour are combined ﬁrst, ﬁts the data best, but we generally cannot reject
that the production function has all inputs in one CES function (i.e. a 3-input 1-
level CES function). These nesting structures are used by most of the models in
Table 5.1. However, for the (KL)E nesting structure we reject that elasticities are
equal to 1, in favour of considerably lower values, whereas several of the climate
policy models in the table use a Cobb-Douglas function for (part of the) produc-
tion function. Finally we estimate (constant) rates of factor-speciﬁc technological
change, and test for different technology trends. We reject the hypothesis that only
energy-speciﬁc technological change matters, and the hypothesis of total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, in favour of factor-speciﬁc technological change. That
is, technology trends differ signiﬁcantly between capital, labour and energy.
In all models in Table 5.1, ﬁrms minimize costs. Hence estimates of constant sub-
stitutionelasticitiesfordynamicclimatepolicymodelsshouldstartfromﬁrms’op-
timizing behavior. Only a few papers have estimated CES production functions
with capital, labour and energy as inputs, using equations that are derived from
optimizing behavior by ﬁrms. Prywes (1986) and Chang (1994) both use ratios of
ﬁrst-order conditions to estimate the parameters of a (KE)L nesting structure, dis-
regarding the (KL)E and (LE)K structures.41 Both authors ﬁrst use the ratio of the
ﬁrst-order conditions for capital and energy to estimate the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and energy, which we denote by ¾K,E. Using this estimate,
they derive ﬁtted values for composite input Z and its price PZ, which are sub-
sequently employed to estimate the elasticity of substitution between the capital-
energy composite on the one hand and labour on the other, which we denote by
¾KE,L. For this they exploit the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to labour and
Z. However, when taking ratios of ﬁrst-order conditions, it becomes impossible to
identify the individual technology parameters, which we need to study how tech-
41In a footnote, Chang (1994) claims he compared several nesting structures and chose to com-
bine capital and energy ﬁrst, based on the R2. However, he does not report his results.CHAPTER 5: PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY MODELING 131
nological change affects the production function.42
Prywes (1986) uses pooled data from 4-digit U.S. industries for the period 1971-
1976 to estimate elasticities for 2-digit industries. He ﬁnds estimates for¾K,E rang-
ingfrom-0.57to0.47. Hisestimatesfor¾KE,L rangefrom0.21to1.58. Chang(1994)
uses time series data for Taiwan and ﬁnds the elasticity of substitution between
capital and energy to be about 0.87, and the one for labour and the capital-energy
nest to be around 0.45.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst introduce the nested
CES production function and derive the equations to be estimated. We then de-
scribe our dataset and the econometric method in section 5.2. In section 5.3 we
present our estimation results, where we ﬁrst discuss which nesting structure ﬁts
the data best and then present the estimated elasticities of substitution for each
nesting structure. We explicitly test whether substitution elasticities differ signif-
icantly from one and whether the production function should be nested. Section
5.3.4 presents our results regarding technological change. In section 5.4 we con-
front our results with the production functions used in the literature on dynamic
climate policy modeling. We summarize and conclude in section 5.5.
5.1 Model speciﬁcation
The two-level three-input CES production function can be nested in three ways:
(KL)E, (KE)L and (LE)K. For the purpose of illustration we focus in this section on
the (KL)E structure, although we estimate all three nesting structures and present

























When (5.2) is substituted into (5.1) we have a nested CES function where inputs
capital K and labour L are combined to form a composite input Z in the lower
42Prywes (1986) estimates total factor productivity growth separately from the ﬁrst order condi-
tions,usingdummyvariables. Hencehisresultsontechnologicalchangedonotaffecthisestimates
of the substitution elasticities and are hence outside the scope of this chapter.
43Asintheliteratureongeneralequilibriumclimatepolicymodeling,weassumeconstantreturns
to scale production functions. Note that in models with endogenous technological change the re-
turns to scale need not be constant at the aggregate level, although they are for each individual
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nest, which in turn is combined with the energy input E to give ﬁnal output Q. In
the remainder of the chapter we denote a composite of two inputs by Z. The Aj,
j 2{E,K,L},areparametersrepresentingfactor-speciﬁclevelsoftechnology.44 The
elasticity of substitution between energy E and composite input Z equals ¾KL,E,
and ¾K,L is the elasticity of substitution between inputs K and L. Parameters ®
and ¯, 0Ç®,¯Ç1, are share parameters.45
When an elasticity of substitution equals unity, the production function involved
reduces to a Cobb-Douglas function with the share parameters in (5.1) and (5.2)
as production elasticities. From (5.1) and (5.2) it is easy to see that if ¾KL,E Æ ¾K,L,
then the nested function reduces to a one-level CES production function where all
three inputs are equally easy to substitute for each other. On the other hand, if two
inputs are not in the same nest, then the elasticity of substitution between these
inputs is determined by the two CES elasticities and the cost-share of the compos-
ite. Hence a different nesting structure implies different values for the substitution
elasticities.
One of the questions to be answered in this chapter is whether a total factor pro-
ductivity representation of technology in climate policy models is sufﬁcient, or
technology trends are input speciﬁc. With a purely total factor productivity rep-
resentation of technology we have AE Æ AK Æ AL, in which case we can multiply
an input-neutral productivity parameter AQ out of the right-hand side of (5.1). To
test for factor-augmenting technological change versus input-neutral total factor
productivity growth we need to identify all (factor-speciﬁc) technology parame-
ters. As noted in the introduction, this is not possible when the equations to be
estimatedarederivedfromratiosofﬁrstorderconditions. Wewill showthat, using
a system of equations derived from cost-minimization, we can not only identify
all factor-speciﬁc technology parameters but in addition we can explicitly test for
input-neutral TFP growth against the null hypothesis of factor-speciﬁc technolog-
ical change.
FollowingBerndt (1991, p. 457), weassume thatour 2-digit industry-level data(see
section5.2)aresufﬁcientlydisaggregatedtoassumethatpricesareexogenous,and
derive our system of equations from the cost function approach. With a two-level
CES production function, the cost minimization problem of a ﬁrm can be repre-
sented as a two-stage problem: in the case of the (KL)E nesting structure we ﬁrst
have to ﬁnd the optimal demand for K and L per unit of Z, given prices and tech-
nology, and then use the resulting relative price of Z to solve for the optimal de-
44Note that we multiplied out any total factor productivity term AQ and Z-speciﬁc technology
parameter AZ. Hence these are included in the factor-speciﬁc technology parameters Aj.
45The levels of output, inputs, Z, and of the ﬁve technology parameters are time- and possibly
country- or industry-dependent, but we suppressed the subscripts to ease notation.CHAPTER 5: PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY MODELING 133
mand for E and Z in the upper nest.46 We present the problem for the upper nest
of the (KL)E nesting structure (the problems for the nest with K and L, and for the















where the price of input j is denoted by Pj, and ¯ Q is a given output level. From the
ﬁrst order conditions we can derive the cost function c(PE,PZ,Q). After applying
Shephard’slemmaweﬁndtheconditionalfactordemands. Followingtheliterature
on climate policy modeling, we assume price-taking behaviour by ﬁrms, which
impliesthattheunitcostfunctiongivesthepriceofoutput. Substitutingthisresult
into the conditional factor demands, taking logarithms, and rearranging, gives for
















As is well-known in the literature on estimating constant substitution elasticities,
not all parameters can be estimated, as usually the equation (or system of equa-
tions)tobeestimatedisunder-identiﬁed. Thisiscanbeseenin(5.4): ifweestimate
this equation using price and quantity data (by adding an error term to the right-
hand side), the ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side would end up in the constant
termandhencetheshareparameter®andtechnologyparameter AE cannotbein-
dividually identiﬁed. After taking ﬁrst differences (i.e. for each variable X we take
X(t)¡ X(t ¡1)), we get percentage changes in (5.4).47 Since the ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side was a constant, it drops out, and we can identify the (constant)
growth rate of the factor-speciﬁc technology parameter from the constant term,
using the estimate for the elasticity of substitution. The same procedure can be
applied for input Z and the lower nest. This gives us the following four equations
for the (KL)E structure, where lower-case letters denote percentage changes:
e ¡q Æ (¾KL,E ¡1)aE Å¾KL,E(pQ ¡pE) (5.5)
z ¡q Æ ¾KL,E(pQ ¡pZ) (5.6)
k ¡z Æ (¾K,L ¡1)aK Å¾K,L(pZ ¡pK) (5.7)
l ¡z Æ (¾K,L ¡1)aL Å¾K,L(pZ ¡pL) (5.8)
46The weak separability of the nested CES function allows us to ﬁrst solve for the relative optimal
factordemandforthelowernest. Sinceourfunctionsarehomogenousofdegreeone,wethenknow
the input demand and cost price per unit of Z. This information can subsequently be used to ﬁnd
the optimal levels of E and Z, from which the optimal levels of K and L can be derived.







growth rate or percentage change of E in continuous time. The same procedure is applied to all
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On the left-hand side of each equation we see the percentage change in the ratio
of two quantities. On the right-hand side of each equation we ﬁrst see a term con-
taining an elasticity of substitution, ¾i,j or ¾i j,k, and a technology parameter aj
(exceptfor(5.6), seefootnote4), andatermconsistingoftheproductofasubstitu-
tion elasticity and the percentage change of the ratio of two prices. Hence the ﬁrst
equation explains the growth rate of the energy-output ratio e ¡q from the (nega-
tive of the) growth rate of their relative price pQ ¡pE, the substitution possibilities
¾KL,E, and the rate of energy-augmenting technological change aE.
Unfortunately z and pZ are unobservable, and they can neither be derived using
the method used by Prywes (1986) and Chang (1994) (as in that case we would not
be able to estimate the technology parameters), nor using the observable prices
and quantities of the inputs that form the intermediate input.48 To circumvent
this problem, we add pK ¡pQ ¡(pZ ¡pQ) to both sides of (5.7), which gives us the
growth rate of the share of capital costs in the costs of the intermediate input on
the left-hand side:
pK Åk ¡(pZ Åz)Æ(¾K,L ¡1)aK Å(¾K,L ¡1)(pZ ¡pK)). (5.9)
We then add pZ ¡pQ to both sides of (5.6), and divide both sides by ¾KL,E ¡1, to
get
pQ ¡pZ Æ
pZ Åz ¡(pQ Åq)
¾KL,E ¡1
, (5.10)
and substitute this into the right-hand side of (5.9) to ﬁnd
pK Åk ¡(pZ Åz)Æ(¾K,L ¡1)aK
Å(¾K,L ¡1)
µ





Note that pK Åk ¡(pZ Åz) and pZ Åz ¡(pQ Åq) are observable changes in cost
shares, and we have solved the problem of z and pZ being unobservable. Applying
the same procedure to (5.8) gives us the following system of equations:
e ¡q Æ (¾KL,E ¡1)aE Å¾KL,E(pQ ¡pE) (5.12)
g µKZ Æ (¾K,L ¡1)aK Å
¾K,L ¡1
1¡¾KL,E
g µZQ Å(1¡¾K,L)(pK ¡pQ) (5.13)
g µLZ Æ (¾K,L ¡1)aL Å
¾K,L ¡1
1¡¾KL,E
g µZQ Å(1¡¾K,L)(pL ¡pQ) (5.14)
48For example, we cannot construct the growth rate of the capital-labour composite, z, as a
weighted average of the growth rates of capital and labour. This would give z Æ µKZk Å(1¡µK Z)l,
where the µs are cost shares. However, (2) in growth rates gives z ÆµKZ(aK Åk)Å(1¡µK Z)(aL Ål),
where we cannot observe the ajs. Hence constructing a series for z or pZ using data on prices and
quantitiesofcapitalandlabouronly(thatis,withoutknowledgeofthetechnologyparameters),will
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where g µmn ´ pmÅm¡(pnÅn)isthepercentagechangeofthecostshareofinputM
inthecostsofproducingN,and(5.13)is(5.11)usingthenewnotation. Forthecase
of the (KL)E nesting structure, this leads to the following model to be estimated:
y1 Æ ®1Å¯1x1Å"1 (5.15)
y2 Æ ®2Å¯21x21Å¯22x22Å"2 (5.16)
y3 Æ ®3Å¯31x31Å¯32x32Å"3 (5.17)
where the "s are error terms and the dependent variables are y1 Æ e ¡q, y2 Æ pK Å
k ¡d ln(PKK ÅPLL) and y3 Æ pL Ål ¡d ln(PKK ÅPLL), with d lnX denoting the
ﬁrst difference of the natural logarithm of X. The independent variables are x1 Æ
pQ ¡pE, x21 Æ x31 Æ d ln(PKK ÅPLL)¡pQ ¡q, x22 Æ pK ¡pQ and x32 Æ pL ¡pQ.
From (5.13) and (5.14) we see that we have to impose the following cross-equation
restrictions when estimating the system: ¯22 Æ¯32 and ¯21 Æ¯31 Æ¡¯22/(1¡¯1).49
We can then derive our parameters as follows: ¾KL,E Æ ¯1, ¾K,L Æ 1¡¯22, aE Æ
®1/(¯1¡1), aL Æ¡®2/¯22 and aK Æ¡®3/¯22.
Followingtheanalysisabove,weseethatifweassumethattechnologyisnotfactor-
speciﬁc but based on input-neutral total factor productivity (that is if we do not
normalize AQ to 1 and in addition assume that AE Æ AK Æ AL Æ 1) we can derive
the TFP growth parameter aQ. For the (KL)E nesting structure this gives:
e ¡q Æ (¾KL,E ¡1)aQ Å¾KL,E(pQ ¡pE) (5.18)
g µK Z Æ
¾K,L ¡1
1¡¾KL,E




g µZQ Å(1¡¾K,L)(pL ¡pQ) (5.20)
Since the last model is a special case of the model with factor-speciﬁc technolog-
ical change, we can test whether technological change is based on input-neutral
total factor productivity growth (as modeled by Goulder and Schneider, 1999, Sue
Wing, 2003) or factor-speciﬁc. To be more precise, we can test for the model of TFP
growth by testing ¡®2/¯22 Æ¡®3/¯32 Æ0.50
In addition we can test for speciﬁc functional forms. We can test whether the
production function is a one-level, non-nested CES by testing the restriction ¯21
(Æ ¯31) Æ 1. We can test for a Cobb-Douglas function for one of the two levels by
testing ¯1 Æ1 and ¯22 Æ¯32 Æ0, respectively.
49Using the weak separability of the nested CES function, we ﬁrst estimate (5.15) and use the
result for ¯1 to impose the restriction on ¯21 and ¯22.
50We also tested for the model with TFP growth by testing ®2 Æ ®3 Æ 0, since both tests are sta-
tistically correct but may give different results. Our conclusions are qualitatively unaffected when
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5.2 Econometric model and data
We estimated the system (5.15)-(5.17) for each of our 3 nesting structures. To iden-
tify the parameters of our model, we ﬁrst estimate (5.15) and use the resulting es-
timate for the elasticity of substitution for the outer nest in the restriction on the
system (5.16)-(5.17) (see footnote 5.1). As described below, we have industry-level
time series data for 12 countries. We estimate models with industry-speciﬁc elas-
ticities and models with country-speciﬁc elasticities.51 That is, we estimate the
system (5.15)-(5.17) for each nesting structure with panels for each industry to es-
timate industry-speciﬁc elasticities, and estimate the same system for each nest-
ing structure with panels for each country to estimate country-speciﬁc elasticities,
which gives us in total 6 systems to estimate. We use country-industry ﬁxed effects
(i.e. a dummy for each country-industry combination) and estimated the ﬁxed ef-
fects models using least squares dummy variable models. We then tested, for each
equation in each model, whether the ﬁxed effects where the same for all country-
industry combinations. We were unable to reject this hypothesis for any equation
(at the 10% signiﬁcance level). As a consequence, pooled regressions are more ef-
ﬁcient than regressions using ﬁxed effects, and the remainder of the chapter con-
tains results from pooled regressions.
The data are derived from the IEA Energy Balances and from the OECD Interna-
tional Sectoral Database.52 They form an unbalanced panel for 12 OECD coun-
tries, with up to 7 industries (6 sub-industries of the manufacturing industry plus
the construction industry), and up to 19 years of observations. The countries in-
volved are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, USA and West-Germany. The industries in-
volved are basic metal products, construction, food & tobacco, textiles & leather,
non-metallic minerals, transportation equipment, and the paper, pulp & printing
industry. Datacomefromthetimeperiod1978-1996. Wedroptheﬁrstandlastper-
centile of observations for q, e, l, k, and their prices, to correct for outliers without
having to judge on individual observations. This gives us in total 1031 observa-
tions.
All prices are in 1990 U.S. dollars, PPP. The price of value added is the numeraire.
Industry output is the sum of value added and the value of energy at 1990 market
prices. Energy is energy use in kiloton of oil equivalents (IEA Energy Balances).
Price of energy is per kiloton of oil equivalent (IEA Energy Balances). Capital is
gross capital stock (OECD International Sectoral Database). Price (user cost) of
51We have too few observations per country-industry combination (12 on average, with for some
country-industry combinations as few as 6 observations) to estimate elasticities using panels at the
combined country-industry level.
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capital is foregone interest plus depreciation minus capital gain. Here the interest
rate is the nominal bond rate (IMF, International Financial Statistics), depreciation
is the ratio of consumption of ﬁxed capital and gross capital stock (both OECD
International Sectoral Database) or 3.5%, capital gain is the percentage change in
the ratio of gross capital stock in current national prices and gross capital stock.
Labouristotalemploymentinmanhours(OECDInternationalSectoralDatabase).
Price of labour is compensation of employees, per man hour (OECD International
Sectoral Database).
5.3 Estimation results
Before we move to our results regarding goodness of ﬁt, the elasticities of substitu-
tion and technological change, we ﬁrst discuss the cross-equation restrictions that
were mentioned before.
5.3.1 Cross-equation restrictions
As noted in section 5.1, we have to impose some cross-equation restrictions on the
system (5.16)-(5.17) to estimate the elasticity of substitution for the inner nest. Be-
fore we did so, we ﬁrst estimated the unrestricted system for all nesting structures,
both for country- and industry-speciﬁc elasticities.53 In most cases, the cross-
equation restriction ¯22 Æ ¯32 was rejected. More precisely, for the model with
country-speciﬁc elasticities the restriction was rejected for all countries for the
(KL)E and (LE)K nesting structures, and for the (KE)L structure it was rejected for 7
out of 12 countries. For the model with industry-speciﬁc elasticities the restriction
was rejected for all sectors for the (KL)E and (LE)K nesting structures, and for the
(KE)L nesting structure it was rejected for 5 out of 7 industries.
However, the purpose of this chapter is to estimate elasticities of substitution that
can be used in the dynamic climate policy modeling literature, by making the ex-
actly the same assumptions as in the climate policy modeling literature. That is,
we started from a nested constant returns to scale CES production function, and
assumed perfect competition at all levels. Although a 3-input translog production
function is much more ﬂexible, it would have given a range of (non-constant) elas-
ticities, which would not be suitable for climate policy models without having to
make additional assumptions. We therefore proceed with our analysis, imposing
the cross-equation restrictions even for those equations where they are rejected
ex ante, to ﬁnd the parameters of the nested CES production function that ﬁts the
53The results of the unrestricted regressions for the (KL)E nesting structure are reported in the
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Table 5.2: Goodness of ﬁt
(KL)E (LE)K (KE)L
Industry ¾s 0.4071 0.3363 0.1278
Country ¾s 0.4055 0.3115 0.1456
Note: R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
data best.
5.3.2 Goodness of ﬁt
As noted in the introduction, the literature on climate policy modeling lacks a
systematic comparison of the empirical relevance of the nesting structures (KL)E,
(KE)L and (LE)K. We present the goodness of ﬁt of the three nesting structures in
table 5.2.
Table 5.2 shows that there are substantial differences in how well each nesting
structure ﬁts the data. For both the model with industry-speciﬁc elasticities and
the model with country-speciﬁc elasticities the R
2
is highest for the (KL)E nesting
structure. The (LE)K nesting structure ﬁts the data much better than the (KE)L
structure. This is quite surprising, as one might expect the decision on capital in-
vestment to be determined jointly with the decision on labour demand or energy
demand, instead of the demand for labour to be determined jointly with the de-
mand for energy. Compared to the other nesting structures, the (KE)L structure
ﬁts the data poorly.
5.3.3 Elasticities of substitution
Table 5.3 presents our results for the elasticities of substitution. We will discuss
them by nesting structure.54
The (KL)E nesting structure
Several dynamic climate policy models use the (KL)E or ((KL),(EM)) nesting struc-
ture. That is, they ﬁrst combine capital and labour, and this composite is subse-
quently combined with energy (or an energy-materials composite) using a differ-
ent elasticity of substitution. The ﬁrst column of Table 5.3 shows our estimates for
54We tested whether the elasticities were the same for all countries or all industries. We rejected
this hypothesis for all nests and for all nesting structures at the 1% signiﬁcance level, except for the
elasticity of substitution for the outer nest of the (KE)L structure, i.e. ¾KE,L (both for countries and
for industries), and for the inner nest of the (LE)K structure, i.e. ¾L,E for country elasticities.CHAPTER 5: PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY MODELING 139
Table 5.3: Estimated elasticities of substitution
(KL)E (LE)K (KE)L
¾KL,E ¾K,L ¾LE,K ¾L,E ¾KE,L ¾K,E
Industry ¾s
Basis metals 0.6454¤¤ 0.6190¤¤ 0.4990¤¤ 0.8889¤¤ 0.8866¤¤ 0.9606¤¤
(0.0639) (0.0212) (0.0198) (0.0179) (0.0417) (0.0132)
Construction 0.2892¤¤ 0.2242¤¤ 0.1796¤¤ 0.5127¤¤ 0.9496¤¤ 0.9931¤¤
(0.0566) (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.0442) (0.1112) (0.0026)
Food & Tob. 0.3990¤¤ 0.4597¤¤ 0.4240¤¤ 0.8454¤¤ 0.9231¤¤ 0.9920¤¤
(0.0585) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0253) (0.0716) (0.0051)
Transport Eq. 0.1705¤ 0.4638¤¤ 0.3927¤¤ 0.8167¤¤ 1.0126¤¤ 1.0022¤¤
(0.0818) (0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0378) (0.0800) (0.0008)
Non-metal. Min. 0.2546¤¤ 0.4541¤¤ 0.3925¤¤ 0.8204¤¤ 0.9465¤¤ 1.0001¤¤
(0.0653) (0.0242) (0.0238) (0.0262) (0.0650) (0.0038)
Paper etc. 0.4489¤¤ 0.4103¤¤ 0.3518¤¤ 0.7997¤¤ 0.8907¤¤ 0.9945¤¤
(0.0684) (0.0220) (0.0215) (0.0291) (0.0706) (0.0076)
Textiles etc. 0.2944¤¤ 0.2737¤¤ 0.2320¤¤ 0.7852¤¤ 1.0440¤¤ 0.9987¤¤
(0.0649) (0.0192) (0.0187) (0.0323) (0.0728) (0.0018)
Country ¾s
Belgium 0.6053¤¤ 0.6154¤¤ 0.5379¤¤ 0.8566¤¤ 1.0328¤¤ 0.9984¤¤
(0.0765) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0333) (0.0759) (0.0034)
Canada 0.1725 0.5273¤¤ 0.3662¤¤ 0.7912¤¤ 0.8861¤¤ 0.9865¤¤
(0.1231) (0.0481) (0.0531) (0.0453) (0.0716) (0.0143)
Denmark 0.4957¤¤ 0.4184¤¤ 0.4066¤¤ 0.8611¤¤ 0.8227¤¤ 0.9498¤¤
(0.0947) (0.0348) (0.0325) (0.0327) (0.0864) (0.0187)
Finland 0.5415¤¤ 0.5525¤¤ 0.4495¤¤ 0.8530¤¤ 0.9465¤¤ 0.9882¤¤
(0.0717) (0.0290) (0.0281) (0.0276) (0.0623) (0.0048)
France 0.3518¤¤ 0.4200¤¤ 0.3842¤¤ 0.7886¤¤ 1.0526¤¤ 1.0003¤¤
(0.0719) (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0341) (0.1004) (0.0032)
UK 0.2481¤¤ 0.2748¤¤ 0.2278¤¤ 0.7138¤¤ 0.8027¤¤ 0.9474¤¤
(0.0764) (0.0280) (0.0282) (0.0427) (0.0774) (0.0137)
Italy 0.2417¤¤ 0.5216¤¤ 0.4651¤¤ 0.8037¤¤ 0.9218¤¤ 0.9799¤¤
(0.0766) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0327) (0.0845) (0.0078)
Netherlands 0.1928¤ 0.2892¤¤ 0.2479¤¤ 0.8165¤¤ 1.0284¤¤ 0.9963¤¤
(0.0936) (0.0263) (0.0258) (0.0448) (0.0999) (0.0019)
Norway 0.3255¤¤ 0.3800¤¤ 0.3276¤¤ 0.7728¤¤ 0.7821¤¤ 0.9182¤¤
(0.0895) (0.0288) (0.0277) (0.0386) (0.0861) (0.0210)
Sweden 0.2531¤¤ 0.4655¤¤ 0.4087¤¤ 0.8165¤¤ 1.0348¤¤ 1.0010¤¤
(0.0756) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0325) (0.0828) (0.0021)
USA 0.5470¤¤ 0.3191¤¤ 0.2852¤¤ 0.8584¤¤ 0.9793¤¤ 0.9999¤¤
(0.1100) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0488) (0.1198) (0.0013)
West-Germany 0.3311¤¤ 0.4271¤¤ 0.3750¤¤ 0.7457¤¤ 1.1802¤¤ 0.9869¤¤
(0.0968) (0.0432) (0.0418) (0.0565) (0.1628) (0.0157)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */** indicates that coefﬁcient differs from zero at
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Table 5.4: Tests for Cobb-Douglas function.a
(KL)E (LE)K (KE)L
¾KL,E ¾K,L ¾LE,K ¾L,E ¾KE,L ¾K,E
Industry ¾s
Basis metals 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 0.0029
Construction 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6501 0.0082
Food & Tob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2828 0.1161
Transport Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8752 0.0071
Non-metal. Min. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4107 0.9778
Paper etc. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1216 0.4695
Textiles etc. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5459 0.4682
Country ¾s
Belgium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6659 0.6385
Canada 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1117 0.3441
Denmark 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0403 0.0074
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3905 0.0159
France 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6000 0.9284
UK 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0110 0.0001
Italy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3553 0.0104
Netherlands 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7759 0.0549
Norway 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0116 0.0001
Sweden 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6745 0.6451
USA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038 0.8627 0.9203
West-Germany 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2687 0.4034
a Two-sided p-values for H0: elasticity equal to 1.
theelasticityofsubstitutionbetweenenergyandthecapital-labourcomposite. We
seeaconsiderableamountofvariationoverindustriesandcountries. Theindustry
estimates range from 0.17 to 0.65, while the country estimates range from 0.17 to
0.61. Note that we cannot reject perfect complementarity (i.e. an elasticity equal
to zero) between energy and the capital-labour composite for Canada. The elas-
ticities for capital and labour are reported in the second column and show quite
some variation as well, with estimates ranging from 0.22 to 0.61 for the industry
elasticities and from 0.27 to 0.62 for the country estimates.
Table 5.4 presents the probability values for the two sided tests whether each elas-
ticity is equal to one, in which case we would have a Cobb-Douglas production
function.55 For all countries and industries the null-hypothesis of a unit elasticity
is rejected.
In addition we tested for common elasticities over the two nests (i.e.¾KL,E Æ¾K,L).
55Ap-valuesmallerthan0.05impliesthatwecanrejectthenull-hypothesisatthe5%signiﬁcance
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Table 5.5: Tests for common elasticities (no nesting).a
(KL)E (LE)K (KE)L
Industry ¾s
Basis metals 0.6944 0.0000 0.0909
Construction 0.3146 0.0000 0.6956
Food & Tob. 0.3328 0.0000 0.3368
Transport Eq. 0.0009 0.0000 0.8970
Non-metal. Min. 0.0043 0.0000 0.4106
Paper etc. 0.5907 0.0000 0.1438
Textiles etc. 0.7598 0.0000 0.5345
Country ¾s
Belgium 0.9059 0.0000 0.6511
Canada 0.0074 0.0000 0.1693
Denmark 0.4440 0.0000 0.1505
Finland 0.8864 0.0000 0.5045
France 0.3766 0.0000 0.6021
UK 0.7429 0.0000 0.0659
Italy 0.0009 0.0000 0.4941
Netherlands 0.3217 0.0000 0.7480
Norway 0.5615 0.0000 0.1252
Sweden 0.0078 0.0000 0.6832
USA 0.0450 0.0000 0.8636
West-Germany 0.3655 0.0000 0.2375
a Two-sided p-values for H0: ¾i,j Æ¾i j,k.
That is, we tested whether the production function could have a single elasticity of
substitution and hence could be non-nested. As is shown in Table 5.5, we cannot
reject a non-nested production function for 5 out of 7 industries and 8 out of 12
countries.
The (LE)K nesting structure
The substitution elasticities for both nests of the (LE)K nesting structure differ sig-
niﬁcantly from zero for all countries and all industries. Values for¾LE,K range from
0.18 to 0.50 for the industry estimates and from 0.23 to 0.54 for the country esti-
mates. Industry and country elasticities for the inner nest range from 0.51 to 0.89
and from 0.71 to 0.86, respectively. For all elasticities we can reject the null of a
unit elasticity at the 1% level. Contrary to the (KL)E structure we can reject the
null-hypothesis of a common elasticity for both nests for all countries and all in-
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The (KE)L nesting structure
The (KE)L nesting structure, which has the lowest R
2
, shows remarkably high elas-
ticities when compared to the (KL)E and (LE)K nesting structures. For the outer
nest, ¾KE,L, the values range from 0.89 to 1.04 for the industry estimates, and from
0.78 to 1.18 for the country estimates (see Table 5.3). The values for the elasticity
of substitution between capital and energy range from 0.92 to 1.001, for countries
and from 0.96 to 1.002 for industries.
When we test for Cobb-Douglas production functions for the outer nest, we can
only reject it for the basis metals industry (at the 1% signiﬁcance level) and for
Denmark, the UK and Norway (at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level). For the
inner nest we reject a Cobb-Douglas production function for 5 countries and 3
industries. We cannot reject a common elasticity for both nests, for all industries
and for all countries.
5.3.4 Technological change
The models in Table 5.1 not only differ in nesting structure and sizes of substitu-
tion elasticities, but also in the way productivity improvements enter the produc-
tion function. We saw in Table 5.1 that, of those models with endogenous tech-
nological change, 4 models use energy-speciﬁc technological change, 2 models
use industry-speciﬁc total factor productivity changes and 1 model uses factor-
speciﬁc technological change. Since all these models either use a (KL)E or (KLE)
nesting structure, and since this is the structure that ﬁts the data best, we focus on
the results for technological change for the (KL)E nesting structure (recall that for
the(KL)Enestingstructurewecouldnotrejecta(KLE)structureformostcountries
and most industries).
Table 5.6 shows the (constant)factor-speciﬁc technology trendsfor the (KL)E nest-
ing structure. We ﬁnd rates of energy-augmenting technological change of 1.2-
2.8% per year. Interestingly we ﬁnd the highest rate of energy-speciﬁc technolog-
ical change (over industries) in the energy-intensive basis metals industry. The
rates of labour-augmenting technological change are generally higher than the
rate of energy-augmenting technological change, with values around 3%, while
the rates of capital-augmenting technological change are found to be negative and
around -2.4%.56
56The negative rate of capital-augmenting technological change is intriguing. Acemoglu (2003)
shows that when the income share of capital is below its steady state level, technological change
willbecapital-using, i.e.aimedatincreasingthecost-shareofcapital. Whentheelasticityofsubsti-
tutionbetweencapitalandlabourissmallerthan1,thiswillleadto aK ¡aL beingnegative. Ourdata
as well as our empirical results match this theory. In the late 1970s (the beginning of our sample)
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Table 5.6: Rates of factor-speciﬁc technological change, (KL)E nesting structure
Energy Labour Capital
Industry ¾s
Basis metals 0.0283¤¤ 0.0420¤¤ ¡0.0337¤¤
(0.0098) (0.0048) (0.0039)
Construction 0.0141¤¤ 0.0206¤¤ ¡0.0165¤¤
(0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0018)
Food & Tob. 0.0167¤¤ 0.0296¤¤ ¡0.0238¤¤
(0.0053) (0.0033) (0.0026)
Transport Eq. 0.0121¤¤ 0.0298¤¤ ¡0.0239¤¤
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0028)
Non-metal. Min. 0.0135¤¤ 0.0293¤¤ ¡0.0235¤¤
(0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0026)
Paper etc. 0.0182¤¤ 0.0271¤¤ ¡0.0218¤¤
(0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0023)
Textiles etc. 0.0142¤¤ 0.0220¤¤ ¡0.0177¤¤
(0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0019)
Country ¾s
Belgium 0.0262¤¤ 0.0409¤¤ ¡0.0349¤¤
(0.0092) (0.0057) (0.0048)
Canada 0.0125¤¤ 0.0332¤¤ ¡0.0284¤¤
(0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0040)
Denmark 0.0205¤¤ 0.0270¤¤ ¡0.0231¤¤
(0.0070) (0.0033) (0.0026)
Finland 0.0226¤¤ 0.0351¤¤ ¡0.0300¤¤
(0.0075) (0.0043) (0.0036)
France 0.0160¤¤ 0.0271¤¤ ¡0.0232¤¤
(0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0026)
UK 0.0138¤¤ 0.0217¤¤ ¡0.0185¤¤
(0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0019)
Italy 0.0136¤¤ 0.0329¤¤ ¡0.0281¤¤
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0035)
Netherlands 0.0128¤¤ 0.0221¤¤ ¡0.0189¤¤
(0.0040) (0.0025) (0.0020)
Norway 0.0153¤¤ 0.0254¤¤ ¡0.0217¤¤
(0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0023)
Sweden 0.0138¤¤ 0.0294¤¤ ¡0.0251¤¤
(0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0028)
USA 0.0228¤¤ 0.0231¤¤ ¡0.0197¤¤
(0.0086) (0.0026) (0.0021)
West-Germany 0.0155¤¤ 0.0274¤¤ ¡0.0235¤¤
(0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0030)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */** indicates that coefﬁcient
differs from zero at 5/1% level of signiﬁcance.
Furthermore,weﬁndthat aK¡aL isindeednegative,alongwith¾K,L Ç1. InAcemoglu’sframework,
the rate of capital-augmenting technological change can then be negative when gross investment
in this type of technological change is not enough to compensate for knowledge depreciation.144 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Table 5.7: Tests for ai Æ aj, for (KL)E structure
aE Æ aL aE Æ aK aL Æ aK
Industry ¾s
Basis metals 0.2099 0.0000 0.0000
Construction 0.1923 0.0000 0.0000
Food & Tob. 0.0380 0.0000 0.0000
Transport Eq. 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
Non-metal. Min. 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000
Paper etc. 0.1834 0.0000 0.0000
Textiles etc. 0.1167 0.0000 0.0000
Country ¾s
Belgium 0.1761 0.0000 0.0000
Canada 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
Denmark 0.4010 0.0000 0.0000
Finland 0.1450 0.0000 0.0000
France 0.0583 0.0000 0.0000
UK 0.1059 0.0000 0.0000
Italy 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000
Netherlands 0.0478 0.0000 0.0000
Norway 0.0769 0.0000 0.0000
Sweden 0.0044 0.0000 0.0000
USA 0.9772 0.0000 0.0000
West-Germany 0.0508 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Two-sided p-values for H0: ai Æ aj.
If we write (5.1) and (5.2) and the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to each input
in percentage changes, we can derive the effect of input-augmenting technologi-
cal change on the cost-share of each input.57 That is, we can show, for each input,
whether technological change is input-using or input-saving. Our estimates for
the (constant) rates of technological change imply that technological change has
been labour- and energy-saving, and capital-using (as explained in footnote 57,
this does not directly follow from the signs of the rates of factor-speciﬁc techno-
logical change).
57 Equations (5.1) and (5.2) in percentage changes give q Æ aQ Å µEQ(aE Å e) Å (1 ¡ µEQ)z





Q AE(AEE)¡1/¾KL,EQ(1¡¾KL,E)/¾KL,E Æ PE. After multiplying both sides with
E/Q and rewriting into percentage changes, we ﬁnd g µEQ Æ
1¡¾KL,E
¾KL,E (z¡aE ¡e). Substituting the ﬁrst
twoexpressionsintothelatterweﬁnd g µEQ Æ
1¡¾KL,E
¾KL,E (1¡µEQ)(µLZ(aLÅl)Å(1¡µLZ)(aK Åk)¡aE¡e).
Using the results of our empirical analysis and observed cost-shares from our data, and keeping in-
putlevelsconstant,weﬁnd g µEQ Æ
1¡¾KL,E
¾KL,E ¢0.95¢(0.65¢0.03Å0.35¢(¡0.024)¡0.02)Ç0,since¾KL,E Ç1.
Hence, energy-augmenting technological change reduces the cost-share of energy and is hence
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For our purpose it is interesting to see whether the technology trends for the three
inputs differ from each other. Table 5.7 presents, for each country and each in-
dustry, tests whether the technology trends are equal. We can reject that the rate of
energy-augmentingtechnologicalchangeandtherateoflabour-augmentingtech-
nologicalchangeareequal,for3outof7industriesand4outof12countries(atthe
5% signiﬁcance level). When testing the equality of either of these two technology
trends and the rate of capital-augmenting technological change, we can reject the
null-hypothesis for all industries and countries. We therefore conclude that rates
of factor-speciﬁc technological change tend to differ over factors.
As noted in Section 5.1, we can test for the model of input-neutral total factor pro-
ductivity growth by testing aL Æ aK Æ 0. As can be inferred from Tables 5.6 and
5.7, we can reject aL Æ aK Æ 0 for all countries and industries for the (KL)E nesting
structure.
5.4 Discussion
Comparing the results of the previous section with the climate policy models in
Table 5.1, we can draw four conclusions.
The ﬁrst conclusion refers to the nesting structure chosen by the climate policy
models. Nearly all models have capital and labour in the same nest. This nesting
structure is supported by our results as the (KL)E nesting structure seems to ﬁt the
data best. The (KE)L nesting structure, as used in Burniaux et al. (1992), on the
other hand, performs rather poorly in terms of goodness of ﬁt. The argument that
the demand for capital and energy is determined jointly, as machines use energy,
is only partly valid. Capital is not just the stock of available machines, but money
invested in general, or foregone consumption. Our results suggest that, given the
(KL)E nestingstructure, substitutionelasticitiesmay be thesame for bothnestsfor
several countries and industries. Indeed, several of the models in Table 5.1 do not
have a separate nest for the capital-labour composite, but model both inputs to-
getherwithenergyinanon-nestedfunction. Henceourresultssupportthenesting
choice for most of the models in Table 5.1.
Itshouldbenoted,however,thatourresultssuggestthatthereisconsiderablevari-
ation over countries and industries in substitution possibilities. Our second con-
clusion therefore is that both the sizes of the elasticities, and whether the nesting
structure is (KL)E or non-nested KLE, vary considerably over both countries and
industries.
Our third conclusion refers to the sizes of the elasticities of substitution. Several
climatemodelsthatusea(KL)EorKLE(orKLEM)nestingstructureuseaunitelas-
ticity of substitution for (part of the) production function. However, our results for146 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
the (KL)E nesting structure, which is the nesting structure that ﬁts the data best,
show that we can reject the Cobb-Douglas function for all industries and for all
countries. We ﬁnd that ¾KL,E ranges from 0.1 to 0.6, while ¾K,L ranges from 0.2 to
0.6. The recent literature on capital-labour production functions rejects unit elas-
ticities, in favour of smaller values, as well (see e.g. Antràs (2004) and references
therein). We thereforeconclude thatthe elasticities of substitutionin (parts of) the
production functions in some of the papers in Table 5.1 are too high.
Our results for factor-speciﬁc technological change suggest that technology trends
differsigniﬁcantlyoverinputs. Energy, labourandcapitalallhaveasigniﬁcantrate
of technological change, and they generally differ signiﬁcantly from each other.
This is ignored in climate policy models that use Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions, since they do not allow technological change to affect relative marginal pro-
ductivities of inputs. In addition, our results go against models with input-neutral
total factor productivity growth. Our fourth conclusion is therefore that most pa-
pers in Table 5.1 put too many restrictions on their models regarding the possibili-
ties for technological change.
What are the possible effects of elasticities that are too high, and of a rigid way of
modeling changes in the production isoquant, on the results that are found by cli-
mate policy models? First of all, changes in the elasticity of substitution affect the
model results when there is no endogenous technological change. As noted in the
introduction, Jacoby et al. (2006) found that the MIT EPPA model is most sensitive
to changes in the elasticity of substitution between the capital-labour composite
and energy. Both the model of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and the model of
Popp (2004) use a unit elasticity, which is rejected by the data.
Secondly the higher an elasticity of substitution, the easier it is to substitute away
from an input that faces an increase in its relative price, and the lower will be the
need to invest in input-saving technological change. As a consequence, climate
policy models that use elasticities of substitution that are too high may underesti-
mate the role of endogenous technological change in reducing the costs of climate
policy.
Furthermore, models witha Cobb-Douglas production functionneglectthe role of
factor-speciﬁc technological change, since with a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion technological change does not affect the relative marginal productivity of in-
puts. It is therefore impossible to aim innovations at energy-saving technologies:
changesintheproductionisoquantarealwaysinput-neutralproductivityimprove-
ments. Hence the costs of achieving a certain improvement in the productivity of
energy may be lower when moving away from a unit elasticity of substitution.
Finally, energy-speciﬁc technological change and input-neutral total factor pro-
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freedom from an economy. Adding additional ﬂexibility to a model could lead to a
lower burden of climate policy on an economy.
5.5 Summary and conclusions
Thischaptercontributestotheliteratureonclimatepolicymodelingbyestimating
nested CES production functions using capital, labour and energy as inputs. We
ﬁnd that the nesting structure in which ﬁrst capital and labour are combined us-
ingaCESfunction,andthenthiscompositeofcapitalandlabouriscombinedwith
energy in a second CES function, ﬁts the data best. For this (KL)E nesting structure
we were, for most countries and most industries, not able to reject the hypothe-
sis that the elasticities are equal for both nests. The (KL)E nesting structure, or its
non-nested form with equal elasticities for both nests, is used by most models in
theappliedclimatepolicymodelingliterature. However,ourestimatesfortheelas-
ticities of substitution vary substantially over countries and over industries, and
are lower than those used in some of the models. In addition we explicitly reject
unit elasticities of substitution (i.e. Cobb-Douglas production functions). Regard-
ing technological change, we ﬁnd factor-speciﬁc growth rates that are signiﬁcant
and that mostly signiﬁcantly differ from each other. We reject input-neutral total
factor productivity growth (in favour of factor-speciﬁc technological change) and
’only energy-augmenting technological change’, both of which are used by several
papers in the climate policy literature.
Given that lower elasticities imply that it becomes harder to substitute away from
energy, and given that most models in the climate policy modeling literature put
toomanyrestrictionsontheirmodels,wesuggestthattheroleofendogenoustech-
nological change in reducing the costs of climate policy may be bigger than has
been found by some climate policy models. Whether this claim holds, should of
course be tested by adapting the models in Table 5.1 to our empirical ﬁndings, and
comparing the additional effect of endogenous technological change in the origi-
nal model with that from the adapted model.148 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
5.A Appendix: Estimatesfor(KL)Ewithoutcross-equa-
tion restrictions
As noted in section 5.1, we need to estimate the system (5.15)-(5.17) with cross-
equation restrictions. However, as noted in section 5.3.1, these cross-equation re-
strictionsarerejectedformostofourregressions. Wedecidedtocontinuewithour
analysis using regressions with restrictions that are rejected ex ante, because the
purpose of the chapter is to provide estimates that are as close as possible to the
models used in the climate policy modeling literature.
In this appendix, we present the estimation results for the inner nest of the (KL)E
model, that is for the parameters that determine ¾K,L (note that the estimates for
¾KL,E arenotaffectedbythecross-equationrestrictions). Wepresenttheestimates
of the parameters ¯21, ¯22, ¯31 and ¯32 for the unrestricted model in the second to
ﬁfth column of Table 5.8. Note that we can only report estimates of the ¯s, not
of the elasticities themselves, since all parameters are inter-dependent in the re-
stricted regressions: ¯21 Æ ¯22/(1¡¾KL,E) Æ ¯31 Æ ¯32/(1¡¾KL,E). Since these re-
strictions are rejected ex post in the unrestricted regression, we cannot meaning-
fully relate the parameter estimates from the unrestricted regression to elasticities
from the restricted regression. However, we can compare the estimated ¯s of the
unrestricted system with those of the restricted system, and we report the latter
estimates in the last two columns of Table 5.8. The parameters reported in the last
two columns are the basis for the elasticities in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5.3,
where ¾K,L Æ1¡¯22 Æ1¡¯32 Æ1¡¯21/(¾KL,E ¡1)Æ1¡¯31/(¾KL,E ¡1).
Although60outof76parametersintheunrestrictedregressionhavethesamesign
as the parameter from the restricted regression, the restriction¯22 Æ¯32 is rejected
for all industries and countries in the (KL)E speciﬁcation. Having to impose re-
strictions seems to be the price to be paid to get estimates based on the nested
CES functions that are used in the CGE models of the climate policy modeling lit-
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Table 5.8: Estimated parameters without and with cross-equation restrictions, for
inner nest of (KL)E
Unrestricted model Restricted model
¯21 ¯22 ¯31 ¯32 ¯21 Æ¯31 ¯22 Æ¯32
Industry ¯s
Basis metals ¡0.9356¤¤ 0.1033¤ ¡0.26391¤ 0.4288¤¤ ¡1.0746¤¤ 0.3810¤¤
(0.1298) (0.0453) (0.1157) (0.0222) (0.0598) (0.0212)
Construction 0.7496 0.0597 0.0886 0.8219¤¤ ¡1.0914¤¤ 0.7758¤¤
(1.9199) (0.1102) (1.6161) (0.0298) (0.0439) (0.0312)
Food & Tob. ¡0.8686¤ 0.0721 ¡0.5290 0.5724¤¤ ¡0.8989¤¤ 0.5403¤¤
(0.4428) (0.0715) (0.3721) (0.0217) (0.0376) (0.0226)
Transport Eq. ¡4.2901¤ 0.0094 2.2503 0.5912¤¤ ¡0.6464¤¤ 0.5362¤¤
(2.0130) (0.0801) (1.7363) (0.0323) (0.0384) (0.0319)
Non-metal. Min. ¡0.3931 ¡0.0061 ¡0.5567¤¤ 0.5964¤¤ ¡0.7324¤¤ 0.5459¤¤
(0.2296) (0.0679) (0.1869) (0.0234) (0.0324) (0.0242)
Paper etc. ¡0.3802¤ 0.0139 ¡0.5549¤¤ 0.6350¤¤ ¡1.0701¤¤ 0.5897¤¤
(0.1810) (0.0748) (0.1452) (0.0211) (0.0400) (0.0220)
Textiles etc. ¡1.1104 ¡0.0466 0.8596 0.7556¤¤ ¡1.0293¤¤ 0.7263¤¤
(0.6930) (0.0717) (0.5996) (0.0185) (0.0272) (0.0192)
Country ¯s
Belgium 0.2246 ¡0.1324 ¡1.0397¤¤ 0.4629¤¤ ¡0.9745¤¤ 0.3846¤¤
(0.4856) (0.0833) (0.3889) (0.0384) (0.0950) (0.0375)
Canada ¡0.2034 0.0429 ¡1.3071¤¤ 0.6519¤¤ ¡0.5713¤¤ 0.4727¤¤
(0.3582) (0.0767) (0.3037) (0.0544) (0.0581) (0.0481)
Denmark ¡1.7132¤¤ 0.2799¤¤ ¡1.2850¤¤ 0.6097¤¤ ¡1.1531¤¤ 0.5816¤¤
(0.3426) (0.0983) (0.2928) (0.0356) (0.0690) (0.0349)
Finland ¡0.9521¤¤ 0.0448 ¡0.2817 0.4937¤¤ ¡0.9759¤¤ 0.4475¤¤
(0.1819) (0.0644) (0.1680) (0.0303) (0.0623) (0.0290)
France ¡0.4672 ¡0.0815 ¡0.8176¤ 0.6150¤¤ ¡0.8949¤¤ 0.5800¤¤
(0.4516) (0.1001) (0.3894) (0.0271) (0.0429) (0.0278)
UK ¡1.2017¤ 0.2001¤ ¡1.1595¤ 0.7746¤¤ ¡0.9645¤¤ 0.7252¤¤
(0.5409) (0.0784) (0.4725) (0.0282) (0.0373) (0.0280)
Italy ¡0.8379¤ 0.0620 ¡0.6129¤ 0.5243¤¤ ¡0.6309¤¤ 0.4784¤¤
(0.3399) (0.0855) (0.2960) (0.0357) (0.0465) (0.0353)
Netherlands ¡1.1946¤ ¡0.0278 0.0428 0.7337¤¤ ¡0.8806¤¤ 0.7108¤¤
(0.5779) (0.0984) (0.5387) (0.0267) (0.0325) (0.0263)
Norway ¡0.5387¤¤ 0.1183 ¡0.5191¤¤ 0.6460¤¤ ¡0.9191¤¤ 0.6200¤¤
(0.1991) (0.0944) (0.1644) (0.0283) (0.0426) (0.0288)
Sweden ¡0.4527 ¡0.0722 ¡0.3206 0.5792¤¤ ¡0.7156¤¤ 0.5345¤¤
(0.2324) (0.0823) (0.2027) (0.0250) (0.0340) (0.0254)
USA 0.3689 ¡0.0240 ¡0.6620 0.7144¤¤ ¡1.5030¤¤ 0.6809¤¤
(0.6153) (0.1185) (0.5339) (0.0270) (0.0615) (0.0278)
West-Germany ¡0.7254 ¡0.2078 0.1306 0.5893¤¤ ¡0.8565¤¤ 0.5729¤¤
(0.4651) (0.1620) (0.4221) (0.0426) (0.0646) (0.0432)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. */** indicates that coefﬁcient differs from zero at
5/1% level of signiﬁcance.Bibliography
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Klimaatbeleid en economische dynamica
￿ de rol van substitutie en technologische verandering
In de laatste jaren is klimaatverandering een ingeburgerd begrip geworden. Het
onderwerp keert regelmatig terug in het nieuws, en in 2007 werd de Nobelprijs
voor de vrede zelfs toegekend aan het Intergouvernementele Panel over Klimaat-
verandering (IPCC) en aan Al Gore, voor hun inspanningen om de kennis over kli-
maatverandering te vergroten en te verspreiden.
Klimaatbeleid draait om twee soorten overheidsmaatregelen. Ten eerste zijn er
maatregelen om klimaatverandering tegen te gaan. Deze maatregelen zijn er op
gericht de uitstoot van broeikasgassen, zoals koolstofdioxide (CO2) te verminde-
ren. Dit kan door de uitstoot van broeikasgassen te belasten (door een hogere prijs
zal de vraag dalen), of door een stelsel van verhandelbare emissierechten, gekop-
peld aan een bovengrens op de totale hoeveelheid CO2 emissies. Ten tweede zijn
er maatregelen om de gevolgen van klimaatverandering voor mensen en hun om-
geving te verminderen (bijvoorbeeld door dijken te verhogen in de strijd tegen de
gevolgen van een stijging van de zeespiegel).
In dit proefschrift wordt nader ingegaan op de eerste groep van overheidsmaatre-
gelen. Om preciezer te zijn wordt bekeken hoe beleid dat gericht is op de reductie
van de uitstoot van broeikasgassen voor de opwekking van energie (door de ver-
branding van fossiele brandstoffen zoals kolen, olie en gas), het handelen van eco-
nomische agenten (met name de producenten van energie en de eigenaren van
fossiele brandstoffen) beïnvloedt. Enkele vragen die aan bod komen, zijn: Is het
altijd optimaal om, als we CO2 emissies willen verminderen, relatief minder olie
en meer van het schonere gas te gaan gebruiken? Is het van tevoren aankondigen
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van klimaatbeleid, zodat bedrijven zich erop kunnen voorbereiden, altijd verstan-
dig om te doen? Zullen landen die niet aan klimaatbeleid doen altijd hun emissies
verhogen in reactie op de emissiereducties van landen met klimaatbeleid?
Deze vragen draaien om de dynamische reacties van economische agenten (pro-
ducenten, consumenten) op klimaatbeleid. Dat wil zeggen, we kijken naar de ver-
anderingenindebeslissingenvanagentenalsgevolgvanklimaatbeleid,enhoede-
ze veranderingen invloed uitoefenen op economische uitkomsten (zoals de vraag
naar en productie van fossiele brandstoffen en de daaraan verbonden uitstoot van
kooldioxide; de beslissing om te investeren in schone technologieën). Hierbij kij-
ken we met name naar de rol die substitutie (het vervangen van de ene productie-
factor door de andere) en technologische verandering spelen.
Naast het eerste, inleidende, hoofdstuk bestaat dit proefschrift bestaat uit 2 delen,
die ieder 2 hoofdstukken bevatten. In de rest van deze samenvatting wordt nader
op deze laatste 4 hoofdstukken in gegaan.
Deel I: Klimaatbeleid en de optimale extractie van fossiele brandstoffen
In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 van het proefschrift staat het feit dat fossiele brandstoffen
niet-hernieuwbare hulpbronnen zijn, centraal. Dat wil zeggen: we gaan er van
uit dat als we nu een vat olie (of een ton kolen, of een kubieke meter gas) uit de
grond halen en verbruiken, er minder olie (kolen, gas) beschikbaar is voor de toe-
komst. De ’productie’ van fossiele brandstoffen door de natuur is immers een pro-
ces van miljoenen jaren, en zowel voor consumenten (bijvoorbeeld bij de benzi-
nepomp) als voor producenten (olie-eigenaren in het Midden-Oosten, maar ook
de Nederlandse staat als eigenaar van de Nederlandse aardgasvelden) is dit een
te lange tijdshorizon om rekening mee te houden. Het feit dat fossiele brandstof-
fen niet-hernieuwbaar zijn, heeft grote gevolgen voor het optimale tijdspad voor
de extractie (het uit de grond halen) van fossiele brandstoffen. Voor de eigenaren
van de brandstoffen betekent dit dat ze moeten afwegen of ze hun product dit jaar
verkopen of in de toekomst. Aangezien producenten van consumptiegoederen de
energie zowel dit jaar als volgend jaar nodig hebben, moeten de eigenaren van de
brandstoffen een prikkel hebben om zowel dit jaar als volgend jaar hun product te
verkopen. Dit kan, in het eenvoudigste (Hotelling-)model, alleen als de prijs van
de grondstoffen groeit met de rentevoet. Immers, als de prijs van hun product dit
jaarhogerisdanvolgendjaar, zullenzeallesnuuitdegrondhalenenverkopen, en
de opbrengst op de bank zetten. Indien echter de prijs volgend jaar hoger is, zul-
len ze dit jaar niets verkopen en wachten tot volgend jaar. De grondstofeigenaren
zijn indifferent tussen deze twee opties wanneer de prijs groeit met de rentevoet
(gelijke netto contante waarde).
In het eerste deel van het proefschrift gaan we er van uit dat consumenten geluk-SAMENVATTING 163
kiger zijn naar mate ze meer consumeren (maar met dalend marginaal nut), en
dat ze liever vandaag een euro ontvangen dan volgend jaar. Voor de consump-
tie van fossiele brandstoffen betekent dit (1) dat op ieder tijdstip geldt: hoe meer
consumptie, hoe hoger het nut van de consument; (2) dat we als we nu alles uit
de grond halen en gebruiken, we volgend jaar niks meer hebben; (3) dat de con-
sument meer waarde hecht aan consumptie dit jaar dan aan consumptie volgend
jaar. Voor een gegeven voorraad fossiele brandstoffen betekent dit dat het opti-
maal is om over de tijd steeds minder uit de grond te halen (consumenten hechten
immersminderwaardeaanconsumptieindetoekomstdanaanconsumptieinhet
heden), en dat het optimaal is om door de tijd de totale voorraad op te maken. Als
we door de jaren heen de totale voorraad niet op zouden maken, zouden de eige-
naren ervan meer kunnen verdienen door op een eerder tijdstip meer uit de grond
te halen.58
In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 kijken we naar de gevolgen van klimaatbeleid voor de optimale
extractiepaden van fossiele brandstoffen.
Hoofdstuk 2: Klimaatbeleid en de optimale extractie van fossiele brandstoffen die
verschillen in hun CO2-gehalte
Wanneer de overheid CO2-emissies wil terugdringen, kan ze een belasing op CO2,
of een stelsel van verhandelbare emissierechten gekoppeld aan een limiet aan de
totaleCO2-uitstoot,invoeren. InbeidegevallenkrijgenCO2-emissieseenprijs. Ko-
len, olie en gas verschillen in hun CO2-gehalte. Per eenheid energie, bijvoorbeeld
via de productie van electriciteit, komt er meer CO2 uit kolen dan uit olie, en meer
CO2 uit olie dan uit gas. Per eenheid energie wordt kolen bij een prijs voor CO2-
emissies dus het zwaarst belast. Deze verandering in de relatieve prijs zorgt voor
een verandering in de relatieve vraag naar de verschillende brandstoffen.
Een (statisch) model dat probeert te beschrijven hoe consumenten en producen-
ten reageren op de prijs voor emissies, maar waarin geen rekening wordt gehou-
den met de eigenschap dat fossiele brandstoffen niet-hernieuwbaar zijn, zou dan
als uitkomst gevendat het optimaal is om in reactie op de belasting relatief minder
kolen en olie, en relatief meer gas te gaan gebruiken. In hoofdstuk 2 gebruiken we
een dynamisch model waarin met deze eigenschap wel rekening wordt gehouden.
In het model zijn twee fossiele brandstoffen, die verschillen in hun CO2-gehalte
(bijvoorbeeld kolen en gas), imperfecte substituten in de productie van een con-
sumptiegoed (d.w.z., het is niet eenvoudig om bij een constant productieniveau
58In werkelijkheid zien we dat over de tijd niet steeds minder, maar juist steeds meer fossiele
brandstoffen uit de grond worden gehaald. In dit proefschrift houden we geen rekening met een
groeiende, en steeds welvarender, wereldbevolking en de daaraan verbonden groeiende vraag naar
fossiele brandstoffen, noch met de ontdekking van nieuwe olievelden en nieuwe exploratie- en
winningtechnologieën. Dit heeft geen invloed op de kern van de conclusies van het proefschrift.164 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
meer van de ene brandstof en minder van de andere brandstof te gebruiken). Ver-
volgens wordt de economie geconfronteerd met een constante limiet op de jaar-
lijkseuitstootvanCO2 (’Kyoto-voor-altijd’). DitleidttoteenprijsvoorCO2 uitstoot.
Gezien het feit dat consumenten nog steeds zoveel mogelijk consumptiegoederen
willen, ondanks de limiet op emissies, is het zaak voor de producenten van con-
sumptiegoederen om de productie per eenheid CO2 zo groot mogelijk te maken.
Dit betekent dat naast de CO2-uitstoot per eenheid energie, ook de productiviteit
(intermenvanconsumptiegoederen)pereenheidenergieeenrolspeelt. Dezepro-
ductiviteit verschilt voor de twee fossiele brandstoffen, en hangt onder andere af
van hun relatieve voorraden (relatieve schaarste), en van de substitutiemogelijk-
heden. In een wereld zonder klimaatbeleid geldt: hoe groter de voorraad van een
brandstof is voordat klimaatbeleid wordt ingevoerd, des te groter zal de productie
en consumptie ervan zijn (omdat de eigenaren de totale voorraad willen verkopen
over de tijd). Tegelijkertijd geldt voor een brandstof die in relatief grote hoeveel-
heden wordt gebruikt dat het een lage marginale productiviteit heeft, gegeven de
beperkte mogelijkheid tot substitutie van de ene brandstof naar de andere. Re-
latieve schaarste (de verhouding van de voorraden van de twee brandstoffen) is
zodoende mede bepalend voor de (marginale) productiviteit van een brandstof.
Om aan de emissielimiet te voldoen kunnen producenten van consumptiegoede-
ren besluiten om meer van de schonere brandstof en minder van de meer vervui-
lendebrandstoftegaangebruiken(substitutie),ofzekunnenbesluitenmindervan
hun producten te produceren zodat ze minder brandstoffen nodig hebben, of een
combinatie van beide. In alle gevallen worden de eigenaren van de fossiele brand-
stoffen geconfronteerd met een verandering in de vraag naar hun product. Eén
van de uitgangspunten van ons model is dat grondstofproducenten over de tijd
hun gehele voorraad verkopen. Indien gedurende een bepaalde periode de vraag
naarhunproductdaalt,zullenzedeprijservanmoetenverlagen. Hierdoorstijgtde
vraagnaarfossielebrandstoffenintijdendatdeemissielimietgeenrolmeerspeelt:
in ons eenvoudige model daalt de vraag naar fossiele brandstoffen (en dus emis-
sies) over de tijd zelfs zonder klimaatbeleid, waardoor op een gegeven moment de
emissielimiet geen beperking meer is. Wanneer in deze tijd de vraag stijgt door
de lagere prijs (uiteraard zonder dat emissies te hoog worden), zal over de tijd nog
steeds de gehele voorraad worden verkocht. Deze verandering in de prijzen van de
brandstoffen is dus een tweede prijs-effect, naast de prijs voor CO2-emissies. Ui-
teraard heeft een prijsverlaging op korte termijn een veel kleiner effect op de vraag
naar beide brandstoffen, en geen effect op de totale emissies: om ervoor te zorgen
dat de totale hoeveelheid emissies niet groter wordt dan toegestaan, wordt de prijs
vanemissiesverhoogdinreactieopdeprijsverlaging. Oplangeretermijn,wanneer
de voorraden dusdanig klein zijn dat emissies zelfs zonder beleid lager zijn dan de
maximaal toegestane hoeveelheid, leidt de prijsverlaging wel tot extra vraag.SAMENVATTING 165
Het totale effect van de limiet op CO2-emissies op de vraag naar de twee brand-
stoffen wordt dus bepaald door de relatieve CO2-inhoud per eenheid energie van
de twee brandstoffen, en de relatieve productiviteit per eenheid energie (die me-
de bepaald wordt door de relatieve voorraden). Doordat nu twee factoren een rol
spelen bij het bepalen van de vraag naar de twee fossiele brandstoffen, hoeft het
nietmeerzotezijndatemissiespereenheidenergiedoorslaggevendzijnbijdebe-
slissing van een producent van consumptiegoederen hoeveel van de twee brand-
stoffen te gebruiken. Het kan aantrekkelijk zijn om meer van de brandstof met de
grotere hoeveelheid emissies per eenheid energie te gebruiken, indien het verschil
inproductiviteitpereenheidenergiedusdaniggrootis,datdithetverschilinemis-
sies meer dan compenseert. Cruciaal hierbij is de relatieve productiviteit die mede
bepaald wordt door de relatieve schaarste. Het modelleren van de brandstoffen
als niet-hernieuwbare hulpbronnen, wat bepaalt hoe schaars de brandstoffen zijn,
speelt hierbij een grote rol.
Ons theoretische model geeft dus aan dat het in reactie op klimaatbeleid optimaal
kan zijn om relatief minder van een schone, en relatief meer van een meer ver-
vuilende brandstof te gaan gebruiken. Deze contra-inuïtieve uitkomst hebben we
vervolgens getest met behulp van data voor de prijzen, extractie, en voorraden van
fossielebrandstoffen. Hieruitblijktdathetoptimaalisomvan’smerige’kolennaar
de minder vervuilende brandstoffen olie en gas te substitueren. De stijging in de
gebruikersprijs van kolen, door de prijs voor CO2-emissies, wordt dus niet gecom-
penseerd door de relatieve productiviteit van emissies van deze brandstof, en het
is beter om relatief minder kolen te gaan gebruiken. Indien we echter olie en gas
met elkaar vergelijken, dan volgt uit de empirische toepassing van ons theoreti-
sche model dat het optimaal is om van het schonere gas naar de meer vervuilende
brandstof olie te substitueren. De productiviteit van CO2 uit olie is dusdanig groot
dat dit de hogere CO2-prijs per eenheid energie (vanwege het hogere CO2-gehalte)
meer dan compenseert. Voor een zo groot mogelijke productie van consumptie-
goederen, dient dus minder gebruik te worden gemaakt van kolen, ten gunste van
olie en gas, maar dient het relatieve gebruik van olie toe te nemen ten opzichte van
het schonere gas.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt verder aangetoond dat dit effect groter is naar mate minder
CO2 uitgestoten mag worden, en dat het effect ook aanwezig is als we in plaats
van een limiet op CO2-emissies per jaar een limiet op de concentratie van CO2
in de atmosfeer leggen. Een andere interessante uitkomst is dat als de limiet op
de jaarlijkse CO2-uitstoot een aantal jaren van tevoren wordt aangekondigd, het
substitutie-effect nog steeds geldt voor de periode waarin emissies een prijs heb-
ben. Echter, de substitutie in de periode tussen de aankondiging en uitvoering van
het beleid is de andere kant op: van gas en olie naar kolen. Op deze manier houdt
deeconomiemeervandemeestproductievebrandstof(productiviteitpereenheid166 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
emissies!) over voor de periode waarin emissies beprijsd worden.
De belangrijkste conclusie van hoofdstuk 2 is dus dat de introductie van schaars-
te en inter-temporele substitutie (door middel van het modelleren van fossiele
brandstoffenalsniet-hernieuwbarehulpbronnen)indeanalysevanklimaatbeleid,
de conclusies die komen uit statische modellen kan omdraaien. Ook de beperkte
substitutie-mogelijkheiden spelen hierbij een rol, aangezien deze mede bepalend
zijn voor de marginale productiviteit van de brandstoffen, en dus voor de richting
van substitutie (van ’smerige’ naar schonere brandstoffen, of juist andersom).
Hoofdstuk 3: Optimale extractie- en emissiepaden wanneer klimaatbeleid van tevo-
ren wordt aangekondigd
Hoeweldiversevormenvanoverheidsbeleidkostenmetzichmeebrengenvoorhet
bedrijfsleven, kunnen deze kosten verlaagd worden wanneer het beleid een aantal
jaren van tevoren wordt aangekondigd. Zo hebben bedrijven een aantal jaren de
tijd om zich voor te bereiden, bijvoorbeeld door middel van het aanpassen van
productieprocessen.
Dit geldt ook voor klimaatbeleid. Klimaatbeleid legt een prijs op de emissies van
CO2, en leidt zodoende tot kosten voor bedrijven die veel energie gebruiken. Het
Kyoto Protocol, dat bepaalt dat diverse westerse landen hun emissies moeten ver-
lagen in de periode 2008-2012, werd al in 1997 ondertekend, en gaf bedrijven dus
bijna 10 jaar de gelegenheid om zich voor te bereiden. Echter, in deze periode tus-
sen het ondertekenen en het in werking treden van overheidsbeleid, zijn bedrijven
en consumenten vrij om te doen wat ze willen. Voor klimaatbeleid betekent dit dat
ze in deze periode vrij zijn in hun emissies van CO2.
Wat betekent dit voor de emissies in deze periode? Hoe beïnvloedt het aankon-
digen van klimaatbeleid de prikkels voor de vraag naar en productie van fossiele
brandstoffen, en dus emissies? Deze vragen staan centraal in hoofdstuk 3 van dit
proefschrift.
Inhetvorigehoofdstukkwamnaarvorendathetfeitdatfossielebrandstoffenniet-
hernieuwbaar zijn, een grote rol kan spelen bij het effect van klimaatbeleid op de
vraag naar fossiele brandstoffen en de daaraan verbonden emissies. In hoofdstuk
3 kijken we naar de vereenvoudigde situatie waarin productie plaats vindt op basis
van slechts één niet-hernieuwbare hulpbron. We laten substitutie tussen brand-
stoffen dus buiten beschouwing, en kijken alleen naar het tijdspad van de vraag
naar fossiele brandstoffen.
We kijken opnieuw naar een eeuwig-durende limiet op de jaarlijkse uitstoot van
CO2 (’Kyoto-voor-altijd’), maar deze wordt nu enige tijd van tevoren aangekon-
digd. Opnieuw geldt dat consumenten zoveel mogelijk willen consumeren, dat ze
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stof niet-hernieuwbaar is: wat we nu uit de grond halen en gebruiken, is niet meer
beschikbaar voor de toekomst. Zoals aangegeven op pagina 163, betekent dit voor
een gegeven voorraad fossiele brandstoffen dat het optimaal is om over de tijd
steeds minder uit de grond te halen (consumenten hechten immers minder waar-
deaanconsumptieindetoekomstdanaanconsumptieinhetheden). Ditbetekent
dat zonder klimaatbeleid emissies over de tijd dalen. Verder is het voor de eigena-
ren van de brandstof optimaal om over de tijd de totale voorraad op te maken.
Doordat klimaatbeleid van tevoren wordt aangekondigd, zijn er twee perioden
waarin emissies niet beperkt worden door klimaatbeleid. Eerst is er een periode
waarin het beleid wel is aangekondigd maar nog niet wordt uitgevoerd. De tweede
periode is wanneer extractie zonder klimaatbeleid leidt tot minder emissies dan is
toegestaan onder de emissielimiet. Deze tweede periode volgt dus op de periode
waarin emissies gelijk zijn aan de maximaal toegestane hoeveelheid.
Gedurendedeperiodedatdeoverheidklimaatbeleidvoert,mogendeemissiesniet
hoger zijn dan een bepaald niveau. Doordat we kijken naar het geval van slechts
één niet-hernieuwbare hulpbron, betekent dit dat de extractie van deze hulpbron
vast ligt gedurende de periode waarin de restrictie op emissies bindend is (er zijn
geen andere productiefactoren in het model). Indien nu gedurende de periode
waarin emissies vastliggen minder van hun product verkocht kan worden, moeten
de eigenaren van de brandstof meer van hun product verkopen in andere perio-
den om over de tijd nog steeds hun gehele voorraad te verkopen. Ze zullen hun
prijs dus moeten verlagen. De prijs van de brandstof groeit met de rentevoet, om
brandstofeigenaren indifferent te laten zijn tussen het nu verkopen van hun pro-
duct en de opbrengst op de bank zetten enerzijds, en het in de toekomst verkopen
van hun product terwijl nu niks wordt verkocht anderzijds (zie pagina 163). Dit
betekent dat in perioden waarin geen limiet ligt op de emissies van CO2, de prijs
van de brandstof gelijk is aan de prijs op het moment vlak na de aankondiging van
het beleid, gecorrigeerd voor de jaarlijkse prijsstijging ter hoogte van de rentevoet.
Doordat deze prijs lager is dan in het geval er nooit klimaatbeleid zou zijn, en een
lagere prijs betekent dat de vraag hoger is, zijn in beide perioden waarin emissies
niet beperkt worden door klimaatbeleid de emissies hoger in vergelijking met de
situatie waarin nooit sprake zou zijn van klimaatbeleid. Oftewel: het aankondigen
van een limiet op de CO2-uitstoot leidt tot een toename van emissies in de periode
tussen de aankondiging van het beleid en het moment waarop de limiet daadwer-
kelijk wordt afgedwongen. Dit effect treedt niet op in modellen waarin fossiele
brandstoffen niet als niet-hernieuwbare hulpbron zijn gemodelleerd.
Deze toename van CO2-uitstoot in de periode tussen aankondiging en uitvoering
vanklimaatbeleidgaatnatuurlijk lijnrechttegenhetdoelvanklimaatbeleidin. Het
doel is om de concentratie van broeikasgassen in de atmosfeer te stabiliseren. Het
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baar is er dus een afweging tussen het aankondigen van klimaatbeleid om de kos-
ten ervan te verlagen enerzijds, en de effectiviteit van het beleid in termen van de
CO2-concentratie in de atmosfeer anderzijds.
DeelII:Klimaatbeleid,substitutievanproductiefactoren,entechnologischever-
andering
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 van het proefschrift kijken we naar de relatie tussen klimaatbe-
leid, substitutiemogelijkheden, en technologische vooruitgang. Substitutie houdt
in dat meer van een bepaalde productiefactor wordt gebruikt, en minder van een
andere, zonder dat het productieniveau verandert. De substitutie-elasticiteit geeft
aan hoe makkelijk dit kan: hoe hoger de substitutie-elasticiteit, hoe eenvoudiger
het is om minder gebruik te maken van een productiefactor waarvan de kostprijs
is gestegen (bijvoorbeeld door klimaatbeleid). Technologische vooruitgang houdt
in dat meer geproduceerd kan worden bij gelijk gebleven gebruik van productie-
factoren, doordat de productiviteit van één of meer factoren is toegenomen door
nieuwe technologieën.
Hoofdstuk 4: Een nieuwe blik op ’carbon leakage’: unilateraal klimaatbeleid met
gerichte technologische vooruitgang
Wanneer een individueel land, of een groep landen die tezamen niet de gehele
wereld omvat, besluit de emissies van CO2 te verlagen (unilateraal klimaatbeleid),
bestaat het gevaar dat andere landen hun emissies juist verhogen. Wanneer bij-
voorbeeld de vraag naar fossiele brandstoffen in de regio met klimaatbeleid daalt,
kan de wereldprijs van deze brandstoffen ook dalen. Als gevolg hiervan zullen an-
dere landen juist meer fossiele brandstoffen gaan gebruiken. Tegelijkertijd zal de
kostprijs van goederen die veel energie nodig hebben in hun productieproces stij-
genindelandenmetklimaatbeleid,vanwegedeprijsvoorCO2-emissies,waardoor
devraagnaarditsoortgoederenzalverschuivennaardelandenzonderklimaatbe-
leid, omdat zij hun kostprijs niet hoeven te verhogen. Dit leidt tot extra productie
in deze landen, en dus extra emissies. De toename in emissies in deze landen, in
reactie op de emissieverlaging van andere landen, wordt ’carbon leakage’ (letter-
lijk: koolstof lekkage) genoemd. Modellen waarin internationaal klimaatbeleid is
gesimuleerd, suggereren dat 2% tot 41% van de emissiereductie in de landen met
beleid teniet wordt gedaan door de stijging van emissies in andere landen.
In hoofdstuk 4 werpen we een nieuwe blik op carbon leakage, door te kijken naar
derolvantechnologischeveranderingbij unilateraalklimaatbeleid. Klimaatbeleid
zorgt voor een verandering in de (relatieve) prijzen van meer en minder vervuilen-
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naar deze producten verandert. Deze zelfde prijs- en vraagveranderingen hebben
ook invloed op de richting van technologische verandering. Bedrijven in de sector
diezorgtvooronderzoekenontwikkeling(O&O)richtendeontwikkelingvannieu-
we technologieën immers op sectoren waar voor hen de meeste winst te behalen
valt. Indien nu de vraag naar producten van een bepaalde sector daalt, wordt het
voor de O&O bedrijven minder interessant om technologieën te ontwikkelen voor
deze sector.
In dit hoofdstuk kijken we naar twee landen die identiek zijn qua omvang en qua
productietechnologieën. In beide landen bestaat de economie uit drie sectoren.
Twee sectoren produceren intermediaire goederen die gebruikt worden voor de
productie van een consumptiegoed in de derde sector. De twee sectoren voor
intermediaire goederen verschillen in hun energie-intensiteit. Eén van de secto-
ren produceert intermediaire goederen die energie-extensief zijn, en de andere
produceert intermediaire goederen die energie-intensief – en daarmee dus rela-
tief ’vuil’ – zijn. Beide landen zijn ontwikkeld en doen aan O&O, maar slechts één
van de twee landen voert klimaatbeleid (denk bijvoorbeeld aan Europa versus de
Verenigde Staten). Beide landen moeten besluiten hoeveel arbeid (de enige pro-
ductiefactor in het model) ze gebruiken voor de productie van schone producten,
en hoeveel ze gebruiken voor de productie van energie, wat weer gebruikt wordt
voor de productie van energie-intensieve goederen. Om de energie-extensieve en
energie-intensieve intermediaire goederen te produceren wordt arbeid respectie-
velijk energie gecombineerd met machines. Technologische verandering houdt in
datnieuwetypenmachineswordenontwikkeld. Wekijkennaarheteffectvantech-
nologische verandering op emissies van het land zonder klimaat beleid (in reactie
op een emissieverlaging in het andere land) en dan met name naar het geval waar-
in de sector die nieuwe technologiën ontwikkelt kan kiezen of ze dit doen voor de
vervuilende sector of voor de schone sector. Daartoe ontwikkelen we twee varian-
ten van ons model.
In de eerste variant kan de winstmaximaliserende O&O sector wel bepalen hoe-
veel ze investeren in nieuwe technologieën (nieuwe typen machines) in reactie
op prijsveranderingen, maar niet voor welke sector deze technologie is. Dat wil
zeggen, technologische verandering is wel endogeen (wordt bepaald binnen het
model), maar de richting van de technologische verandering is exogeen (ligt vast).
Voor deze variant van het model tonen we aan dat het land zonder klimaatbeleid
inderdaad de emissies verhoogt in reactie op een emissieverlaging in het andere
land. Doordat het land met beleid de emissies verlaagt, wordt de productie van
energie-intensieve goederen in dit land duurder: er kan minder energie gebruikt
worden om aan de emissielimiet te voldoen, dus moeten er meer machines inge-
zet worden om hetzelfde productieniveau te behalen. Omdat dit echter niet opti-
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meer energie en minder machines), zijn de kosten per product echter hoger. In
het andere land is dit niet het geval, en dus wordt het aantrekkelijk om vervuilen-
de goederen uit het andere land te importeren, waardoor de emissies in dat land
toenemen. Echter, de (marginale) productiviteit van productiefactoren daalt naar
mate er meer van wordt gebruikt: als je steeds meer arbeid gebruikt om energie
te produceren stijgt de productie van energie wel, maar neemt de energieproduc-
tie per arbeider af. Hierdoor wordt ook de kostprijs in het andere land hoger. De
productie van energie en energie-intensieve goederen in het land zonder klimaat-
beleid neemt toe, totdat de prijzen voor beide landen weer gelijk zijn: doordat er
vrije handel is tussen de landen, moeten de prijzen uiteindelijk weer gelijk zijn.
Als gevolg hiervan nemen de emissies in het land zonder beleid wel toe, maar met
een kleinere hoeveelheid dan de emissiedaling in het andere land. De wereldwijde
emissiesnemenduswelaf, maarmetminderdandeemissiedalinginhetlandmet
klimaatbeleid, ondanks dat bedrijven in deze variant van het model zelf kunnen
bepalen hoeveel ze investeren in onderzoek en ontwikkeling.
Indetweedevariantvanhetmodelkijkenwenaarhetgevalwaarbijbedrijveninde
sector voor onderzoek en ontwikkeling wél kunnen bepalen voor welke sector (de
schoneofdevervuilende)zenieuwemachinesontwikkelen. Wezijndusmetname
geïnteresseerd in het effect van gerichte technologische verandering - het feit dat
de O&O sector kan bepalen voor welke sector ze nieuwe machines ontwikkelen -
op de emissies van het land zonder klimaatbeleid. Het is voor de O&O sector ener-
zijds aantrekkelijk om nieuwe technologieën te ontwikkelen voor de sector waar
de prijs van het intermediaire goed het hoogst is, maar anderzijds ook om nieuwe
technologieën te ontwikkelen voor de sector die de meeste producten verkoopt.
Klimaatbeleid in een land verlaagt de productie van energie in dat land, waardoor
klimaatbeleid een negatief hoeveelheidseffect op O&O voor de energie-intensieve
sector heeft. Tegelijkertijd leidt een lager aanbod tot een hogere prijs voor pro-
ducten in de vervuilende industrie en dat heeft een positief prijs-effect op O&O
voor deze sector. De vraag is nu welk effect sterker is, en hoe dit doorwerkt in de
emissies van het land zonder klimaatbeleid.
Het effect op technologische verandering en op emissies hangt af van de moge-
lijkheden voor producenten van consumptiegoederen om tussen de twee soorten
intermediaire goederen te substitueren. Dat wil zeggen: hoe makkelijk is het om
minder van het energie-intensieve goed te gebruiken en meer van het schonere,
in reactie op een verandering in de relatieve prijs van de intermediaire goederen,
en toch evenveel van het consumptiegoed te produceren? Indien het relatief mak-
kelijk is om tussen beide goederen te substitueren, zal een prijsverandering door
klimaatbeleid leiden tot een grote vraagverandering in de richting van het schone-
re product. Dit betekent dat het bovengenoemde hoeveelheidseffect groter is dan
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(de goederen zijn immers vrij verhandelbaar tussen de twee landen) nieuwe tech-
nologieën gaat ontwikkelen voor de energie-extensieve, schone, sector. Indien het
daarentegenmoeilijk is om vanheteneintermediairegoed naarhetanderete sub-
stitueren, zal de vraagverandering die volgt op een prijsverandering relatief klein
zijn. In dat geval is het prijseffect groter, en zullen nieuwe technologieën voor de
vervuilende sector ontwikkeld worden.
Hoe deze verandering in technologieniveaus voor de twee sectoren vervolgens van
invloed is op de relatieve productiviteit van arbeid in de schone sector ten opzich-
te van energie in de energie-intensieve sector, hangt eveneens af van de substi-
tutiemogelijkheden. Het netto-effect is dat technologische verandering gericht is
op het vergroten van de relatieve productiviteit van de productiefactor die rela-
tief groter in omvang wordt. In ons geval is dat dus arbeid in de relatief schone
industrie: het land met klimaatbeleid kan minder energie produceren, waardoor
het wereldaanbod van energie daalt, en het relatieve aanbod van arbeid en van
energie-extensieve goederen stijgt. Doordat zowel het relatieve aanbod als de rela-
tieve productiviteit (en dus de beloning voor arbeid in de energie-extensieve sec-
tor) toeneemt, neemt het kostenaandeel van energie in de totale (wereld-)produc-
tiekosten af. Technologische verandering is zodoende ’energie-besparend’.
Doordat de relatieve productiviteit van energie daalt als gevolg van de technologi-
sche verandering (door de stijging in de productiviteit van arbeid in de andere sec-
tor), wordt het voor het land zonder klimaatbeleid minder aantrekkelijk om ener-
gie in te zetten en energie-intensieve goederen te produceren. Het gevolg hiervan
is dat dit land, in vergelijking met de situatie waarin technologische verandering
nietopeenbepaaldesectorgerichtkonworden, minderenergiezalproducerenen
dus minder CO2 zal uitstoten. Dat wil zeggen, doordat de O&O sector haar innova-
ties kan richten op de sector waar deze de meeste winst opleveren, is de mate van
carbonleakageondubbelzinniglager. Inhetspeciﬁekegevalwaarindesubstitutie-
elasticiteit precies gelijk is aan één, wordt de mate van carbon leakage echter niet
beïnvloed door de richting van technologische verandering.
De volgende vraag is: kan de daling in de relatieve productiviteit van energie, door
gerichte technologische verandering, zo groot zijn dat het voor het land zonder
klimaatbeleid aantrekkelijk wordt om de emissies, in reactie op de emissiedaling
in het andere land, ook te verlagen? In dat geval zou sprake zijn van ’negatieve
carbon leakage’: in plaats van een toename in de emissies van het land zonder kli-
maatbeleid,zoudenindatgevaldeemissiesindatlandookdalen. Ofditwelofniet
mogelijk is, hangt af van de mogelijkheden tot substitutie tussen de twee interme-
diairegoederen,welkenauwsamenhangenmetdeprijselasticiteitvanderelatieve
vraag naar energie (ten opzichte van de vraag naar arbeid in de andere sector). Het
blijkt dat als deze prijselasticiteit groot genoeg is (om precies te zijn: groter dan
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lig zal verlagen, door de relatieve daling in de productiviteit van energie als gevolg
van technologische verandering. Een blik op de literatuur waarin prijselasticitei-
ten voor energie worden geschat op basis van data, leert ons dat een waarde groter
dan 2 niet onwaarschijnlijk is.
Wat betekenen deze conclusies voor klimaatbeleid? In de numerieke modellen die
de gevolgen van unilateraal klimaatbeleid (zoals bijvoorbeeld het Kyoto Protocol)
doorrekenen, wordt geen rekening gehouden met het feit dat prijsveranderingen
invloed hebben op innovatie en dus op de richting van technologische verande-
ring. Wij hebben aangetoond dat wanneer deze modellen daar wel rekening mee
zouden houden, deze lagere waarden voor carbon leakage zouden kunnen vinden
dan tot nu toe. Dit kan vervolgens invloed hebben op het politieke debat: één van
de redenen waarom de Verenigde Staten het Kyoto Protocol niet geratiﬁceerd heb-
ben, was de angst dat een emissieverlaging in de VS zal leiden tot een toename
in de emissies in landen buiten het Protocol, zoals bijvoorbeeld China. Wanneer
kwantitatieve modellen die carbon leakage bestuderen rekening houden met en-
dogene, gerichte technologische verandering, vinden zij wellicht dat de mate van
carbon leakage minder groot is dan tot nu toe gedacht.
Hoofdstuk 5: Productiefuncties voor het modelleren van klimaatbeleid: een empiri-
sche analyse
In de recente literatuur rond de effecten van klimaatbeleid speelt technologische
verandering een grote rol. Met behulp van numerieke modellen proberen econo-
men uit te zoeken hoe klimaatbeleid invloed heeft op technologische verandering,
en hoe dit vervolgens weer andere variabelen beïnvloedt. Tot enkele jaren geleden
werd in dit soort modellen de stand van de techniek constant gehouden. Na de
opkomstvandeliteratuuroverendogenetechnologischeveranderingzijnookeco-
nomische modelbouwers voor klimaatbeleid begonnen hun numerieke modellen
aantepassenomtechnologischeveranderingtemodellerenalseenendogeenpro-
ces, dat wil zeggen gericht op winstmaximalisatie en reagerend op prijs- en hoe-
veelheidsveranderingen.
Een probleem in deze literatuur is echter dat de precieze formulering van de pro-
ductiefuncties in deze modellen in het algemeen niet gebaseerd is op empirische
analyses. Een productiefunctie geeft aan hoe de inzet van productiefactoren zoals
arbeid,kapitaalenenergieleidttotdeproductievaneindproducten: hoemakkelijk
ishetommeervandeeneproductiefactortegebruikenenmindervandeanderbij
gelijkblijvend productieniveau, en met hoeveel neemt het productieniveau toe in-
dien de inzet van een productiefactor met x% toeneemt? De productiefuncties van
modellen die klimaatbeleid simuleren bestaan veelal uit functies met constante
substitutie-elasticiteiten (CES - constant elasticity of substitution) met als produc-
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in de numerieke modellen in deze literatuur verschillen in drie dimensies.
Ten eerste verschillen de modellen in de zogenaamde nesting-structuur van de
productiefunctie. Wanneer er drie productiefactoren zijn, kunnen deze op ver-
schillende manieren gecombineerd worden. Kapitaal en arbeid kunnen eerst ge-
combineerd(‘genest’)wordeninéénCESfunctie, omditkapitaal-arbeidaggregaat
daarna te combineren met energie in een nieuwe CES functie. Maar het is ook mo-
gelijk om eerst kapitaal en energie te combineren, en dit aggregaat te combineren
met arbeid in een tweede CES functie. Ten derde is het mogelijk om arbeid en
energie eerst te combineren in één CES functie. Ten slotte kunnen alledrie pro-
ductiefactoren samen in één CES functie gecombineerd worden, in welk geval er
geensprakeisvannesting. Dekeuzevandenesting-structuurisvaninvloedophet
antwoordopdevraaghoemakkelijkmindervandeenefactorgebruikgemaaktkan
worden, en meer van de ander, in reactie op prijsveranderingen.
Ten tweede verschillen de modellen in de hoogte van de gebruikte substitutie-
elasticiteiten, zelfs wanneer ze dezelfde nesting-structuur gebruiken. Een belang-
rijkerolishierbijweggelegdvoordesubstitutie-elasticiteit(dieinhetvorigehoofd-
stuk, in een productiefunctie met andere productiefactoren, ook een belangrijke
rol speelde). Hoe hoger de substitutie-elasticiteit, hoe makkelijker het is om min-
der gebruik te maken van een factor waarvan de prijs is gestegen. En dus ook: hoe
lager de kosten voor de economie zijn als de prijs van energie (bijvoorbeeld als
gevolg van klimaatbeleid) wordt verhoogd.
Ten slotte speelt de manier waarop technologische verandering van invloed is op
de relatieve productiviteit van de drie productiefactoren een grote rol. Zoals in het
vorige hoofdstuk is aangetoond, kan de ‘gerichtheid’ van technologische vooruit-
gang grote invloed hebben op economische uitkomsten (in het vorige hoofdstuk
op de emissies van het land zonder klimaatbeleid). Indien de prijs van een pro-
ductiefactor verandert, willen producenten nieuwe technologieën op dusdanige
wijze inzetten dat de productiviteit van hun productiefactoren zoveel mogelijk toe
neemt. Inhetvorigehoofdstukisaangetoonddatproducentenﬂexibelerzijnwan-
neer zij nieuwe technologieën kunnen richten op een bepaalde sector of produc-
tiefactor: zij kiezen dan immers voor een ander pad van technologische verande-
ring(namelijkgerichtophetvergrotenvanderelatieveproductiviteitvandefactor
die relatief in omvang toe neemt) dan in het geval waarin dit pad vast ligt. In de li-
teratuur over klimaatbeleid verschillen modellen in de mate waarin dit mogelijk
is: in sommige modellen kunnen nieuwe technologieën gericht worden op iedere
productiefactor, in sommige modellen alleen op energie, en in andere modellen
kan alleen het algemene niveau van technologie beïnvloed worden, net als bij de
niet-gerichte technologische verandering in het vorige hoofdstuk.
Een groot probleem van deze literatuur is dat de auteurs hun keuze voor hun pro-
ductiefunctie niet baseren op empirische studies. Met behulp van data over pro-174 CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
ductieniveaus en over het gebruik van kapitaal, arbeid, en energie, en over hun
prijzen, kan bepaald worden hoe de drie productiefactoren samen hangen. In
hoofdstuk 5 van het proefschrift wordt dit voor de eerste keer op systematische
wijze gedaan.
Met behulp van data voor 7 sectoren in 12 OECD landen uit de periode 1978-1996
worden drie stelsels van vergelijkingen geschat, voor iedere nesting structuur één
(eerst kapitaal en arbeid, of eerst kapitaal en energie, of eerst energie en arbeid;
vervolgens kan binnen iedere structuur getest worden of de drie factoren niet net
zo goed alledrie in één CES functie geplaatst kunnen worden). De uitkomsten van
de schattingen geven aan (1) welke nesting-structuur het beste bij de data past;
(2) hoe groot de substitutie-elasticiteiten dienen te zijn volgens de data; (3) of de
technologie-trends van de drie productiefactoren over de tijd verschilden of niet.
Eeneersteconclusieisdatvolgensdedatakapitaaleerstmetarbeidgecombineerd
dient te worden. Echter, uit statistische tests blijkt dat voor diverse sectoren en
diverse landen de drie factoren net zo goed in één CES functie geplaatst kunnen
worden. Als we vervolgens kijken hoe numerieke modellen in de literatuur voor
klimaatbeleid gespeciﬁceerd zijn, dan blijkt dat de meeste modellen ook voor één
van deze twee nesting-structuren gekozen hebben.
Onzetweede conclusie is echterdat de waardendie wij vinden voor de substitutie-
elasticiteit voor kapitaal en arbeid, en die voor de substitutie-elasticiteit voor het
kapitaal-arbeidaggregaatenenergie,signiﬁcantlagerzijndandewaardendiesom-
mige modellen in de literatuur gebruiken. Voor beide elasticiteiten vinden wij
waarden ongeveer tussen 0,2 en 0,6. Statistische tests tonen aan dat een waarde
van één te hoog is. Echter, diverse modellen gebruiken een waarde van één.
Ten derde tonen wij aan dat de technologie-trends voor de drie productiefactoren
sterk verschillen. Dit betekent dat technologische ontwikkeling in werkelijkheid
gericht kan worden op de individuele productiefactoren, zodat de relatieve pro-
ductiviteit van iedere productiefactor gestuurd kan worden. Modellen die hier niet
invoorzien,ofdiealleentoestaandatdeproductiviteitvanenergiekanwordenbe-
ïnvloed door technologische verandering, missen dus een belangrijk verband met
de realiteit.
Wat betekent dit alles voor de uitkomsten van de modellen, wanneer deze de in-
voering van klimaatbeleid simuleren? Ten eerste is het gebruik van een te hoge
substitutie-elasticiteit van invloed op de uitkomsten van het model zonder gerich-
te technologische vooruitgang(het referentiepunt waartegende resultatenvanhet
model met gerichte technologische verandering worden afgezet). Ten tweede leidt
een te hoge substitutie-elasticiteit er toe dat er in het model minder druk is om te
investereninnieuwetechnologieën. Bijeenhogeelasticiteitishetimmerseenvou-
diger om weg te substitueren van de factor waarvan de prijs is gestegen. ModellenSAMENVATTING 175
met een te hoge elasticiteit onderschatten dus de rol van endogene en gerichte
technologische verandering in het bepalen van de kosten van klimaatbeleid.
Ten derde negeren modellen die gebruik maken van een substitutie-elasticiteit die
gelijk is aan één de rol van de richting van technologische verandering. In dat ge-
val is de CES productiefunctie een Cobb-Douglas productiefunctie, waarin factor-
speciﬁeke technologische verandering geen invloed heeft op de relatieve produc-
tiviteit van productiefactoren. Bij een lagere elasticiteit kan technologische veran-
dering speciﬁek gericht worden op bepaalde factoren, en kan een gewenste veran-
dering in de relatieve productiviteit van de factoren wellicht worden bereikt tegen
lagere kosten voor onderzoek en ontwikkeling.
Hoe groot deze effecten van een andere productiestructuur en een lagere substitu-
tie-elasticiteit daadwerkelijk zijn, kan alleen worden gevonden door de modellen
uit de literatuur daadwerkelijk aan te passen en de nieuwe uitkomsten te vergelij-
ken met de oude.